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ABSTRACT
THE NEW NORMAL: FAMILIES, CARETAKERS, AND ADULTS WITH AUTISM

Benjamin DiCicco-Bloom
Dr. Charles L. Bosk
Over the last several decades, the clinical prevalence of autism has increased
considerably, as has the amount of popular and scientific attention directed towards the
condition. However, discussions of autism tend to focus on children and finding a cause
and a cure, while the growing numbers of adults diagnosed with autism have received
relatively little attention. This dissertation begins with the argument that popular
representations of autism are shaped by the idealism of modern medicine, and its
overriding search to discover etiologies and treatments for all forms of biological
difference that fall within its purview. And yet, for those responsible for adults with
autism, management, care, and support are more relevant concerns to everyday
experience than are cause and cure. In order to describe and analyze this everyday
experience, this dissertation features a three-year ethnographic study of thirteen families
with adult members with severe forms of autism. After reviewing pertinent historical and
demographic information, the body of the manuscript explores: 1) the process by which
caretakers negotiate between different definitions of problem behavior in the face of
persistent situational complexity and ambiguity; 2) the contextual dynamics that make it
possible for caretakers to perceive as innocent and/or humorous behaviors that are often
viewed as atypical by others; and 3) the ways in which the experience of continued

	
  
atypicality and dependency comes into conflict with popular representations of autism
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while at the same time highlighting the reality of the ever-looming future and the care
and support required after primary caretakers are gone. At the end of the dissertation, I
return to the argument that modern medical idealism discourages popular recognition
that, in the case of autism, continued atypicality and dependency constitute the
condition’s usual prognosis. I conclude with a short consideration of how the themes
explored in this thesis resonate with the experiences of those living with or alongside
other forms of biological difference (e.g. disability, mental illness, Alzehemier’s) that are
currently incurable.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
Over the last several decades the number of individuals diagnosed with autism, a
neurological disorder associated with impaired social ability and restrictive and repetitive
patterns of behavior, has increased considerably (Fombonne 2003, 2009; Matson and
Kozlowski 2011). Occurring in tandem with the increase in autism prevalence has been a
considerable growth in popular and scientific recognition of and interest in the condition
(Grinker 2007). However, much of the attention on autism has remained focused on
children with the condition while adults with autism have been the focus of relatively
little interest (Stevenson, Harp and Gernsbacher 2011; Baily 2012; Greenfeld 2009a,
2009b, 2009c; Wright et al. 2013). The imbalance between children with autism and
adults with autism remains an issue even though people who qualify for the diagnosis as
children often continue to qualify for the diagnosis throughout adulthood. Drawing on
sociological theory concerning the medical model of difference, it can be argued that one
of the primary reasons discussions of autism have remained focused on youth is that we
continue to speak about autism—both explicitly and implicitly—in ways that suggest that
the most important priority is to figure out what causes it and how to cure it.
There are a variety of ways that we might define and represent autism. For
example, we might characterize it as a form of diversity, a human difference that is best
understood in relation to the environment in which it is situated (Goode 1994; Nadeson
2005; Ortega 2009). Or we might describe those with autism as representing an interest
group looking to secure social recognition and services commensurate with their history

	
  
and location in society. However at present autism is largely characterized as a
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biomedical entity: a condition that is housed in a person’s biology and best measured
through clinical-scientific assessment techniques (Rothstein 2012; Gotham et al. 2008;
also see Mercer 1973). There is much to recommend the biomedical view of autism:
evidence shows that—even if there is no “autism biomarker”1—there are considerable
genetic, neurological, and cognitive differences associated (to varying degrees) with
many individuals with the diagnosis (Frith 2003; Happé 1994; Grandin 2006). Moreover,
the perceptual and interactional differences that accompany autism often create
considerable barriers to typical social integration and can create a wide variety of
negative outcomes for those with the diagnosis (Williams 1992, 1994, 1998; Grandin
1986; Mazurek 2013; Taylor and Seltzer; Shattuck et al. 2012). The medical model is a
potentially effective way to signal the social burdens associated with these differences.
However, viewing autism in this way can also encourage stakeholders to hope for the
kinds of miraculous fixes that often get associated with modern medicine in the popular
imagination.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
A biological marker is an indicator of a biological state: “Biomarkers need to be
measurable, associated with the particular condition and stable or predictable across and
within individuals. Biomarkers can be measured using various biological samples,
including blood, urine or saliva. There is increased interest among researchers in socalled neuromarkers, which are biomarkers based on measures of neurochemicals in the
cerebrospinal fluid, brain structure measured using MRI, and/or brain function” (Walsh et
al. 2011: 605). Biomarkers have several applications including (1) that they can be
viewed as risk factors increasing an individual’s susceptibility for a condition, (2) they
can be used to improve diagnosis and prognostication, and (3) they may be used to
develop personalized treatments and measure treatment outcomes over time (Walsh et al.
2011). A variety of autism biomarkers have been proposed, “but as of yet none has been
validated for clinical use” (Walsh et al. 2011: 605).
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Since the behaviors that are associated with autism show themselves in

childhood, the medical model focuses the attention and resources of stakeholders on
children with the diagnosis, and encourages the pursuit of treatments with the assumption
that “early intervention” can change the course of atypical development and, best case
scenario, will discover methods to “defeat” autism (Eyal et al. 2010; Eyal 2013;
Fitzpatrick 2009: Silverman 2012; Valentine 2010).2 A wide variety of stakeholders
support the medical model of autism to varying degrees in part because it mobilizes hope.
For example, the possibility of finding a cure for autism can be a powerful antidote to
parents and other caretakers concerned about the prospect of life-long atypicality
(Feinstein 2010; Greenfeld 2009a; Greenfeld 2010; Newschaffer and Curran 2003; Offit
2008). Yet there are some considerable costs that attend the mission of finding a cause
and a cure for autism. Among these is the reality that by focusing attention and resources
on science into etiology and treatment, we have diminished awareness of and resources
for the many who continue to have autism throughout their lives (Eyal et al. 2010; Eyal
2013). A review of some of the social and historical changes that have animated modern
medical research and practice will contribute to an understanding of why an increased
focus on etiology and treatment is often associated with a decreased focus on long-term
outcomes.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
In the words of Silverman: “Medical and popular understandings of development both
reflect and promote invisibilities in care and lapses in services. The definition of autism
as a disorder of childhood has had tragic consequences for families of adults with
disabilities who have fallen outside the purview of state-sponsored educational or
therapeutic programs” (2012: 17).
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Autism joins a list of popular social problems that have been the target of

medicalization, a process by which phenomena (which could be defined as moral, social,
or legal) come to be defined and treated as medical conditions. As one of the most
powerful arenas through which the “social problems”3 of the 20th century have been
addressed, the language of medicine has been applied to an increasing variety of
troubling phenomena (Conrad and Schnieder 1992; Zola 1972). This stems directly from
the notable successes of clinical intervention in the first half of the 20th century, and the
attendant increase in public and institutional praise, support, and lobbying for medical
science energized by this success (Starr 1982). One of the effects of medicalization has
been a mania for “specificity,” the idea of a perfect “correspondence between
pathological mechanisms, diagnostic categories, and disease specific-treatments”
(Silverman 2012: 13). However, in a recent article questioning the utopian goals of
biomedical science, Neuman and Bosk (2013) argue that “all scientific research
necessitates some degree of abstraction,” and too often health policy fails to
acknowledge, “that the very acts of categorization and measurement required for research
to proceed also create important rifts between clinical research and clinical reality”
(1177). Thus, it is not surprising, for example, that an increasing number of writers and
public commentators have produced critical analyses of the medicalization of social
problems that consider both the benefits and the costs of applying medical concepts and
language to solving issues like hyperactivity, mental illness, and aging (Mishler 1983;
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3
The social problems tradition analyzes processes of collective definition that shape
problems as worthy of public attention (Blumer 1971; Gusfield 1981; Hilgartner and
Bosk 1988; Eyal 2013).	
  

	
  
Conrad 2007).4 Specific to autism, recent advocates and writers have wondered, “to
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what extent the focus on prevention and treatment means valuing or devaluing lives of
affected individuals” (Rothstein 2012:114-115). However, the potential dark sides of
speaking about autism as a medical entity go beyond undermining “neurodiversity,” an
appreciation of the strengths and talents of those with the condition (Happé and Frith
2010; Kapp et al. 2012; Robertson 2010). Indeed, possibly the most damaging result of
the search for treatment is an attendant lack of recognition and exploration of
“prognosis,” or the long-term trajectory of the behaviors, challenges, and individuals
associated with the diagnosis.
Offsetting modern medicine’s increased focus on etiology, pathology, and
treatment, has been a decreased interest in conceptualizing and exploring prognosis.
Medicine has not always viewed prognosis as unimportant. Indeed, when medicine had
few effective interventions, the focus of most clinicians was precisely on describing the
“natural history” and “long term” outcomes of the disease entities they handled.
However, once effective therapies began to be discovered—for a comparatively
impressive, if not unlimited, array of conditions (e.g. smallpox, tuberculosis, whopping
cough, measles)—the focus of medical knowledge shifted to finding a cause and a cure
for any and all conditions of interest. In an article exploring this evolution, Nicholas
Christakis (1997) uses changes in the conceptualization of lobar pneumonia to document

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4
Of course, both the Internet and the consumerization of medicine have challenged the
authority of clinicians even as it has spread the application of medical language beyond
the bounds of medical institutions (Conrad 2007).

	
  
how this shift in priorities brought about an “ellipsis” or increasing disinterest in
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exploring or even talking about prognosis:
Before the emergence of effective therapy, physicians viewed symptoms
against the ground of “natural history,” which is how they understood
what was happening to the patient. After the emergence of effective
therapy, disease was no longer expected to pursue a “natural” course
(indeed, pursuit of a natural course was viewed unfavorably). The new
ground is that of effective therapy, and symptoms, which indicate that
therapy is not effective, are singled out as particularly problematic [. . .]
Technical advances and discoveries since the turn of the century have held
such promise that society has endowed physicians with the duty and the
privilege to eradicate disease. From the triumphalist perspective, death
connotes failure—not just of the therapeutic armamentarium to achieve its
objective, but also of the physician to fulfill his or her social role (305306, 314).
With his analysis of a popular medical textbook over the course of decades, Christakis
demonstrates how the introduction of antibiotics as a relatively effective treatment for
pneumonia meant that the typical course of the condition was transformed into one where
diagnosis was followed by treatment and cure. Thus, what was once “natural” or
“typical”—that a person with pneumonia would go through a bumpy course of symptoms
before getting better (or perishing)—had now been transformed into what clinicians
described as an “atypical” course (Christakis 1997). Though demonstrated in the case of
lobar pneumonia, the increased focus on etiology and treatment and decreased focus on
natural (i.e. untreatable) course and prognosis describe the changing conceptualization of
many conditions to which the medical model is applied. While Christakis’s (1997) article
considers how the focus of doctor’s has been transformed, research has explored how
others, including patients and caretakers, are also complicit in encouraging research into
cause and cure (Christakis 1999; Conrad 2007; Fitzpatrick 2009; Silverman 2012). This

	
  
includes stakeholders associated with conditions that, like pneumonia, are contagious
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and threaten life, as well as stakeholders that are associated with conditions, like autism,
that are neither contagious, nor deadly, nor generally treatable.
The lack of attention that has been paid to adults with autism is one of the primary
costs of viewing the condition through the concepts and world-view of the modern
medical model. There are several ways in which autism is not like lobar pneumonia. For
one, it is not infectious. Secondly, we do not yet have a clear understanding of its
etiology. Thirdly, autism is not life threatening. And finally, there are no generally
accepted therapeutic options that actually cure autism. Christakis (1997) hypothesizes in
his article that “we would expect that when therapeutic options are substantial, prognosis
would be relatively neglected—in large part because the prognosis would be assumed”
(301). However, it seems that in the case of autism, the lack of therapeutic options that
actually cure autism has not accrued in an increased focus on prognosis. Rather, despite
the reality that most children with autism grow up into adults with autism, a majority of
the discussions around the diagnosis are still focused on the etiology, pathology, and
treatment of children with the condition. While the value that modern medicine places on
etiology and treatment makes more sense when applied to those conditions that are life
threatening and for which effective treatment is available, an overwhelming focus on
cause and cure has some particularly troubling consequences when applied to conditions
like autism that are generally neither treatable nor deadly. Reframing Christakis’
summation that “death connotes failure,” it would appear in the case of autism that failure
(to cure) has been translated into a form of (social) death. In other words, it is not that

	
  
adults with autism do not exist; indeed, they exist in sizeable numbers. Rather, it is a
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property of the knowledge that we have created about autism, the goals and assumptions
that undergird our understanding of autism, that drives the sense that adults with autism
do not exist or are not important. It is for this reason that this dissertation uses
ethnography, a form of data collection well suited to exploring phenomena and
experiences that are invisible because of the way in which those phenomena are
popularly conceptualized in the public sphere.
In order to understand autism in a way that begins to describe the social reality of
adults with the diagnosis, this dissertation will employ ethnographic methods to explore
the continued atypicality and dependency that are associated with many individuals with
the condition as they age. Using the medical model to talk about autism has meant that
we have understood autism as a biological condition that children have. At the same time,
it has meant downplaying the social elements of the condition and the reality that most
people with autism are adults (Bishop-Fitzpatrick, Minshew and Eack 2013).
Ethnography is a method that relies on interviews, participant observation, and forms of
social emersion over an extended period of time in order to record and analyze the
meanings that people assign to their experience. It is suited to gaining purchase on a
variety of phenomena that may, for various reasons, elude other forms of data collection
and analysis. One of the primary characteristics shared by questions that are best
addressed through ethnographic investigation are those related to topics that are, for
various reasons, “hidden in the foundations of the social world” (Katz 2012: 272; Katz
1997). Because autism has been described as a condition of childhood—a biological
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entity that should be understood through etiology, pathology, and treatment—we have
collected relatively little data about those with the condition that live into adulthood, and
particularly little about their social (as opposed to biological) reality.
Another group of phenomena that are well suited to ethnography are those that—
because of their particular characteristics—represent with “special clarity phenomena that
exist widely but in diluted form elsewhere” (Katz 2012: 259; Durkheim 1982). Since
popular discussions around autism tend to explicitly and implicitly direct focus towards
the potential for treatment and cure, recognition and discussion of the reality of continued
atypicality and dependency for many adults with the condition, particularly those with
severe autism, are implicitly discouraged. While the specific characteristics that qualify
an individual for a diagnosis of autism have considerable differences from other
developmental disabilities, physical disabilities, and chronic illnesses, the reality that
many such conditions are difficult to cure means that atypicality and dependency
represent important components of the lived reality of those conditions as well. An
ethnographic investigation of autism in adulthood presents the possibility of
understanding the disservice rendered by the assumptions of the medical model when
applied to conditions that elude treatment. Put differently, “ethnography can help to map
out the differences between what health policy asks of clinical research and what such
research is actually equipped to provide” (Neuman and Bosk 2013: 1177). Though
Neuman and Bosk (2013) addressed this comment to the expectations placed on clinical
trials and effectiveness studies, it is possible to extend their insights to the many
conditions whose nature and reality have the potential to be misrepresented by the
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dissertation is specific to a variety of individuals caring for adults with severe autism, the
themes explored have relevance to other medicalized conditions for which magic bullets
have remained elusive and the social mechanisms of care, management, and support are
paramount.
In order to explore the symbolic and social reality of severe autism and the
prognosis of atypicality and dependency with which it is often associated, this
dissertation focuses on those responsible and caring for adults whom are diagnosed with
significant forms of the condition. At its core, this dissertation follows thirteen families
caring for individuals with severe autism. As defined in this study and more generally,
“significant” and “severe” translates into having or qualifying for a diagnosis of
intellectual disability (a comorbidity, in the language of medicine) alongside autism. This
population often requires more substantial support than individuals with higher
functioning forms of autism (e.g. Asperger’s Syndrome) whose atypicality has been
increasingly associated with the successes of silicon valley or the erratic behavior of
famous artists, writers, and thinkers (Silberman 2001; Fitzgerald 2006). Unless otherwise
stated, when I use the term autism in this dissertation I am referring to those with more
severe forms of autism. Recent critiques of the study of autism have described the way in
which those texts that do focus on the social reality of the condition tend to derive their
perspective from the voices and concerns of those connected to but who do not have the
diagnosis (Murray 2008). While this might be partially ameliorated by speaking to
individuals with higher functioning forms of autism, the issue faced when trying to
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measure the social reality of those with more severe autism is that the impairments and
behaviors associated with their condition undermine their ability to produce the
interpretive descriptions of experience that are an important component of ethnographic
findings. Though one might gain information about the social reality of those with
significant autism by interacting with them in others ways—which I do—the value placed
on meaning in ethnographic methods, and qualitative sociology more broadly, is often
intimately linked to individuals speaking about their experience. The goal of this study is
to understand the social reality of autism in adulthood, and what continuing atypicality
and dependency mean to those responsible and caring for adults with autism. In order to
achieve this, this dissertation analyzes the experienced of families and other caretakers as
they live with, manage the behavior of, and care and support adults with severe autism.
The main questions that this study seeks to address include: what does the behavior of
adults with autism look like in the social settings in which they are located? What does
the everyday life of families and other caretakers of adults with autism look like? How do
caretakers interpret and respond to the atypicality of adults with autism? How do they
interpret and respond to the dependency of adults with autism? The rest of the
dissertation is organized into five chapters as follows.
In Chapter 2, I describe the early history and formalization of autism, the social
processes that have contributed to the increasing number of children diagnosed with the
condition, and a review of the small but growing literature on adults with autism. Though
this is a dissertation in sociology, much of the study of autism has been in disciplines like
psychiatry, epidemiology, and neurology, and in the literature review I draw on work
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from these and other fields. This chapter is not meant to provide an exhaustive review
of the massive literature on autism, but rather to provide targeted information in which to
place recent descriptions of the “crisis of autism in adulthood” into a historical (and less
hysterical) context. The literature review suggests that the challenges faced by families
with adults with autism have a long history. It also suggests that the limitations of
contemporary discourse around autism make it important to explore the atypicality and
dependency associated with the condition in the context of the social milieu in which it is
embedded. In so doing, I hope to uncover and rediscover those parts of the experience
that do not accord with the concepts and language that often attach themselves to modern
medicine and the conditions that fall into its purview. I then go on to describe the study
participants, the methods I used to collect and analyze my data, and some other notes
about the logic and structure of the dissertation.
In Chapter 3, I describe and analyze how caretakers interpret and respond to
problem or “maladaptive” behaviors in adults with autism. As an individual with autism
ages into adolescence and early adulthood, maladaptive behavior—including aggression,
self-injury, and other forms of socially inappropriate actions—can become an
increasingly difficult problem. Though such behaviors are not unknown in childhood, the
physical maturing of an individual with autism only makes these behaviors more
dangerous and challenging to manage by those caring for them. Drawing on the
sociological literature of deviance, medicalization, social problems, framing, and
symbolic interactionism, this chapter seeks to understand the process by which caretakers
frame (define), interpret (explain), and socially control (respond to) the maladaptive
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frames of deviance (sickness, badness, handicap) evidenced in both popular and historical
cases of deviance, application of these different frames in everyday life must contend
with the complexity and opposing definitions that are available in naturalistic situations.
In order to theoretically account for the tensions and negotiations that characterize this
process, I employ concepts from both Goffmanian structuralism (with its focus on
frames, or popular definitions of deviance) with those of symbolic interactionism (with
its focus on situations, and the context of meaning). In so doing, I contribute to
sociological theory by exploring how the seemingly oppositional conceptions of social
interaction put forth by Goffman and Symbolic Interactionists can and do coexist in
everyday life. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the causal narratives and
metaphors applied by both professionals and laypeople to various forms of atypicality are
always open to challenge by the often-unremitting complexity and ambiguity that lurk
under the surface of all social interaction.
In Chapter 4, I explore one of the more positive findings in this study of
individuals caring for adults with autism. Many have complained about popular
descriptions that suggest that autism, and those who have the diagnosis, constitute a
tragedy. While it is true that some elements of the experience of caretakers of adults with
autism are best characterized as a form of chronic sorrow (grief linked to a “living loss”),
these elements often exist side by side with elements of the experience of caretaking that
were defined as very positive. Two such elements that found expression in many of the
relationships I observed were the experience of innocence and humor that characterized
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caretaker’s interactions with adults with autism. Drawing on sociological theory from
the study of humor, adolescent development, childhood, and social interaction, I explore
the social dynamics that allowed for the atypicality and dependency of adults with autism
to be experienced as innocent and humorous. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the reality that, despite critiques of those who have romanticized autism, caretakers who
experience the brunt of the challenges associated with the condition often themselves
describe positive experiences that derive from what some might view as a “tragedy” or a
“living loss.”
In chapter 5 I explore in more depth the ways in which the empirical reality of
caring for adults with autism stands in opposition with the fundamental assumptions that
undergird the medical language and images associated with popular representations of the
condition. As explored in this introduction, the language of the medical model pervades
the way that we talk about autism. However, the “clinical view,” as some theorists
describe the lens through which atypicality is understand and addressed medically, tends
to get applied to two very different kinds of abnormality. The first, pathological
abnormality, describes conditions that actually threaten the fundamental operation of an
organism. The second, statistical abnormality, describe conditions which, though they are
sometimes linked to varying degrees of dependency and atypicality, are not life
threatening. The issue with describing both of these with the clinical view or the language
of medicine (e.g. symptoms, etiology, pathology, treatment) is that we can begin to think
about conditions best described as statistical as if they were actually pathological. This
chapter explores how the experience of caretakers of adults with autism challenges the
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the public sphere. This includes suggestions (literal and metaphorical) that individuals
with autism do not continue to exist and grow. It also includes suggestions that when an
individual with autism does show improvement, it is akin to a cure for autism as opposed
to something less miraculous, more gradual, and considerably uneven.
In the second half of Chapter 5 I draw on sociological theory concerning the
process by which people anticipate the future in order to explore the ways in which
responses to continue atypicality and dependency shape the experience of caretakers of
adults with autism. The first half of Chapter 5 demonstrates that in contrast to popular
representations of autism, individuals with the diagnosis continue to survive and develop
(albeit in the context of atypicality and dependency). This reality means that while
growth and development are an important part of the experience of those with autism and
their caretakers, planning for future support needs is an ever present challenge hanging
over those associated with the individual with the condition. In order to explore the ways
in which caretakers conceptualize and respond to this challenge, I look to see how their
actions vis-à-vis the future unfold on multiple levels or modes of future coordination. I
find that the ambivalence and complexity that surround a problem that many argue lacks
an entirely satisfying solution can be viewed in the ways in which actions coordinated to
different modes of the future seem to come into subtle or explicit conflict with one
another. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how the use of pathological language
in the case of other forms of non-lethal (or non-acute) abnormality (e.g. mental illness)
continues to discourage recognition of important realities. Though the focus on cause and
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with non-curable statistical abnormality the language of pathology discourages
recognition and discussion of the importance and challenges of securing management,
support, and care in the future.
In Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation by returning to a discussion of the ways
in which the orientation of modern medicine does a disservice to the lived experience of
caretakers of adults with autism and individuals with other forms of significant
atypicality and dependency. The triumphs of modern medicine have encouraged viewing
clinical conditions as ontological entities in which etiological and pathological
mechanisms, diagnostic categories, and disease specific-treatments clearly correspond.
This evolution is in keeping with the successes and optimism of 20th century healthcare,
and the continued suppression or “ellipsis” of outcomes that do not conform to preferred
ends. However, given important demographic (aging population) and epidemiological
(the “transition” to chronic illness) changes, the focus on etiology, pathology, and
treatment threatens to push the rhetoric surrounding medicalized abnormalities
increasingly out-of-sync with the experiences and needs of those dealing with these
conditions in everyday life. We are unable to cure a variety of entities—everything from
developmental disabilities to “transmuted” diseases—and yet these conditions place great
demands on lay and professional caretakers as those with the diagnoses continue to live
albeit atypical and dependent.
I suggest that the other conception of medical entities—the physiological view,
which focuses on individual level variation and social context—pushes us to look at the
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lived experience of such conditions in order to discover understandings and goals that
are more in line with the management, car, and support that benefit individuals with these
conditions. Since ethnography is highly suited to exploring individual complexity and
social contexts, the chapters of this dissertation suggest new concepts and language that
potentially provide access to the lived reality of an increasing number of chronic
conditions. Genuine representations of the lived reality of these conditions are continually
threatened by the progressivism of modern medicine and American culture. I end with a
review of each chapter along with extended quotes from a variety of texts that resonate
with my findings. This allows for an understanding of how the contours of the lived
reality of autism in adulthood might provide important insights into other, increasingly
common, ways of being in the world.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW & METHODS

AUTISM: ITS BIRTH AND EVOLUTION
Like so many other pivotal moments in the history of autism, the story of the diagnosis
begins with an interaction between a child, his family, and a professional. Donald had
been difficult as a young boy: physically awkward, often withdrawn and unresponsive,
and apparently uninterested in human beings. One set of behaviors that stood out were his
obsessions, including a “mania for spinning blocks and pans and other round objects”
(Donvan and Zucker 2010). From the age of three, his refusal to feed himself, along with
other behavioral issues, prompted his doctor to recommend that he be placed in an
institutional setting. In accordance with this suggestion, Donald’s parents—Mary and
Oliver Triplett—placed their son into a state run sanatorium located about 50 miles from
their home. Since the sanatorium’s primary purpose was to isolate youth thought to be at
risk for catching tuberculosis, the staff had little idea how to deal with a child like Donald
who was thought to be—even by his own mother—severely mentally ill. For a while he
did poorly at the sanatorium, withdrawing further into himself, sitting “motionless,
paying no attention to anything” (Donvan and Zucker 2010). However, after some time,
he did improve, and began playing alongside, though not with, other children, eating
more regularly, and regaining his physical health.
Despite evidence that he was getting used to life at the institution, Donald’s
parents decided in August 1938 to get him out and take him back home (Donvan and
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Zucker 2010). While institutionalization was the default option for all kinds of atypical
children at the time, the Triplett’s were determined to get a more targeted form of
assistance for their son. Though he had become acclimatized to life in his new home,
Donald’s diagnosis had remained unclear. The director, who tried to convince the
Triplett’s to leave their son in the institution, could come up with nothing better than
“some glandular problem” to account for his atypical behavior (Donvan and Zucker
2010). However, someone specializing in psychiatry at the time would most likely have
diagnosed Donald with schizophrenia or feeblemindedness (Trent 1994; Grob 1994;
Shorter 1997; Eyal et al. 2010).
‘Feeblemindedness,’ now a woefully outdated term, was primarily a label for
individuals who would today be described as intellectually disabled (Trent 1994).
However, a diagnosis of feeblemindedness was also sometimes given to individuals who
had IQs greater than seventy, but were for other reasons deemed unfit to live in the
community (Trent 1994). Then again, it is likely that some specialists at the time would
argue that though Donald was “oddly distant, uninterested in conversation, and awkward
in his movements,” he had enough striking skills—“flawless ability to name musical
notes as they were played on a piano” and “a genius for multiplying numbers in his
head,”—that the diagnostic criteria for childhood schizophrenia were a better fit to his
condition (Donvan and Zucker 2010; Eyal et al. 2010). Though psychiatrists rarely
diagnose schizophrenia in childhood today, back then childhood schizophrenia was a
broad and widely used label applied to a variety of youth (Eyal et al. 2010). However,
getting a relatively sophisticated diagnosis for Donald relied on attaining access to an
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individual who had some degree of specialized psychiatric knowledge, and for this the
Tripletts would need to travel. Given their resources—Mary came from a wealthy family
of financiers, and Oliver was a successful lawyer—they decided to get the best
professional help available, and scheduled Donald to see a famous specialist working on
the east coast.
In October 1938, Mary, Oliver, and Donald boarded a train for Baltimore in order
to go see Leo Kanner5, an Austrian doctor working at the Johns Hopkins University
Hospital, author of the first English-language textbook on child psychiatry, and widely
regarded as “the world’s foremost expert on childhood emotional development”
(Mnookin 2011: 76). Before their trip to Baltimore, Oliver—a high-strung individual,
known by those close to him for his moods, intensity, and several nervous breakdowns—
spent a period of time writing a detailed letter describing his son’s medical and
psychological history (Donvan and Zucker 2010). When he had finished the letter, Oliver
sent it to Kanner in preparation for their visit (Donvan and Zucker 2010). Though Kanner
remarked several times on the “obsessive detail of the letter,” its contents offered “the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5
Kanner first became known for his research on the mentally retarded. Despite the focus
on etiology and treatment that has come to shape our understanding of autism, Kanner’s
early engagement with developmental disabilities was very much focused on long term
outcomes: “Long before his work in autism, he demonstrated profound concern for
mentally retarded children at a time when most psychiatrists excluded them from clinics.
Significantly, in the 1930s, he undertook a follow-up study of 166 patients who had been
released from Maryland state training schools for the retarded via habeas corpus writs
secured by lawyers over the previous two decades [. . .] The vast majority, he discovered,
had worked as domestic servants before being dismissed as inadequate to the task and
ending up in city slums. When Kanner revealed the truth of what was happening in 1938,
his paper received massive media coverage leading to action to end the practice of
lawyers being able to obtain the release of the mentally retarded into the community”
(Feinstein 2010: 23).
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first detailed listing of symptoms that are now almost instantly recognizable to anyone
who knows autism” (Donvan and Zucker 2010). 6 Soon after the Tripletts visited him,
Kanner became conscious of several other children whose unique constellation of
behaviors had notable enough similarities to Donald’s that he came to believe they
constituted a concrete (i.e. categorical) diagnostic entity (Silverman 2012).7 In 1943,
Kanner wrote about eleven such cases that he argued represented an up until then
unidentified condition in his now classic paper entitled “Autistic Disturbances of
Affective Contact” (Kanner 1943).
Autism8 was first scientifically described as a standalone diagnosis in 1943, with
the main features of the condition including an “extreme aloneness from the very
beginning of life” and an intense desire for the “preservation” of “sameness” (Kanner
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6
Indeed letters and descriptions created by parents like Oliver constituted data and
insights that were fundamental to professional understanding about autism. Without the
dedication and work of parents—and not just basic information, but complex intellectual
analysis—autism would not have been identified and described as it is today. One activist
spoke of Kanner’s observations about autism parent’s and their obsessiveness as follows:
“when he is struck by the same phenomenon and writes thirty-three pages of detailed
description of these children’s unusual behavior based on those mothers’ notes and good
recall, he is called ‘the father of autism’ and hailed as a gifted observer, which, of course,
he was” (Sullivan 1984: 239). It is also important to note that, though he later apologized
for it, Kanner did express the belief early on (in the Freudian fashion of the day) that
parent behavior (e.g. aloofness) might be responsible for a child’s autism (Silverman
2012; Dolnick 1998).	
  
7
However, at first Kanner wondered whether it was childhood schizophrenia, as a journal
entry after his first meeting with Donald posed the question: “schizophrenia?” (Donvan
and Zucker 2010).
8
The term autism—derived from the Greek word autos, which translates as “self”—can
be traced back to the Swiss Psychiatrist Eugene Bleuler. In 1911, Bleuler changed the
definition of the popular diagnosis dementia praecox (first described by Emil Kraepelin)
and renamed it Schizophrenia (Noll 2011). Listed among the compound symptoms that
Bleuler described as definitive of Schizophrenia was “autism”: the “detaching” of
“oneself from outer reality along with a relative or absolute predominance of inner life”
(Bleuler 1911: 304).
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1943: 248, 249). Kanner believed that there were five primary features (i.e. diagnostic
criteria) that linked Donald (to whose story I will return to later) with the other ten
children he wrote about in his paper: 1) “a profound lack of affective contact with other
people”; 2) an “obsessive desire for the preservation of sameness in the child’s routines
and environment”; 3) “a fascination with objects, which are handled with skill in fine
motor movements”9; 4) “mutism or a kind of language that does not seem intended for
interpersonal communication”; and 5) “good cognitive potential shown in feats of
memory or skills on performance tests”10 (Feinstein 2010: 24; Kanner 1943). He ruled
out feeblemindedness because of what he argued were significant signs of intelligence,
and he ruled out schizophrenia because the condition was apparent from the earliest of
days (Kanner 1943). Kanner believed that these five features could be used to
differentiate autism from other childhood disorders.
Despite these commonalities, there was an impressive array of diversity in the
children that Kanner wrote about. Indeed, one colleague argued that it was a credit to
Kanner’s prodigious memory that he was able to “sort out the commonalities” of children
that he had seen over the course of years “given the disparities in these kids” (Feinstein
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9
This is just one of the criteria that has been broadened, as many individuals who are
diagnosed with autism today struggle with fine motor movements (Volkmar and Wiesner
2009).
10
This is another of the criteria that has been broadened, since many individuals with
more profound, measured intellectual disability have been diagnosed with autism. Of
course, there are complications that many have argued call into question Kanner’s
original assumptions about how intelligence manifests. For example, “sometimes a child
with autism may have average or above-average abilities when it comes to tasks that are
nonverbal, whereas the same child’s ability with verbal tasks can be very significantly
delayed” (Volkmar and Wiesner 2009: 5). Suffice it to say that the pattern of cognitive
performance in autism tends to be unusual and complicated.
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autism’s specificity and application to only those cases that clearly fit his definition (Eyal
et al. 2010). He argued that autism was a rare condition, and was so upset when the
diagnosis began to catch on with psychiatrists (during what one group of authors
described as “the first autism epidemic” of “1951-1959”) that he wrote: “almost
overnight [. . .] the country seems to be populated by a multitude of autistic children, and
somehow this trend became noticeable overseas as well” (Kanner 1965: 414; c.f. Eyal et
al. 2010: 129).11 Though this trend passed by 1965 (as the “fashion” moved on to the
“brain-injured” child [Eyal et al. 2010: 129]), changes made to the definition and
conceptualization of autism in the 1970s allowed for it to be applied to a much more
heterogeneous group of individuals than those first described by Kanner’s “classic
autism.”
Since Leo Kanner first introduced the idea of autism to English speakers, the
condition’s formal and applied definition has changed from one used to describe those
with a relatively specific behavioral profile to a label applied to a wide variety of
individuals with behaviors that fall within three broad domains. 12 Kanner’s

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
11
Kanner goes on to say, “It became habit to dilute the original concept of infantile
autism by diagnosing it in many disparate conditions which show one or another isolated
symptoms found as a part feature of the overall syndrome” (Kanner 1965L 414; c.f. Eyal
et al. 2010: 129). It is likely that Kanner was worried that autism might go the way of
Childhood Schizophrenia, which he described at the time as a “pseudo-diagnostic waste
basket into which an assortment of heterogeneous conditions were thrown
indiscriminately,” including “infantile autism” along with “everything else” (Kanner
1965: 417; c.f. Eyal et al. 2010: 128).
12
Not everything has changed. Even from the earliest of days, finding a cause and a cure
was central to autism’s conceptualization: “Kanner’s ultimate goal was to use his
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Lorna Wing and Judith Gould (1979) who argued that autism was not a specific and rare
disorder, but rather a “spectrum” of impairments that fall within three broad categories:
1) issues with social interaction and 2) social communication, and 3) repetitive and
stereotyped behaviors. Wing and Gould started out wanting to show support for Kanner’s
restrictive criteria, but they found that the idea of a neat barrier between Kanner’s autism
and other forms was “rubbish” (Feinstein 2010: 151). Though the term autism was
present in the official diagnostic document of the American Psychiatric Association from
the time it was first published in 1952, the changing definition of the term in successive
versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM, often
described as the “Bible” of Psychiatry [Shorter 1997]) is a good reflection of the complex
evolution of the diagnosis in the professional and public conscience.
When DSM-I was published in 1952, the concept of autism was still formally
defined and viewed by many in the world of psychiatry (despite the protestations of
Kanner and others) as a behavioral feature (dream-like thinking, withdrawal into oneself)
of schizophrenia as opposed to a unique categorical diagnosis (APA 1952: 28; Rimland
1964). Changes over the course of successive versions were considerable. For example,
in 1980 the DSM-III assigned autism its own diagnostic category, and by 1987 the “triad
of impairments”—based on Wing and Gould’s work—was incorporated into the manual
(APA 1980; APA 1987). DSM-III also placed autism (along with several other related
sub-conditions) under the mantel of Pervasive Developmental Disorders (APA 1980).
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
classification as a tool to develop more effective treatments—but before he could do that,
he had to determine the disorder’s root causes” (Mnookin 2011: 76).	
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1980s to requiring only six out of twelve criteria symptoms in more recent editions (APA
2000). One startling fact (cited as a “remarkable example of the arbitrary nature of
diagnostic requirements”) is that a typo in the DSM-IV published in 1994 created much
less restrictive criteria when an “or” was typed instead of an “and”; one study found that
under the mistaken guidelines, four times the number of children could have qualified for
a PDD than was originally intended (Mnookin 2011: 83; Kirk and Kutchins 1992). The
DSM-IV-TR, the edition that was in use when I began this study, defined autism as
qualitative impairments in social interaction and communication, and restrictive,
repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities (APA 2000). It
featured multiple sub-types of autism (all placed under the larger heading of pervasive
developmental disorders), including Autistic Disorder, Pervasive Developmental
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and Asperger Syndrome (generally Autistic Disorder
is applied to the most impaired, and Asperger Syndrome to the least; in the DSM
definition, Asperger Syndrome does not include the impairment in communication).13
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With the release of the DSM-5 in 2013, big changes have come again to the formal
definition of autism: changes from the DSM-IV diagnosis include “shifting from a
multicategorical model to a single diagnostic category of autism spectrum disorder
(ASD), replacing the three-domain model with a two-domain model, relaxing the criteria
for age at onset, and adding symptoms not previously included in DSM-IV, such as
sensory interests and aversions” (Huerta et al. 2012: 1056). In other words, gone are the
autism subtypes (e.g. Autistic Disorder), replaced with a severity scale (“requiring very
substantial support,” “requiring substantial support,” “requiring support”), and social
interaction and communication have been collapsed into one domain (“persistent deficits
in social communication and social interaction”) (APA 2013). According to David S.
Mandell (in-person conversation), scraping the autism subtypes (which were invalid, as
too many people switched between them over the course of development [or between one
doctor visit and another]) is a sign that the science of autism diagnosis has failed.
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Despite what can easily be viewed as a dry and technical history of psychiatric

nosology, the changes to autism in the DSM clearly demonstrate just how much the
formal conceptualization of the condition has changed over time. From DSM-I to DSM5, autism has gone from being described as a manifestation of schizophrenia to a category
by which to label a wide variety of individuals sharing a broad spectrum of loosely
related impairments. This evolution convincingly suggests that one of the main factors
behind the increasing diagnosis of autism is its changing definition. And the broadening
of diagnostic criteria and other changes to the formal definition of autism are indeed
some of the main factors cited by epidemiologists as responsible for the increase in
prevalence (Croen et al. 2002). However despite these arguments, a good deal of the
focus on autism over the course of the last decade, and continuing today, remains on why
there has been such a sudden increase (Grinker 2007). Some of this focus is driven by the
reality that changes to dry technical minutia are a poor match for what appears as, feels
like, and is often described as a transformation of epidemic proportions.
And in indeed, changes in definition are not the only thing that explains the
increase. One study argues that important preconditions include the deinstitutionalization
of children, the return of a population of atypical youth to their homes and school
districts, the sudden search on the part of parents for education and other services in the
community (as opposed to the old answer of institutionalization, or children hidden from
public view), and networks of collaboration, communication, and expertise between
caretakers and other, often marginal, professionals (Eyal et al. 2010; Eyal 2013). These
details are beyond the scope of this literature review. However, given that autism has

	
  
come to shape the way we define the needs of a large and heterogeneous group of
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atypical youth, it is useful to delve deeper into the other main drivers of diagnostic
change cited by epidemiologists: “diagnostic switching from other” disorders to autism,
“service availability,” and “awareness of autism spectrum disorders” in both the “lay and
professional public” (Elsabbagh et al. 2012: 160).

HOW DIAGNOSTIC CHANGE HAPPENS
Autism is a diagnosis that is increasingly applied to individuals who exhibit behaviors
that can be characterized as impairments in social interaction and social communication
along with repetitive and stereotyped actions and routines. Research shows that though
these behaviors tend to co-occur in the population, there is no biomarker for autism—no
independent quantitative test against which we can determine whether or not the
behaviors being observed belong to an easily identifiable, autonomous biological
phenomenon (Happé 1994). Moreover, evidence suggests that these behaviors are linked
to a variety of underlying biological processes, a finding that has led many researchers to
claim that there are many “autisms” (Coleman and Gillberg 2012; Bentancur 2011).
Thus, while the behaviors the diagnosis describes are real, the determination to label such
behaviors as representative of autism is a decision made by a clinician using diagnostic
instruments14 which report on observed actions and questions about patient and family
history (Johnson and Myers 2007; Rossi 2012; Pinto-Martin et al. 2008; Lord et al.
2011). To understand how the changing official definition of autism, along with more
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14	
  Usually using the DSM, but sometimes with more sensitive tools like the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) or the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI).

	
  
awareness and services, has driven an increase in diagnosing individuals exhibiting
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atypical behavior as autistic, a specific case (maybe best described as a thought
experiment) will prove informative.
In the mid-1970s, David Goode (1994) spent time with several children with
congenital rubella, a condition that had rendered them deaf, blind, “profoundly mentally
retarded” and without any formal language (7). Goode got to know one of these girls,
Bianca, over the course of 200 hours of observation and interaction with her and her
family in their home (Goode 1994). One of Goode’s interests was to document how the
physical and social environment of the family home created opportunities for Bianca’s
caretakers to communicate with her in ways that could only be perceived and
documented by those embedded in the situation (Goode 1994; Bogdan and Taylor 1989;
Gubrium 1986; Pollner and Goode 1990; Pollner and McDonald-Wikler 1985). For
example, while an apparently random lift of the hand might seem like just another
“symptom” to an outsider, when performed at 10am in the morning at the breakfast table
Bianca’s mother knew that her daughter was asking for the milk that she always received
at that time (Goode 1994). Goode concluded that “routine constituted so great a
communicational resource for the family that in order to understand many of Bianca’s
gestures and actions, one already had to be familiar with the routine” (Goode 1994: 68).
Goode’s study provided me with thoughtful material and a clear endorsement of the
importance of spending extended time with families in their homes. However, his study
also serves, though possibly unbeknownst to the author, as a potential case study of an
individual who might today be diagnosed with autism.
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Though Bianca was diagnosed with congenital rubella back in the 1970s, it is

quite possible that today she would be diagnosed with autism. In some cases, congenital
rubella gives rise to issues with social interaction, communication, and can lead to
repetitive and stereotyped behaviors. Though scientists know that a fetus contracts
congenital rubella when the mother gets the rubella virus in the third trimester, the reality
that some cases qualify for the criteria of autism allows for the possibility of diagnosis
(though, technically, a doctor should rule out autism since the behavior is attributable to
another neurological condition). If a doctor saw Bianca today and were to think ‘this
looks like autism,’ even if he knew that it had been caused by rubella, he might still
decide to give her a diagnosis of autism. Why? Well for one thing, he has heard of autism
(awareness). Also, “part of the reason [children are classified as autistic] is that clinicians
are more likely to give a child a diagnosis that he or she thinks will help the child receive
the best services or school placement than a diagnosis that conforms to the DSM but will
not facilitate the best form of intervention” (Grinker 2007: 141; Shattuck and Grosse
2007; Mandell and Palmer 2005; Palmer et al. 2005). Moreover, even if a clinician was
hesitant, parents might push for a diagnosis of autism because it is more common, less
stigmatized, and might suggest a better outcome (Grinker 2007; Eyal et al. 2010; Johnson
and Myers 2007). Or, and this is another important distinction, an educational institution
(as administrative records are one of the sources for data for epidemiological studies)
might place a child in the autism category for the sake of services even though a clinician
might prefer another diagnosis (though recent surveillance research suggests that the

	
  
majority of children placed in the special education autism category do meet case
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criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder) (Shattuck 2006).
Given these changes, Bianca, from Goode’s study, might today have been
diagnosed as having autism, and she would have been counted as one among the many
children whose diagnoses aggregated together have led to the increasing prevalence and
awareness around the disorder. That congenital rubella is a potential cause of the
behaviors associated with autism is not a new revelation. Indeed, in (1971) Stella Chess
published a paper showing that some children from the U.S. Rubella epidemic of 1964
did qualify for a diagnosis of autism (and this was based on the much more specific
diagnostic criteria of the 70s). The process of giving one diagnosis over another is called
diagnostic substitution, and its effects on the number of people who are now diagnosed
with autism are profound.
Congenital Rubella is a small part of the increases in autism linked to diagnostic
substitution (Wing and Potter 2002). Cases making up the largest part of the increase are,
on the more impaired end of the spectrum, individuals who would once have been
diagnosed as intellectually disabled/mentally retarded15 (King and Bearman 2009;
Shattuck 2006). It is important to note that almost all of the individuals in my study were
also diagnosed with or qualified for a diagnosis of ID. Other substitutions include
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
15
Mental Retardation is a now an outdated term, having been replaced by intellectual
disability. That being said, some institutions and organizations still refer to intellectual
disability (ID) as Mental Retardation (MR). This includes one of the major organizations
providing services to individuals with ID, the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC)
(which also provides services to many adults with autism, including some in my study).
Throughout this dissertation I will use the term Intellectual Disability unless it conflicts
with the use of the term Mental Retardation by the researchers, individuals, or
organizations being cited or discussed.

	
  
individuals previously diagnosed with schizophrenia, psychosis, emotional
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disturbance, traumatic brain injury, and other forms of mental illness, disability and
developmental delay (Shattuck 2006; Mandell et al. 2012). On the higher end of the
spectrum, individuals with language disorders (Bishop et al. 2008), ADHD, and OCD
would be included (Gillberg and Billstedt 2000; Liu, King and Bearman 2010). Cases of
autism can also be linked to or are associated with tuberous sclerosis complex16, epilepsy,
and Fragile X Syndrome, among other conditions (Newschaffer et al. 2007).
As mentioned earlier, the changing definition of autism in the DSM is one large
factor that has made this possible (Kielinen, Linna and Moilanen 2000). Others are
increased awareness of autism among parents, teachers, and professionals, and greater
availability of services once autism was added to the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (IDEA) in 1991 (Eyal et al. 2013). Indeed, sociological and
epidemiological research has suggested that increases in the resources directed towards
autism services, diagnosis, and research is an important factor driving up rates of
diagnosis, including screening resources, service availability, educational spending
levels, number of school based health centers, and number of pediatricians in a
community (Barbaresi et al. 2005; Mandell and Palmer 2005; Palmer et al. 2005). Thus,
the professionals and institutions that keep track of diagnostic labels—clinicians and
hospitals, teachers and schools, bureaucrats and administrative records, insurance
companies and case files—are more likely to describe an individual as having autism
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
16
The difference between having tuberous sclerosis or congenital rubella and autism, and
intellectual disability or ADHD and autism is that the former are conceptualized as the
underlying cause of the autism in those cases. 	
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with in the past. Though this evolution provides a relatively good explanation for the
increase in autism prevalence, it still leaves people somewhat ambivalent and unsatisfied
as to the two big questions that continue to get asked. Is any of the so-called autism
epidemic due to an increase in true prevalence (as opposed to being entirely composed of
an increase in clinical prevalence)? And is there a cure for autism?
Is there a true (i.e. secular) increase in the prevalence of autism? Let’s put that
question another way. Is there a true increase of people behaving in ways that would
allow them to qualify for a diagnosis of autism if the definition of the condition had
remained constant and diagnosticians and epidemiologists actually diagnosed and
counted the condition in the same way over time? Possibly. However, given the
complexity and social changes explored above, we do not have a clear answer to this
question. In the words of Michael Rutter, “we simply do not know” (Rutter 2009;
Fombonne 2001). Of course, much attention has been placed on whether vaccines, or
toxins, or mercury, or other environmental factors and pollutants could be linked to an
increase (Lawler et al. 2004). And it is possible that at least some of the cases of autism,
even if only the minority, might be linked to these mechanisms (Newschaffer et al. 2007).
However, other, less sensational factors could also be responsible for a secular increase in
autism.
For example, changes in the average maternal and paternal age at conception
have been linked to increased risk of a variety of developmental disabilities, including
autism (Kong et al. 2012; King et al. 2009). Another possibility is that changes in medical

	
  
technology have kept alive low-birth-weight babies and other more susceptible
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populations, thus inflating the number of individuals who qualify for a diagnosis of
autism (Pinto-Martin et al. 2011). A third possibility is that injury during pregnancy
could have some responsibility, or even in vitro fertilization (Newschaffer et al. 2007).
But in the end, we just don’t know (“largely because it is very difficult to develop
quantifiable estimates of diagnostic effects and virtually impossible to prove or disprove
temporal changes in autism population risk profiles given the condition’s unknown
etiology” [Newschaffer et al. 2007: 239]). Of course, there have been other conditions the
prevalence of which has greatly fluctuated due to diagnostic practice: “dementia praecox”
and “childhood schizophrenia” being too interesting examples (Noll 2011; Eyal et al.
2010). And, as was the case for many of these other conditions, the question of whether
there was or could be a cure was a significant aspect of the attention they received.
Is there a cure for autism? The short answer is no. Most individuals diagnosed
with autism as children, will continue to qualify for a diagnosis of autism as adults
(Seltzer et al. 2003). Moreover, the single best predictor of outcome is IQ at the time of
diagnosis; other important indicators are presence or absence of communicative speech at
age five or six, and educational functioning in childhood (Billstedt 2007; DeMeyer et al.
1973; c.f. Coleman and Gillberg 2012: 31). However, could there be an intervention that
works for some children who are diagnosed with autism? Let’s put that question another
way. Is it possible that their are children whose behaviors qualify them for a diagnosis of
autism, but are then given some treatment that makes those behaviors go away enough
that they no longer qualify for the diagnosis? Yes, it is possible. We know, for example,
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that some kids have vitamin deficiencies that lead them to express particular forms of
autism that are potentially treatable (Novarino et al. 2012).17 Of course, that only applies
to those with that particular deficiency, or, put another way, with that particular form of
autism. It is also possible for an individual’s behaviors and impairments to change
enough over time that they stop qualifying for a diagnosis of autism (Fein et al. 2013;
Fountain, Winter and Bearman 2012; Helt et al. 2008;).18 However, once again, the
“optimal outcome” trajectory represents only a minority of those diagnosed on the autism
spectrum, and thus does not describe autism in general. Just as with other developmental
disabilities (e.g. intellectual disability) there is no general cure for autism.
Given that there is no general cure and most people do not age out of autism, the
ire targeted at sensational claims of cure are at the very least understandable. In his
coverage of Jenny McCarthy, who became popular for claiming that autism could be
cured, Karl T. Greenfeld (2010) provides an interesting perspective on why talk of cure
can be destructive:
McCarthy began to try almost every treatment that turned up on Google.
Evan went through conventional, intensive Applied Behavioral Analysis
(ABA) therapy as well as a host of alternative approaches, including a
gluten-free and casein-free (GFCF) diet, hyperbaric oxygen chambers,
chelation, aromatherapies, electromagnetics, spoons rubbed on his body,
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We also have preventative measures for some forms of intellectual disability. For
example, iodine deficiency is known to cause “abnormal neuronal development, mental
retardation, congenital abnormalities, spontaneous abortion and miscarriage, congenital
hypothyroidism, and infertility” (Lancet 2008: 88; Shorter 1997). Thus, public health
efforts to have iodine supplements provided to all humans (e.g. through iodized salt)
represent an effective preventative measure against the prevalence of intellectual
disability.	
  	
  	
  
18
Don’t have enough data to determine if it is intervention or natural development. Some
cases seem more likely to be natural development because no formal intervention was
provided.
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multivitamin therapy, B-12 shots and a range of prescription drugs.
McCarthy says she made a deal with God. “Help me fix my boy,” she
prayed, “and I’ll teach the world how I did it.” She believes that she did
fix her boy. A psychological evaluation from UCLA’s neuropsychiatric
hospital, dated May 10, 2005, was “conclusive for a diagnosis of Autistic
Disorder” [. . .] [now] McCarthy’s boy is a vivacious, articulate and
communicative child who seems to have beaten the condition [. . .] Or is
this the truth? There are dark murmurings from scientists and doctors
asking, Was her son ever really autistic? Evan’s symptoms—heavy
seizures, followed by marked improvement once the seizures were brought
under control—are similar to those of Landau-Kleffner syndrome, a rare
childhood neurological disorder that can result in speech impairment and
possible long-term neurological damage.

Maybe Evan, though qualifying for a diagnosis of autism, did have Landua –Kleffner
syndrome (just as someone who qualifies for autism can also have congenital rubella). Or
maybe he was among that group who outgrow their symptoms. The stakes surrounding
cure have made cases like Evan’s closely followed and hotly debated. The important
point for this study is that most children with autism will grow into adults with autism.
And no matter the degree to which they improve, many of them will continue to remain
atypical and require significant supports as they age (Coplan 2000; Newschaffer and
Curran 2003; Ganz 2007). Thus, though research on adults with ASDs is scant relative to
the burgeoning literature on children with the diagnosis, the lived reality of this
population and its caretakers is an important issue if we are to have a complete and
accurate understanding of those with autism and those who care for them.

ADULTS WITH AUTISM
One of the most popular questions associated with the increase in autism is, “if people
with autism have always been around then why did we not hear about them before?” As
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the above literature review suggests, the reason is that they were just called by a lot of
other names (or given no name at all). A convincing answer to the more recently asked
question, “how is the increase not secular if there are so many children with autism, but
apparently no adults with autism,” is provided by Grinker and Chew (2007):
When scientists respond that there has been no true rise in autism, that we
are diagnosing autism more, and counting it better, believers in an autism
epidemic— mostly parent advocates, philanthropists, and politicians—
argue triumphantly that if there is no epidemic, then 1 of every 150 adults
in the United States must, in fact, have autism. Along with journalists,
they repeatedly ask, "Show me where the one in 150 autistic adults are.
We can't find them." Just where might those 1 in 150 adults with autism
be? As surprising as it may seem, they are living and working among us.
Some live at home with their aging parents or siblings. Some live in group
homes, or in institutions. Some have jobs and live independently. Many
have other diagnoses given to them when they were children, such as
mental retardation, seizure disorder, or schizophrenia. Recently, one of us
met a severely autistic 60-year-old woman in eastern Tennessee, who we'll
call Donna. Donna's internist diagnosed her with autism ten years ago,
when she was 50. Her mother said that Donna's first label, in 1950, was
"mentally retarded with emotional block and obsessive compulsive traits."
Today, for the purposes of public assistance, she is classified as mentally
retarded. There is no record anywhere to suggest that Donna is "autistic."
Now, imagine another, more mildly autistic adult, who has a job with
minimal social demands (filing medical records, perhaps), has poor eye
contact, and some anxiety. Perhaps he is even married. After all, as they
get older, many people with autism, like the well-known writer, Temple
Grandin, make significant advances. First, he may not seek treatment or
even think he has problems. Second, even if he did, he may not go to a
psychiatrist, but rather to an internist who could treat his anxiety. Third,
even if he did go to a psychiatrist, it is not likely the psychiatrist would
diagnose an adult with autism, especially if the psychiatrist had no clinical
data on his early childhood (autism is still a developmental disorder
diagnosed in childhood, and the tools for diagnosing autism in adults are
not nearly as valid or reliable as those for children).
Grinker and Chew provide one real and one hypothetical case of autism in order to show
how there can be so many adults who would have qualified for the diagnosis as children
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yet who remain seemingly invisible. The case of Donald T. is another great example
of how an individual with autism can disappear in adulthood. Now in his 70s, Donald still
lives in his hometown of Forest Mississippi (Donvan and Zucker 2010). He continues to
have odd behaviors: difficulties with the “art” of conversation; assigning numbers to all
of his acquaintances; difficulty with abstractions like “implication,” “mood,” and
“emotion” (Donvan and Zucker 2010). Yet, he is able to live independently, has traveled
all over the world (alone), drives a car, and plays golf every week. Most people in his
neighborhood don’t realize that “DT,” as he is locally referred, has autism, but many
“shrug off his oddities” and even “openly admire his strengths” (Donvan and Zucker
2010). While this would seem to support the argument made by Donvan and Zucker
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
19	
  This essay continues: “We will likely continue to hear some journalists and some
autism advocates say ‘We can’t find autistic adults.’ But the reality is that they are not
looking. And for good reason. Children with autism are, of course, much easier to count
than adults, because they are in schools, but they were once as invisible as many autistic
adults are today. Indeed, Thomas Insel, the Director of the National Institutes of Mental
Health, told Newsweek in November 2006 that during his psychiatric training in the
1970s he saw ‘not one child with autism.” It’s not because he wasn’t looking, or because
Insel was not trained in child psychiatry. It’s because they were misdiagnosed,
institutionalized, and treated by neurologists (if at all). In the 1970s, psychiatrists seldom
saw children and there were only a few hundred child psychiatrists in the entire country.
One of our spouses, who did her residency at Massachusetts General Hospital in the
1980s, never saw a case of autism because the hospital had no developmental program at
the time [. . .] But just because we cannot count adults with autism does not mean that
they do not exist; nor does it mean that the prevalence rate for autism in adults must be
lower than it is in children. Adults with autism are, in fact, becoming increasingly visible
as autism awareness continues to rise and as more and more adults begin to identify
themselves as autistic, and speak and write about their experiences growing up and living
with autism. Their invisibility is not a sign that autism is a childhood epidemic, but rather
of how different out knowledge of autism is today. So it isn’t surprising when Donna’s
mother, now eighty-two, looks at parents like us with envy. ‘I wish my child had been
born today,’ she said. ‘She would get a proper diagnosis, have different therapies we
could try, and we wouldn’t be so isolated as a family.’ We hope Donna’s mother is right,
that we really are in a better place today, and that when our children become adults they
will not be invisible” (Grinker and Chew 2007).
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Donald’s impairments are not as severe as many others on the spectrum. Appreciating the
heterogeneity that characterizes the population of individuals that presently carry a
diagnosis of autism is an important step to recognizing the diversity of challenges that
face adults on the spectrum and their caretakers.
The reality that diverse individuals now qualify for an autism spectrum disorder
means that heterogeneity and varied outcomes are a fundamental part of understanding
the condition in adulthood. One of the first and few articles to focus on adults with autism
was published by non-other than Leo Kanner (1971) when he released a paper entitled
“Follow-Up Study of Eleven Autistic Children Originally Reported in 1943.” Kanner
found that the outcomes of the eleven individuals he first reported on in 1943 were in
keeping with the diversity that characterized the sample then, though all retained many
signs of their original diagnosis. While Donald and Frederick were relatively
independent, for example, six of the original eleven were living in institutional settings
(1971). One, Elaine, was living in a State Hospital at the age of 39, and was described in
an administrative report thusly:
She is up and about daily, eats and sleeps well and is acting quite
independent. She is able to take care of her personal needs and is fairly
neat and clean. Her speech is slow and occasionally unintelligible and she
is manneristic. She is in only fair contact and fairly well oriented. She
cannot participate in a conversation, however, except for the immediate
needs. If things do not go her way, she becomes acutely disturbed, yelling,
hitting her chest with her fist, and her head against the wall. In her lucid
periods, however, she is cooperative, pleasant, childish, and affectionate.
She has epileptic seizures occasionally of grand mal type and is receiving
antiepileptics and tranquilizers. Her general physical condition is
satisfactory (Kanner 1971: 140).
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atypical characteristics of Kanner’s eleven were associated with a diverse range of social
situations and support needs. The considerable broadening of the spectrum since autism’s
early days has meant that an even wider range of behavioral profiles and outcomes are
associated with the diagnosis (particularly with the introduction of Asperger’s Syndrome
in 1994).
However, on the whole, the average outcome for autism, if compared to the ideal
or “optimal outcome” (i.e. living independently, working full time, being married, and
having friends) is relatively poor (Helt et al. 2008). Though the focus of research is on
treatment and the potential for a typical adulthood, many caretakers responsible for
individuals aging with the condition—who often remain significantly atypical and
dependent—increasingly turn towards questions concerning care, management, and
support (Gray 2002). Though it is true that happiness is different for everybody, and we
shouldn’t assume that normative outcomes are something that should always be pushed
for, more basic needs (e.g. housing, medical care, physical safety) are concerns that most
would agree are compelling.20 And yet, the description of the “coming crisis of
adulthood” in a variety of newspapers is a bit misleading, as adults with autism have
always been around and stakeholders have been trying to figure out what the best course
of action for their integration and care is for centuries (Houston and Frith 2000; Wing
1989). Though we are still struggling to come up with the best answer for them, it is the
new reality—the new normal, if you will—that many characterized as socially atypical
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
20
See Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs.
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and dependent are increasingly being diagnosed with autism. For those who have more
severe forms of the disorder, the requirement of life-long care and support are a relative
certainty.
Though individuals with autism represent a heterogeneous group, those with more
significant forms of the condition generally remain significantly atypical and dependent
throughout their lives. In a recent paper Eyal (2013) draws on Wing and Gould’s work to
construct summaries of the four behavioral profiles that characterize individuals on the
spectrum. The two most severe groups are described thusly: 1) along with the three
impairments of autism, the most severe cases “are associated with profound aloofness
and indifference in most situations, accompanied by repetitive self-stimulatory behaviors
such as hand flapping and head banging. There is almost certainly comorbidity with MR
[. . .] and potentially also epilepsy”; 2) at a lower level of severity, children may speak,
but in “stereotyped and idiosyncratic phrases, often repeating how they were addressed
without reversing pronouns [. . .] they are typically indifferent toward other children but
not toward adults, whose company they eagerly seek, though failing to use nonverbal
communicative behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze to regulate the interaction and insisting
inflexibly on the repetition of certain routines” (2013: 866). These two groups roughly
represent the individuals who make up my sample, modified for the developmental
changes that are associated with adulthood (though, after time spent in the field, the
maxim “once you have met one individual with autism you have met one individual with
autism” resonates with me more clearly than ever). The needs of those who fall within
these two groups are considerable.
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Though few studies of adult outcomes focus only on those with more

significant forms of the condition, the numbers of more inclusive samples speak plainly
enough. According to one study of a sample of young adults with all forms of autism,
since graduating from high school 87.1% had ever lived with parents or another guardian,
16.6% had ever lived independently, and 11.8% had ever lived in a supervised living
situation (Anderson et al. 2014). A low estimate of unemployment among adults with all
types of autism is 66% but others say between 80 and 85% (Walton 2011). Very little
literature on adults is focused solely on those with more severe forms of the condition
(Coleman and Goldberg 2012). Almost no literature exists on individuals with more
significant forms of autism that are older than 45, though some recent research looks at
populations in psychiatric hospitals that qualify for a diagnosis of autism (most of whom
are currently diagnosed with something else, e.g. schizophrenia) (Mandell et al. 2012).
Howlin and Moss (2012) argue that individuals with ASDs are significantly
disadvantaged in issues of employment, social relationships, physical and mental health,
and quality of life. Though another study found that a majority of young adults with
autism have a better than expected “quality of life,” it concludes that they usually remain
dependent on caregivers for support in educational, accommodation and occupational
situations (Billstedt, Gillberg and Gillberg 2005). Outcomes in adolescence and
adulthood are dependent on many factors including autism severity, cognitive
functioning, language development, additional psychopathology, and access to
intervention programs and services (Levy and Perry 2011). Between 38% and 62% of
individuals with autism also qualify for a diagnosis of intellectual disability (have an IQ
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requires managing and planning for present and continuing atypicality and dependency.
The individuals in my study are among that group that is unlikely to live
independently at anytime during their life, are diagnosed with or qualify for a diagnosis
of intellectual disability along with their autism, and for whom management, care, and
support often require considerable resources and present a difficult challenge for families
and other caretakers. Many individuals with ASD also have intellectual disabilities (ID)
and approximately 70% have a lifelong disability requiring substantial social support
(Wright et al. 2013). Families tend to be the first line of support, and are instrumental in
shaping the outcomes of those with the condition (Power 2008). Marsha Mailick Seltzer
and colleagues (Barker et al. 2011; Smith, Greenberg and Seltzer 2012; Seltzer et al.
2011; Taylor and Seltzer 2011) have chronicled some of the challenges and stressors
facing families of adolescents and adults with autism, with a particular focus on the stress
and burdens associated with caretaking duties.21 Particularly challenging to manage and
care for are those individuals whose autism is associated with aggressive, violent, or
other forms of maladaptive behavior (Gray 2002). However, it is not necessary for
maladaptive behaviors to be present in order for caregivers to become convinced that
they have no good options. One chilling story explores the worst along with more
promising situations:
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
21
One important finding is that, since states have had systems of care set up for those
with intellectual disability for some time, there may actually be less services for those
with autism who do not have ID (Taylor and Seltzer 2011). This, however, does not
diminish the challenges that surround providing care for individuals like the adults with
autism in this study.
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We will never know the complete story of what happened on Nectarine
Avenue in San Jose this past Tuesday evening, but sadly, we can guess.
According to news reports, Elizabeth Hodgins, 53, shot her 22-year-old
son George, who was severely autistic. People who knew the family said
Ms. Hodgins was overwhelmed with the demands of caring for her son,
who had recently aged out of his educational program. This heartbreaking
story hits home to any parent of a child with autism, because our worst
fear is: what comes next? Will my child be able to live a productive and
happy life as an adult? [. . .] The stories aren’t always as sad as this one
from Sunnyvale. Last week, I spent several hours visiting The ARC22 of
San Francisco, a wonderful option for families of adult children with
developmental disabilities. I met one young man with autism who runs a
“micro-enterprise,” a coffee stand in the building that has become a great
training ground for eventual jobs in customer or food service. Other clients
stopped in to meet up with counselors or friends before heading out for a
day of community-based learning or internships. In the evenings, there are
support groups for parents, and activities (including a nightclub complete
with disco balls) for clients. The staff at the ARC is warm, welcoming and
committed to adults with disabilities leading fulfilling and productive lives
as fully-integrated members of our community (Norton 2012).

This article shows how caretakers can feel that there are no options, and that they will
never escape the needs of a loved one. It also demonstrates that loved ones sometimes
find themselves in circumstances that are very much ruled by the availability of services
in an area (Gray 2002). Service availability and professional support has the potential to
make a big difference to both caregivers and adults with autism. That being said, the
emotional challenges associated with autism are shaped not only by service availability
but also the financial reality of life-long dependency. A recent study found that the cost
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
22
ARC stands for Association for Retarded Citizens. Several individuals in my study
received services from this organization (e.g. sheltered work-programs, evening social
programs). Much of the services for families located in one of the states in my study were
covered by MR (Mental Retardation) waivers. To have this waiver, a diagnosis of
intellectual disability was required. It is possible to view individuals with autism
acquiring an MR diagnosis as their primary diagnosis so that they can get access to a
waiver as a form of reverse diagnostic substitution. It once again shows how services and
funding play an important role in determining what diagnosis an individual is given.
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his or her lifespan was $2.4 million (Buescher et al. 2014). The largest cost components
in childhood were “special education services” and “parental productivity loss,” and in an
individual’s adulthood “residential care or supportive living accommodation” and
“individual productivity cost” (Buescher et al. 2014: E1). While the rhetoric of
“epidemic” and “crisis” might appear as one way to raise the alarm about the needs of
adults with autism and their caretakers, pitching these needs in medicalized and hysterical
terms can distort the nature of the real and complex challenges that families and other
caregivers face.
To understand the contours of the challenge that face caretakers of adults with
autism while avoiding the rhetoric of epidemic, crisis, and other hysterical descriptions,
the lived experience of those facing the challenge presents an important and nuanced
resource to learn from those on the front lines. Families come to realize that when their
child ages out of school mandated services, they are faced with understanding and relying
on a service system with an entirely different logic. Funding can come from a variety of
sources: Medicaid, Medicare, SSI, SSDI, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, and other
public and private organizations. However, resources for adults are organized around
eligibility and availability as opposed to the legal “entitlements” that describe special
education funding. The goal for many is to find a supportive and meaningful social
situation that provides individuals who remain atypical and dependent with dignity,
productivity, and purpose. While large state institutions used to house and care for many
individuals with developmental disabilities, the landscape for housing since

	
  
deinstitutionalization is more complex. Group homes, adult foster care, supervised
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living, supported living, and transitional living are all options, but given the new
complexity and decentralization families most do a lot of the leg work.23 Of course, even
during the age of the major institutions, families and community care were still an
important part of the picture (Power 2008). Understanding how families and other
caretakers interpret and respond to the care, management, and support that adults with
autism require is crucial for starting to understand the social dynamics that are the context
in which those who remain atypical and dependent exist.

FIELDWORK
In the summer of 2010 I embarked on a study that was originally intended to be an
ethnographic exploration of the domestic lives of families with young children with
autism. The study was pitched as a “dinner study,” in which I would join families for a
typical evening meal and conduct interviews with parents. With the support of the Center
for Autism Research (CAR)—a cooperative venture between the University of
Pennsylvania and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP)—I began recruiting
families from the Autism Match list: a recruitment initiative to connect researchers with
families interested in participating in a wide variety of autism studies
(https://autismmatch.org/). A research assistant assigned to my project made first contact,
and I would follow-up with those families that showed interest. If, after talking on the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
23	
  Some individuals with autism are also among the ranks of the homeless, inmates of the
criminal justice system, or residents in the growing number of nursing homes (Grob
1994).	
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phone, families agreed to participate, I would drive to their home—usually arriving in
the early to mid-afternoon—and get acquainted, share dinner, and conduct semistructured interviews.
For those families who were open to further participation, I conducted follow up
visits and interviews both in the home and the community. At first, I restricted
recruitment to families with one child on the spectrum and those who had a diagnosis of
autistic disorder. However, I soon lifted both these restrictions. I lifted the first restriction
because my sample was too small to get seriously concerned about “controlling
variables” (though most families in the study did end up having only one member with
autism). I stopped limiting myself to families that had individuals with a diagnosis of
Autistic Disorder because of the fuzzy lines between Autistic Disorder and PDD-NOS
(illustrated by the reality that several of the individuals in my study were given both of
these diagnoses at different times). Indeed, issues with diagnostic validity and reliability
represent one of the main reasons the DSM-5 definition of autism replaced the subcategories of Autistic Disorder, PDD-NOS, and Asperger’s with a single diagnosis of
Autism Spectrum Disorder along with a three level severity scale (APA 2013).	
  That
being said, my focus and the individuals in my sample remain limited to those with more
severe forms of autism: individuals who have or are likely to qualify for a diagnosis of
intellectual disability alongside their diagnosis of autism, and those who, in the words of
the two highest levels of the DSM-5 severity scale, require “very substantial support” or
“substantial support” throughout their lives (APA 2013).
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Three of the first four families in my study (when I was still focusing on young

children with autism) came from the autism match list (the Murphy, Lewis, and Boyles
family) and one I met while attending a parent-panel session at a workshop for families
with newly diagnosed children (the King Family) (See Table 1). Between June and
December 2010 I joined all four of these families for dinner and interviews in their home,
and then a varying number of follow-up visits in the home and/or the community.
Besides hanging out and watching TV, drinking wine in the kitchen while dinner was
made, or playing video-games in the basement, I participated in school observations,
baseball games, soccer practices, and birthday parties. The interviews I conducted were
organized around several general questions (e.g. tell me what meals are like with your
family, how did autism come to your child, with whom do you talk with about autism),
but I allowed the interview to progress organically and probed on those terms and topics
that interviewees themselves highlighted as relevant (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree
2006). I also participated in several support group meetings in order to better understand
the issues facing families caring for and professionals working with young children and
adolescents with autism.
Though my time with families with young children with autism confirmed my
belief about the importance of understanding the condition through the perspective of
caretakers, soon after entering the field I began to consider switching the focus of my
project to families and professionals associated with adults with autism. Besides

	
  
48	
  
24
arguments in the autism literature and from faculty mentors as to the importance of
collecting more data on adults with the condition, the caretakers already in my sample
and those I met through them were constantly telling me how important a project on
adults would be. I quickly realized that the topic was ideally suited for ethnography, since
one of the methods “warrants” is to understand populations about which little is known
(Katz, 1997, 2012).
Fieldwork with adults with autism and their families occurred in two phases. The
first phase was conducted between January and August 2011. During this period I
continued using the approach I had used to recruit and collect data from families with
children with autism. Over the first half of 2011 I built a sample of thirteen families with
adult members with autism between the ages of 17 and 43 (See Table 1). As I came to see
how important professionals were to the experience of adults with autism and their
families, I also started to interview them as well (e.g. job coaches, transition counselors,
non-profit executives) (See Table 2). Some of the individuals in the professional sample
were also members of the families in my family sample, and were included in both
samples and taken through at least two separate interviews to understand their multiple
relationships to autism.
Almost all of the professionals I interviewed for the study I met through the
families. Five of the families with adults with autism I met through Autism Match: Clarke
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Professor David S. Mandell of the Center for Autism Research and Professor Peter S.
Bearman of the Columbia Sociology Department were particularly clear on this point.
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Yates (66) and his son Allen* (29) ; Marge (50) and Anderson (50) Vogler, and their
three sons Tom (18), Brian* (17), and Jack (14); Eva (57) and Ross (58) Downing, and
their son James* (21); Yveline (50) Bryan and her son Roger* (19); and Ross (64) and
Molly (63) Zago, and their son Martin* (31). The other eight families I met through word
of mouth or other informal means. Sally (59) Emerson, and her daughter Shirley* (20);
Davis Barba (67), and his son Lewis* (31); Kate (56) and Evan (59) Lane, and their son
Ziggy* (23); Ken (51) and Kelly (51) Fischer, and their daughter Jessica (22) and son
Jeff* (20); Winnie (49) and Warren (52) Barclay, and their son’s Tyson* (17) and Taylor
(19); Chrissie Hamilton (62), her ex-partner Heather (53), and their children Meg (23)
Drew (21), and Byron* (20); Jack (70) and Vale (70) Lee, and their two children Miller*
(43) and Bianca* (40); and Caroline (48) and Fischer (50) Fini, and their sons Tim (20)
and Bill* (18). I met the Barclays through Alison King. I met the Finis through the
Barclays. I met the Lanes years before graduate school, when I worked as a teacher in an
autism school. I met the Hamiltons through Kate Lane. The Downings introduced me to
Jack and Vale Lee.
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  * =Diagnosed with autism. Also, as per IRB #812120 of the University of
Pennsylvania, all names are pseudonyms.	
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TABLE 1: Sample of Families
Family

Members
(Age)26

Connection

Geography/Race
-State: One of
Three (A, B, C)
-Urban/Suburb/
Rural
-Race

Fischer

Kelly (51)
Ken (51)
Jessica
(22)
Jeff (20)
Kate (56)
Evan (59)
Ziggy
(23)
Rebecca
(21)
Arietta
(84)
Marge
(50)
Anderson
(50)
Tom (18)
Brian
(17)
Jack (14)
Winnie
(49)
Warren
(52)
Taylor
(19)
Tyson
(17)

Met Jessica
through
Faculty

State A

Lane

Vogler

Barclay

Met
through a
personal
connection

Suburb
Caucasian
State B
Rural
Caucasian

Autism
Match

State A
Suburb

Fieldwork
-2011: #
visits
-2013: #
days lived
with
-Interviews:
# with
family
members
2011: 3
2013: 5
Interviews:
5
2011: 3
(lived with
them)
2013: 4
Interviews:
4

Notes

Global
Development
al Delay with
features of
PDD-NOS.
Originally
PDD-NOS,
DSM-III.
Later,
Autistic
Disorder.

2011: 3
2013: 7
Interviews:
8

Initially
PDD-NOS.
Later, ASD.

2011: 3
2013: 8
Interviews:
4

Tyson:
Originally
PDD-NOS,
Later Autistic
Disorder.
Taylor:
Asperger’s
Syndrome

Caucasian

Met
State A
through
Alison King Rural/Suburb
[See bottom
of this
Caucasian
chart]

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
26	
  Ages reflect those given when I first made contact with the families in 2010 – 2011.
Logically, everyone was a couple years older when I lived with families in 2013. 	
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Yates

Zago

Emerson

Downing

Clarke
(66)
Sophie^*!
Allen (29)
Kay (26)^
Ross (64)
Molly
(63)
Martin
(31)
Alexander
(29)^
Sally (59)
Moore
(58)^*
Murphy
(25)^
Ester
(21)^
Shirley
(20)
Ross (58)
Eva (57)
James
(21)

Autism
Match

State A
Suburb

Autism
Match

Caucasian
State A
Rural

2011: 2
2013: 7
Interviews:
2
2011: 2
2013: 7
Interviews:
4

Classic
Autism

2011: 2
2013: 1 (did
not sleep
over)
Interviews:
2

In 2013 I
accompanied
Sally (from
State A) for
one day to
visit Shirley
in her Group
Home (in
State B).
Son had
severe
epilepsy. Was
unsuccessful
reconnecting
in 2013.
In 2013 I
accompanied
the Finis and
several other
families to a
play
organized
especially for
families with
individuals
with autism.
Never got to
meet Lewis
because of
his sensitivity
to strangers
since his

Caucasian
Met Sally
through a
Professor

State A & B
Urban
Caucasian

Autism
Match

State A
Urban/Suburban

2011: 2
Interviews:
2

Caucasian
Fini

Barba

Caroline
(48)
Fischer
(50)
Tim (20)
Bill (18)

Met
Caroline
through
Winnie
Barclay

Davis (67) Met Davis
Laura!
through
James
Kate Lane
(37)^
Nelson
(33)^

State A
Suburban
Caucasian

State C
Suburban
Caucasian

2011: 3
2013: 1 (did
not sleep
over)
Interviews:
2

2011: 1
Interviews:
1
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Lewis
mom’s death.
(31)^
Was
unsuccessful
reconnecting
in 2013.
Lee
Jack (70) Ross
State A
2011: 1
Miller is nonVale (70) Downing
2013: 5
verbal.
Miller
introduced
Suburban
Interviews:
Bianca is
(43)
me to Jack
6
verbal. In
Bianca
and Vale
Caucasian
2014: 2
2014 I lived
(40)
with the Lees
again for two
days.
Hamilton Chrissie
Kate Lane
State C
2011: 1
In 2013 I
(62)
introduced
2013: 2 (did spent a day
Heather
me to
Suburban
not sleep
with Chrissie
%
(53)
Chrissie
over)
visiting
Meg (23)
Caucasian
Interviews:
Byron at his
Drew (21)
5
Group Home.
Byron
I also spent
(20)
some time,
separately,
with Drew
and his
girlfriend,
Heather, and
Meg.
Bryan
Yveline
Autism
State A
2011: 1
In 2013 I
(50)
Match
2013: 3 (did hung out with
Robert
Urban
not sleep
the Bryans
*
(49)
over)
from morning
Roger
AfricanInterviews:
until night,
(19)
American
2
but, at the
request of
Yveline
(space issues)
did not sleep
over.
FAMILIES FROM ORIGINAL SAMPLE WITH YOUNG CHILDREN WITH
AUTISM
Murphy
Idalyz
Autism
State C
201027: 6

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
27
Numerals after “2010” are the number of times I visited with a given family with a
child with autism.
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King

Lewis

Boyles

(39)
Michael
(36)
Anthony
(6)
James (4)
Nick (2)
Alison
(37)
Morgan
(43)^*
David
(10)
Ashley
(8)
Robert (6)
Joyce (35)
Lewis
(37)
Jim (7)
Wilson
(4)
Tina (43)
Colvin
(51)^
Time (16)
Perry
(10)
Cameron
(10)

Match
Suburban

Interviews:
3

½ Caucasian
½ Latino
Met Alison
at an
Autism
Event

State A
Suburban

2010: 7
Interviews:
4

Caucasian

Autism
Match

State C
Suburban

2010: 2
Interviews:
2

Caucasian
Autism
Match

State C
Urban

2010: 2
Interviews:
1

Perry and
Cameron are
Identical
Twins.

AfricanAmerican

Key: Bold = Diagnosed with Autism; ^ = Never Met; * = Separated/Divorced; ! =
Deceased
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TABLE 2: Sample of Interviews with Autism Professionals
Professiona
l
Alison
King
Jean
Gilbert

Age

Sally
Emerson
Ross
Downing
Douglas
Schultz
Rose
Richard
May
Harker

59

Connection

37
59

Met through
the Fischer
Family

58
48
24
30

Grace
NA
Sharon
Miller
NA
Mulroney
Lisa Tapley 49
Rachel
Davis

55

Mary
Wagner

62

Ran
Grobler

23

Michelle
Jager

28

Jackie

52

Met through
Alison King
Met through
Alison King
Met through
Alison King
Met through
Faculty
Met through
Clarke Yates
Met through
Barclay
Family
Met through
Vogler
Family
Met through
Vogler
Family
Met through
Vogler
Family
Met through
Vogler
Family
Met through

Institution

Position

Interviews

Non-Profit
(Services)
School

Project Director

1

Transition
Coordinator

3

Research
Organization
Non-Profit
(Services)
Non-Profit
(Services)
Non-Profit
(Services)
Non-Profit
(Services)

Clinician/Research 2
er
Executive
1

28

Executive

1

Program Manager

1

Program Director

1

Research
Organization
Sheltered
Workshop
School

Social Worker

1

Manager

1

Vocational
Coordinator

1

School

Special Education
Supervisor

1

School

Teacher

1

School

Paraprofessional

1

School

Transition
Coordinator

1

Day

Director

1
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Interviews with professionals who also happen to be members of the families in my
sample are separate from family interviews. They occurred in an occupational setting,
and featured the same kinds of questions I asked other professionals.
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Jackson

Zago Family

Sandy
Beadnall
Betty
Keane
Ann-Marie
Sabell

34

Chrissie
Hamilton

62

Kevin
Fester

24

Hannah
Haden

35

Jack
Lambert

65

Ellen
Hacker

NA

Jane
MahlerBace
Sarah
Loewe

39

35
49

56

Met through
Lane Family
Met through
Lane Family
Met through
Lane Family

Met through
Hamilton
Family
Met through
Fischer
Family
Met through
Fischer
Family
Met through
Fischer
Family
Met through
Fischer
Family
Met through
Fischer
Family

Program/Shelt
ered
Workshop
Residential/Fa
rm Campus
Residential/Fa
rm Campus
Residential/Fa
rm Campus

Residential
Director
Day Program
Coordinator
Chief of
Residential
Services
Founder &
Executive

1

Group Home/Day
Program Staff

1

Non-Profit
(Services)

Residential
Director

1

Non-Profit
(Services)

Executive

1

Non-Profit
(Services)

Director
Community
Integration
Services
Habilitation
Director

1

Autism Specialist

1

Non-Profit
Organizations
(Services &
Advocacy)
Non-Profit
(Services)

Non-Profit
(Services)
Non-Profit
(Services)

1
1
1

1

By the end of summer 2011 I had shared dinner with members of all but one of the
thirteen families with adults with autism in my sample. The questions I asked during
interviews included: tell me about how your adult child [sibling, etc.] with autism is at
home; tell me about the outside activities you engage in with them; tell me about how
you understand your loved one with autism; tell me about the services they receive; tell
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me about how you think about the future. I also had follow-up visits with most of the
families with adults with autism. Besides the probing method used before, I also asked
specific or follow-up questions from subjects of interest that had arisen during past
informal conversations or participant observation. For professionals, interviews were also
general but were based around a different set of broad questions: tell me about your job;
tell me how you got into this line of work; tell me how your work relates to families with
adults with autism; can you tell me about work you did with a particular family that went
well?; can you tell me about work you did with a particular family that was more
challenging?; can you tell me about aspects of the system in which you work that
facilitate your work?; can you tell me about aspects of the system in which you work that
have made your work more challenging?
Between September 2011 and December 2012 I exited the field in order to
transcribe interviews, analyze my data, start drafting my dissertation, and finish up some
other projects. During this period I became increasingly convinced that I should conduct
another phase of research. The strength of ethnography is that you immerse yourself
among people, and really learn about their everyday lives. Longitudinal observation
matched with interviews, documental analysis, and reading also allows one to
“triangulate”: compare findings from one time or form of data with those from another
(Denzin 2009). By recruiting over time, I was able to select diverse families that
challenged my findings (because of family income, race, or geographic location) (Small
2009). By collecting data over time, I was able to seek out aspects of the situations under
study that had been excluded from previous fieldwork (Duneier 2011). Revisiting

	
  
families would allow me to achieve something that much sociology lacks, a
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consideration of how the characteristics of my sample changed over a longer period of
time (Collins 1999). Living with families would provide me with a feel for the issues in
which I was interested that can only be gotten from what one ethnographer described as a
deep immersion among one’s population of interest (Avery 2010). In the fall of 2012 I
started reconnecting with the thirteen families in order to determine if each of them
would be open to my living with them for a short period.
Between January 2013 and June 2013 I lived with eight of the thirteen families
with adult members with autism, and spent time with all but two of them (see Table 1). I
moved into basements, guest rooms, and bedrooms. I ate breakfasts, lunches, and dinners.
I joined family members when they went grocery shopping, to parties and cookouts, to
charity events and restaurant outings, to farmer’s markets and carnivals. In short, I sought
to be a member of the family. I also wanted to get a better understanding of the social
context in which the adults with autism in my study lived their lives. These adults resided
in a variety of different settings: four lived in family-owned, non-profit run group homes,
one on a residential campus, and six still lived with their parents. In order to get a clearer
picture of their lives, I gained entrance to and spent time with them at their day programs,
group homes, residential settings, schools, and work sites, and met, talked, and, in some
cases, formally interviewed staff and administrators at them all.
By the end of the research I had conducted 1000+ hours of participant
observation, conducted 80+ semi-structured interviews, and collected 1000+ pages of
documental information about the individuals and families in my study. I also met and

	
  
informally talked with a significant number of other families and professionals over
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the course of the study. Many times while in the field I had a digital audio recorder
running. I used the recorder in order to help me capture the details and nuances of the
interactions I observed (Duneier 1991; Desmond 2012). Before using the recorder I
would let family members know that I wanted to audio record our interactions in order to
capture the dialogue and verbalizations of adults with autism and those caring for them. I
asked whether this would be ok. I only used the recorder when participants agreed to its
use. Sometimes I brought a computer during visits to group homes, work sites, or
residential campuses so that I could type during breaks. Other times I wrote notes to
myself through texts, e-mails, and an electronic notepad on my phone (Goffman 2009).
At night and with the support of the day’s jottings, recordings, and recollections, I would
write detailed field notes about that day’s events.
Though I entered the field with broad interests in the experience of caretakers
planning and providing care for individuals with autism, the questions and topics
recorded and explored in interviews and field notes evolved during my time in the field.
Data analysis also reflected an evolving process. I worked inductively with my data,
generating topics of interest and follow-up questions from initial analyses; these directed
further forays into the field. Over time, I honed themes through the manual comparing
and contrasting of data, and created inductive propositions that I would confirm,
disconfirm, or modify with additional information (Lee 2013). When I encountered new
or disconfirming data, I would revisit and change my analysis so that it would correspond
with the findings of my fieldwork (Katz 2001). Though I had some control over the shape

	
  
of my sample, I was restricted by the autism match list and the networks of previous
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participants who introduced me to other potentially interested families. One such
limitation is that most of the families in my study are linked with young adults with
autism (concentrating on the transition period out of high school, and almost all younger
than 45). Though this matched my interests in how families and caretakers plan and
experience the transition to adulthood, the issues faced by caretakers of individuals 45+
with autism are less represented.
Of course, I met many caretakers and adults with autism that were connected to
those already in my sample. This allowed me to collect data, though more limited, on
individuals representing a variety of ages and situations. Throughout the dissertation I
draw on field notes, informal conversations, interviews, and published material to
represent the lived experience of those caring for adults with autism. Extended quotes and
passages from my data are presented in this dissertation in two formats: italics represent
material from written field notes; normal text represents material from transcribed
interviews. In Chapter 5, some of the material presented in normal text derives from
typed, facilitated conversations with an adult male with autism. As per the stipulations of
the University of Pennsylvania IRB, proposal #812120, names and locations are changed
or omitted in order to protect the anonymity of those in my study.
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CHAPTER 3

The Ambiguity of Deviance: Framing and Social Control Among Caretakers of
Adults with Autism

INTRODUCTION
Microsociology—a body of techniques and concepts used to systematically explore the
dynamics of everyday interaction—was created and rose to prominence in 20th century
America (Garfinkel 1967; Collins 1981). Erving Goffman, possibly the most renowned
practitioner of microsociology, created a language to describe and explain the interaction
rituals that constitute our face-to-face encounters (Goffman 1959; Collins 2004). Given
his interest in how interpretation and meaning organize interactional dynamics, Goffman
tends to be categorized as a member of the symbolic interactionist tradition (Dreitzel
1970; Gonos 1977). Symbolic interactionists adhere to the assumption that the
“situational context of meaning” is central: that “meaning as an interpretive process” is
“located in interpretive acts,” and that the study of meaning requires “close attention to
the uniqueness and variability of situations” (Rochberg-Halton 1982:456; Blumer 1969).
Though Goffman’s interest in the encounters through which people make
meaning seems to fit him in nicely with the symbolic interactionistist tradition, a closer
look at his work shows the affiliation to be more apparent than real (Gonos 1977). For
example, in Frame Analysis (1974), his most ambitious attempt to craft a theoretical
statement about his approach to social life, Goffman sought to describe the extrasituational structures that shape social interaction regardless of the contours of any

	
  
specific encounter. In so doing, Goffman’s goal was to “see behind” the constant
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activity of everyday interaction to the “structures,” “frames,” or “worlds” in which a
particular language of reality is binding (Gonos 1977:857). For example, forms of
everyday activity—the classroom, the dinner table—have a symbolic structure in which
people are assigned roles—student, teacher—that shape their behavior and
interpretations, to varying degrees, regardless of the vagaries of the situation. This would
place Goffman more cleanly in the camp of “structuralism,” in which frames serve as a
lens through which a focused activity is influenced by the meanings of wider society—a
screen which “not only selects but also transforms and modifies what is passed through
it” (Goffman 1961a:33; c.f. Gonos 1977:861; Lévi-Strauss 1967). Though theoretical
discussions about how best to bring understanding abut structures and frames together
with the complexity of situations and interactions have appeared at times, there have been
relatively few explorations of how qualitative data can be used to explore the nature of
their empirical relationship (Snow 2001; Diehl and McFarland 2010; Moore, Jasper and
Gillespie 2011). This chapter will draw on concepts that grow out of the sociology of
deviance—a subject area of interest to both symbolic interactionists and Goffman—in
order to explore how caretakers of adults with autism dealing with problem or
maladaptive behavior negotiate between different frames or definitions of rule-breaking
in the face of the ambiguity and complexity of lived experience and its situations.
Given the degree to which they increase the burdens of caretaking and disrupt
daily life, maladaptive or problem behaviors have long been highlighted by the literature
on autism as a major challenge for those caring for individuals—particularly adults—

	
  
with the condition. The developmental disabilities literature describes maladaptive
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behavior as actions that jeopardize the physical safety of the individual engaging in them
or others, significantly limit or delay access to or use of ordinary community facilities,
and/or cause difficulties in “developmental progress, socialization, and or success in a
specific environment” (Neisworth and Wolfe 2005:129; Clarke 1996). Some maladaptive
behaviors associated with autism include self-injury, physical aggression, screaming or
other disruptive noises, inappropriate sexual behavior, and, the target of increasing
awareness given recent media attention, elopement (also known as wandering or darting)
(Gray 2002a; Solomon and Lawlor 2013; McIlwain 2013; Hart 1989; Greenfeld 2009a).
Though maladaptive behaviors are present in a considerable number of children with
autism, their expression in adulthood is of greater concern because of the “increasing
size” of the maturing individual, the “vulnerability of parents and siblings” and other
caretakers, and the harsher penalties—enacted by various stakeholders (e.g. law
enforcement, the general public)—for these forms of behavior when engaged in by an
adult (Gray 2002b:220; Debbaudt 2002). It is also important to note that individuals with
autism who also have a diagnosis of intellectual disability (i.e. all in my study) are more
likely to engage in maladaptive behaviors during the course of their development
(Shattuck et al. 2007). While maladaptive behaviors are mentioned in the formal
definition of autism, there remains little exploration of how caretakers understand and
manage them (APA 1994; Shattuck et al. 2007).
Though individuals with autism engage in a wide variety of atypical behavior,
maladaptive behaviors—particularly the most extreme forms (e.g. self-injury, aggression,
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sociology, as deviant or rule-breaking behavior. There is a long tradition in sociology of
describing unwanted/rule-breaking behavior that constitutes a threat to role performance
and the stability of social systems as deviance (Durkheim 1982). Much of the focus in the
microsociological literature on deviance has been on the social processes by which
certain behaviors are labeled deviant and then made the target of social control (Becker
1963; Bosk 1979; Duneier 1999; Meier 1982; Scheff 1966; Goffman 2009). Of much less
focus has been the process by which those behaviors that are already labeled as deviant
get further defined as a certain kind of deviance in naturalistic encounters. Explorations
of how deviance is defined or framed does occur, but the data used tends to be historical
or quantitative; more recently the deviance in question tends to be described as “social
problems” given the analytical level of the data and increasing disappearance of the
explicit use of the term deviance in sociology (Barry et al. 2009; Conrad and Schneider
1992; Conrad 2007; Gratett 2011; Saguy, Gruys, and Gong 2010). In the exceedingly rare
cases when definitions of deviance are explored through qualitative data, analysis shows
that applications are very messy as, for example, different individuals apply different
definitions of deviance to the same behavior or phenomena (Bosk 2013; Hoppe 2013,
2014). An examination of how caretakers of adults with autism frame, interpret, and
respond to maladaptive behavior represents an opportunity to explore how the “binding
reality” of popular frames holds up against the vagaries and ambiguity of deviant
behavior in naturalistic situations. Such an examination will also uncover how caretakers
of adults with autism negotiate over how best to interpret and socially control deviant
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actions, potentially providing insight into the process by which people pick and choose
among several options for defining deviance in relation to a wide variety of behaviors and
situations.
This chapter will look at how caretakers use frames to shape interpretations and
social control strategies for maladaptive behavior in adults with autism, and how the
application of these frames is challenged by the framings of other stakeholders and the
ambiguity inherent to many social situations. In their classic study of historical change in
the definition of deviance, Conrad and Schneider (1992) explore how a variety of rule
breaking behaviors have increasingly been defined as a sickness as opposed to a crime or
a sin (badness). While Conrad and Schneider (1992) perceive themselves as descendants
of the symbolic interactionsist perspective, it can be argued that popular definitions of
deviance constitute structures that select and translate reality in ways similar to how
Goffman imagined his frames doing. More explicitly drawing the link between the
medicalization of deviance and Goffman’s frame analysis, more recent studies of “social
problems” (e.g. obesity) have described popular definitions as “frames” or “metaphors”
(Saguy, Gruys and Gong 2010; Barry et al. 2009). Of course, as opposed to Goffman’s
frames, which are based on the definition of a situation (e.g. classroom), these studies are
more interested in the definitions that respondents ascribe to phenomena (e.g. “the
obesity epidemic”) that are an aggregate of individual behaviors and characteristics
(Saguy 2013). Though it would seem plausible that the methods of microsociology could
be used to explore the application of such frames in the naturalistic situations studied by
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symbolic interactionists, most individuals studying the definition of deviance continue
to use historical or survey data (see studies cited in Conrad 2007).
Below I review some of the literature that describes definitions of social problems
(i.e. publically targeted deviance) as frames, and then identify the three frames
(misbehavior, sickness, and handicap) that were induced from ethnographic data with
caretakers of adults with autism. I then move on to introduce the three cases of
maladaptive behavior (two among families, one in a school setting) that are the focus of
this paper. In the results I review evidence of the frames preferred by different caretakers
in the three cases, and then explore how the ambiguity of reality and interpretations and
control strategies of other stakeholders led to conflict and negotiation. In the conclusion I
consider how, as structures that are available to individuals in their personal and
professional life, frames of deviance should be viewed as options that stakeholders test
against the ambiguity of reality as they try to come to terms with troubling behavior that
compels interpretation and response.

FRAMING & DEVIANCE
The concept of framing was first introduced into sociology through one of the later works
of Erving Goffman (1974). Goffman defined a frame as a “schemata of interpretation”
that renders events and occurrences as meaningful, and in so doing functions to organize
experience and guide action (1974:21; Snow et al. 1986). Studies that analyze framing
are usually concerned with how the media, organizations, and opinion leaders shape
general views of social phenomenon, particularly phenomena deemed to be social
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Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Though many of these studies
do not explicitly link themselves to the sociology of deviance, in their theoretical and
substantive analyses they rely on themes that were thoroughly explored in that subfield
(Gratett 2011). These studies conceptualize frames as definitions the basic assumptions of
which shape the interpretations of and responses to social problems. An example of three
broad frames often applied to deviant human behavior—in this case the rising rates of
obesity—are delineated in an article by Saguy, Gruys, and Gong (2010): 1) “those on the
political right frame higher body mass as the product of unhealthy choices, casting fat
people [. . .] as morally deviant or even ‘villain’”; 2) “those on the political left blame
social-structural factors including the food industry, car culture, urban planning, or the
prohibitive cost of fresh fruits and vegetables for contributing to an ‘obesigenic’
environment”; and 3) “others attribute body size to biological (including genetic) factors”
(591). The article goes on to explore how these three frames of obesity—individual
choice, socio-structural casualty, and biological symptom—operate in news coverage of
obesity in the French vs. the American media. Despite the similarity between these three
frames and those which will be explored in this paper, my analysis is not interested in
dissecting some of the issues (e.g. the association between political position and preferred
deviance definitions) that studies of framing in the media often are. Moreover, while the
older labeling studies of deviance often focus on “formal agents of social control” in
“institutional settings”—guards in prisons, workers in mental institutions—a considerable
portion of this paper occurs in the privacy of people’s homes (Meier 1982:47). I decided
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noticed some striking similarities in the way conflict and negotiation over frames
occurred in both. I felt this provided an opportunity to talk about framing in both public
and private settings, and to reconsider the distinction that exists between theoretical
characterizations of the nature of problem solving in these two realms (Abbott 1988;
Nussbaum 2006).
	
  
MISBEHAVIOR, SICKNESS, HANDICAP
Though outlined here with the naturalistic settings that are the focus of this paper in
mind, the three frames that characterize stakeholder negotiations over the care of
individuals with autism—misbehavior, sickness, and handicap— roughly correspond
with the individual choice, biological symptom, and socio-structural casualty frames
featured in the paper by Saguy, Gruys and Gong (2010) mentioned above.
Misbehavior refers to deviance that is engaged in willfully, and has as its source
manipulative or malicious intent. In past research this frame has been called “badness,”
and, given the literature’s focus on formal cases, is usually applied to actions defined as
either “sins” or “crimes” (Conrad and Schneider 1992). However, I change the name of
this frame from badness to misbehavior because the stakeholders that are the focus of this
paper don’t typically use words like “sin” and “crime” to describe the actions of those
with autism that are in their care. Caretakers who draw on the misbehavior frame define
the rule-breaker as a rational actor who behaves as they do in order to fulfill “basic
human desires” that they are unable to satisfy through “socially sanctioned” means

	
  
(Tucker 1999:222). Given the self-directed nature of misbehavior, the logic of this
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frame suggests that punishment—a response in which punitive measures attempt to make
the fulfillment of basic desires through unsanctioned means a less attractive endeavor—is
the most appropriate social control strategy.
Sickness refers to deviance stemming from disease, a pathological state that
warrants therapeutic intervention. Framing deviance as sickness leads to interpretations
of behavior in which motivation is removed from the person’s will and relocated to their
body or mind (Conrad 2007). The ontological view of sickness—associated with modern
conceptions of pathology—views disease as caused by an alien biological agent that
somehow enters the body, causes structural damage (e.g. a lesion), and results in a person
having “symptoms” or physical/psychic expressions that deviate from the norm
(Aronowitz 1998). Though the ideal case is disease linked to an infectious agent (e.g. a
virus), damage associated with genetics, toxins, bacteria, or other factors are also
relevant. More importantly, the concept of “compulsion”—actions shaped by forces
beyond a person’s control—has long allowed for medical explanations of behavior
“without requiring conclusive evidence of organic cause” (Conrad and Schneider
1992:273). Based on the logic of the sickness frame, attempts at social control must focus
not on punishing deviance but on treating the underlying pathology and restoring the
individual to their original self. Though the generic response of public health is
prevention as opposed to treatment, interpretations and social control strategies that
borrow from public health concepts—such as “contagion” and “quarantine”—also get

	
  
subsumed under the umbrella of the sickness frame in popular usage (Hoppe 2013;
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Tucker 1999).
Handicap refers to deviance stemming from a disability, a permanent structural
atypicality best controlled through changes to the physical and social environment. The
handicap29 frame defines deviance as behavior that stems from normative motivations,
and is only made deviant by the inability of the disabled person, because of their
handicap, to gratify these needs in a socially acceptable fashion. The ideal case is a
physical handicap, such as an amputated leg or a paralyzed arm. The most basic response
to a handicap is to change the physical environment by way of a “prosthesis,” a
replacement for the compromised structure (e.g. a prosthetic limb, a wheelchair) that
facilitates normative function. The disability rights and anti-psychiatry movements
expanded the handicap frame from physical to neurocognitive disabilities and extended
the technique of environmental change from the concrete to the social world.
Specifically, it was proposed that the marginalization of the disabled was due largely to
discrimination and stigma (social barriers) and not the organic processes responsible for
their disability (Eyal et al. 2010; Goffman 1961b; Shapiro 1993; Scotch and Schriner
1997). In one of the major syntheses of this extension Wolf Wolfensberger (1972) argued
that the mentally retarded (today, the intellectually disabled) could be deinstitutionalized
if people in the community acted like social prostheses. In other words, just as a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
29	
  “A note on terminology: in the disability literature, ‘impairment’ is a loss of normal
bodily function; a ‘disability’ is something you can’t do in your environment as a result; a
‘handicap’ is the resultant competitive advantage” (Nussbaum 2006:423). Though I am
not concerned with how an impairment influences competitive advantage, I use the word
handicap instead of disability in order to retain the focus on the disabled person’s
relationship with others.	
  	
  

	
  
prosthetic limb allows a physically disabled person to function more normatively, a
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social prosthesis—an aid, a friend, a family member—can act as translator between the
cognitively disabled individual and the human community around them (Eyal et al. 2010;
see also Goode 1994). In so proposing, Wolfensberger (1972) made communication a
crutch by which the seemingly deviant behavior of the cognitively disabled was
overcome, allowing them to be “normalized” so that they could navigate and participate
in everyday social life. His is among the most influential of the “social-contextual”
approaches to disability that formed the backbone of the disability rights movement
(Shakespeare 2006:9).

THE VOGLERS, THE HAMILTONS & MARIA WAGNER’S CLASS
The Vogler family consists of Anderson (52), Marge (52), Tom (20), Brian (19), and Jack
(16). I lived with the Voglers for eight days in the spring of 2013. Brian, diagnosed with
autism at the age of four, supplies a frenetic and quirky element to his family’s domestic
life. His interactions with family members, and theirs with him, are often affectionate,
empathic, and humorous. I first got to know the Voglers over the course of three separate
days in the summer of 2011. Despite leaving me, the first time I visited, with the overall
impression of a happy family, signs of a more ambivalent relationship between Brian and
his loved ones quickly surfaced. Jack’s hesitance around his brother, Marge’s mention of
a “tough period,” and Anderson’s reference to weekly aggressive tantrums served as
preamble to a more complex reality.
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Brian’s tough period was characterized by unpredictable and dogged physical

violence. For roughly two years, Brian Vogler (age 14-16) engaged in routine aggression
towards his family and home. In attacks usually targeting his parents, Brian persistently
tried to bite shoulders, scratch faces, pinch arms, and kick legs. Sometimes the proximate
cause of his agitation was clear: orders given (“Brian close the refrigerator!”) or desires
blocked (a tape jammed in the VCR). Other times the proximate trigger was a mystery.
However, everyone recognized the primary antecedent: a “dead look” composed of
clenched teeth, slack mouth, and blazing eyes. Three times out of four Brian would go for
his father. Weekly attacks—lasting fifteen minutes to an hour—were punctuated by epic
meltdowns—like the time Brian attacked his dad on a plane, forcing the pilot to execute
an emergency landing. The damage and injuries caused by Brian’s tantrums, and the
anxiety and logistics of preparing for their occurrence pushed all members of the Vogler
family to analyze the source of the violence. Brian’s aggression quickly dissipated a
month before I visited the family in 2011, around the same time that the doses of two
medications he was taking—Zoloft and Risperdal—were decreased.
The Hamilton family consists of Chrissie (64), Heather (55), Meg (25), Drew
(23), and Ross (22). Though Heather and Chrissie are now separated, they were in a
relationship for almost 30 years. Ross, who is diagnosed with autism, is Chrissie’s
biological child, and Drew and Meg are Heather’s. Since Chrissie and Heather used the
same sperm donor to conceive their children, Ross, Drew, and Meg share the same father.
I first met Chrissie and Drew—along with Chrissie’s girlfriend, Sally—when I joined
them for dinner in 2011. I reconnected with them and spent time with all the other
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members of the family—including Heather—intermittently over the span of a couple
weeks in the summer of 2013. When I first met Ross, I immediately noticed his striking
features: close-cut auburn hair, trim beard, blue eyes, and a charming, devious smile. I
also noticed his perseverative behavior—defined as the repetition of a particular
response, such as a word, phrase, or gesture, despite the absence or cessation of a
stimulus—that is commonly associated with a diagnosis of autism, and is believed to
stem from efforts to deal with anxiety (Volkmar and Wiesner 2009). During a lunch I
shared with Ross and Chrissie, Ross asked for soda dozens of times—“sodabilet” he
would say (his phrase for “soda please”). Throughout the meal, Chrissie tried hard not to
grant Ross’s request (he had already had a soda earlier in the day). Though Chrissie
obviously loves spending time with her son—she often says things like “isn’t he just the
cutest” and “he’s such a great kid”—it was clear how time-consuming Ross could be
(eventually Chrissie gave in and got Ross a soda, and then another one on the way back
to his group home). However, the energy associated with managing Ross’s perseverative
behaviors seems mundane when compared to all that went into dealing with the selfinjury that characterized his two-year long behavioral crisis.
Soon after Chrissie and Heather separated and right before his 18th birthday, Ross
began to engage in increasingly severe self-injurious behavior. Ross’s behavioral crisis
started innocently enough when he began picking a spot on the back of his neck after a
routine haircut. Besides Chrissie’s break-up with Heather, other changes in Ross’s life
included his brother leaving home for college and two in-home aids—both of whom had
been working with Ross for six years—leaving to pursue other opportunities. Within
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began picking at other parts of his body as well. Ross’s new staff did not have the
experience to respond to his self-injurious behavior. Moreover, things got so bad that the
school Ross attended—one of the best autism specific schools in the country—decided
that they were not equipped to manage his behavior anymore. Over the course of six
months, Ross was shuttled between local hospitals and a major psychiatric crisis center.
He dropped down to 102 lbs. Since he was six feet tall, this weight loss left Ross
emaciated. At the nadir of his suffering, he contracted a dangerous infection and almost
died. Ross turned a corner in the months after Chrissie moved her son to a developmental
center at the urging of a friend who worked there. Chrissie believes that the center took
“pressure” off of her son, but it still took about a year before Ross was moved back into
the community.
Maria Wagner (62) is a special education teacher at North Point (NPHS), a public
high school in a suburban school district; she teaches a group of six students who are all
diagnosed with autism. I personally got to know Maria in the winter of 2013 when I
followed one of her students—a seventeen-year-old male with autism from one of the
families in my study—to school. During the course of that week I spent time with Maria,
her students, her staff, and other individuals working in the special education department.
Through interviews, conversations, and observations, I learned about the level of
coordination often required in order to serve developmentally disabled youth in the
context of a mainstream high school. Given the reality that she is there teacher, my
analysis of Mrs. Wagner’s class will revolve largely around her experience working with
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responsibility enforced by Maria’s superordinate’s). Maria is exceptionally warm to those
around her, particularly her students. Despite the seeming softness that her affection lends
to her manner, Maria takes her responsibilities very seriously and speaks fluently about
the strenuous and demanding nature of her job. She is constantly observing and analyzing
her student’s behavior. For example, she spends first period every day “getting a read” on
her students’ moods because it helps Maria to determine what type of behavior to expect
from each of them that day. Maria also told me about—and I was able to observe—the
physically challenging aspects of her job. Trained in physical education and a girl’s
soccer and field hockey coach on the side, Maria claims that her athleticism is important
because, “you have to be healthy when you work with these kids.” Indeed, despite her
belief—professed to me several times—that her student’s participate as equally as
possible in the social life of the school, Maria has faced a variety of situations in which
behavior on the part of her kids has challenged the ideal of inclusion that she values so
highly.
Maria described several incidents to me in which she had to deal with behavior
from one of her students that was so disruptive that it threatened the smooth operation of
the school and their membership in the community it represents. A few years before we
talked, one of Maria’s students, Zach, pulled a fire alarm in the hallway of the school.
Zach was hauled down to a conference room in the main office where fire police, in the
presence of school administrators, “yelled” at him, and tried to determine “why he did
that.” Two days later, another one of Maria’s male students, Preston, also pulled a fire
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moments before the end of the school day, and the consequent delay in buses (the high
school, middle school, and elementary school share the same batch of vehicles) pushed
back pick-up times for the entire district. Given the degree to which Preston’s behavior,
even more so than Zach’s, disrupted the smooth flow of the school day, the fire police
and school administrators were even more upset and Maria and her students became the
targets of even more negative attention.
Another challenging experience that Maria shared with me featured a student in
her class, named Darrin, who became the focus of the principal’s concern after he learned
that Darrin was liable to undress and masturbate in public. In response to his increasing
predilection to strip down naked and stimulate himself, Darrin’s parents, in consultation
with a behavioral therapist, created a program in which he was taught to go to his room
and close the door when he wanted to masturbate. For sanitary purposes they also taught
Darrin to use a diaper for clean up. Unfortunately, this led Darrin to associate diapers—
indeed, a variety of padded objects—with masturbation. During a couple unfortunate
episodes in middle school, Darrin saw an object that resembled a diaper and consequently
initiated the behavior in public. On one occasion Darrin’s middle school teacher tried to
intervene, and in response Darrin gave his teacher a punch that landed her in the hospital.
When Darrin started high school he was placed in Maria’s class. Maria was well
informed about the behavioral issues that had been such a challenge to Darrin’s previous
instructor. Maria devised a variety of methods (e.g. not allowing Darrin to visit a local
market with the rest of the class for fear he would undress in the aisle that sold diapers) in

	
  
order to avoid scenes. Maria also decided to inform key school personnel who she
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believed would support her efforts to accommodate Darrin’s challenging behavior. It was
because of this second decision that Maria had a challenging run-in with the school
principal. Below I explore the Voglers’ framing of Brian’s aggression, Chrissie and
Heather’s framing of Ross’s behavior in the decades before and then during his crisis,
and the framing of various difficult behaviors exhibited by Mrs. Wagner’s students by
North Point school administrators, community authority figures, and Maria herself.
	
  
MISBEHAVIOR: ANDERSON, HEATHER, AND THE NORTH POINT FIRE POLICE
The intensity and regularity of his son’s aggression, his role as primary target during the
attacks, and his sense of responsibility for protecting his family all contributed to
Anderson Vogler’s view of Brian’s tantrums as misbehavior. During Brian’s 14th year,
the increasing frequency and severity of his rages convinced Anderson that in order to
effectively respond to his son’s behavior he needed to change his own daily routine. As a
husband and father, Anderson felt it was his duty to protect his wife and two other sons.
To this end, Anderson started coming home everyday before Brian got off the bus. After
Brian got home, Anderson would keep a vigilant eye on him, hoping to catch any signs of
trouble. If a few days went by and no tantrum occurred, Anderson and his family knew
that one was likely imminent. When an episode did invariably occur, Anderson would do
his best to take the brunt of the abuse: “biting was the worst, I still have scars to this
day.” Sometimes Anderson was able to re-direct Brian by saying things like “you’re
hurting me!” In response, Brian might, for example, go to his bedroom and spend his

	
  
aggression on the walls. Other times, verbal complaints were not as successful in
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deterring Brian, and he would continue to scratch, hit, and/or bite his father. Sometimes,
when his son continued to aggress against him, Anderson’s own response would become
aggressive in character. For example, he might restrain Brian or push him away from
other family members. In the periods between Brian’s tantrums, Anderson would often
ruminate over possible explanations for his son’s violent actions. These explanations
typically characterized Brian’s behavior as willful and predatory:
I’ll kick it around in my head all the time, just trying to figure out why
he’d get aggressive and why only at us. Is it just like he’s holding it in and
like I’m just going to take it out on you? Are we doing something to
highly piss him off or it’s that old you only hurt the ones you love kind of
thing?
The specificity of Brian’s targeting shaped Anderson’s sense that the attacks were
intentional and malicious—“I’m just going to take it out on you.” Even if it was possible
that he and his family might be triggering Brian’s behavior—“are we doing something to
highly piss him off?”—Anderson still found it very troubling that Brian limited his
attacks to loved ones. Given his framing of his son’s aggressive behavior, Anderson’s
offensive tactics were meant to control the tantrums and make it clear to Brian that his
actions were unacceptable. In other words, Anderson employed his physicality as a
punitive measure meant to deter actions that he defined as misbehavior.
The unpleasant and persistent nature of Ross Hamilton’s most challenging
childhood and adolescent behaviors increasingly shaped Heather’s belief that they were
most accurately framed as misbehavior. In addition to perseverating on his favorite
snacks (e.g. soda), Heather Hamilton listed public nudity, masturbation, feces smearing,

	
  
and “elopement” (wandering away, see Anderson et al., 2012) as some of her son’s
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toughest behaviors:
He went through years of smearing feces. That was a lot of fun to clean up [. . .]
Then he got into this masturbating phase, that was just about as much fun [. . .]
When he masturbated, not only did he masturbate, but anything that was pourable
he would pour on his penis, and masturbate with that. It could be shampoo, so the
entire bottle he would pour on himself [. . .] or, you know, lotions, anything,
again, that was pourable, he would just pour all over his body, all over his
bedroom, and then go to town. You never knew what you were cleaning up.
Though these experiences were challenging to everyone in the family, Heather
increasingly became the one most likely to frame Ross’ actions as misbehavior. She
believes that despite Ross’s impairments, he often knew when he was doing something
naughty. Heather also believes that the most effective response to Ross’s problem
behaviors would have been stricter discipline. To illustrate how she tried to act on this
belief, Heather told me that she would often tell Ross to “get back to your room” when he
engaged in the habit of, for example, walking around the house naked:
Fifty percent of the time he would listen, and run upstairs, and maybe put
a pair of underpants on, or maybe go to his room [. . .] he was being
defiant, he knew what that meant to go to his room and get clothes on, he
knew exactly what that meant, but he wasn’t getting attention.
Though Heather recognized that sometimes Ross did listen, she viewed his actions and
half-hearted compliance as examples of him manipulating those around him. As Ross
aged, Heather became increasingly distressed by the burdens of managing his behavior.
She spoke about him running around the house naked and making noises while friends of
her other children were over; though some friends got used to it, Heather was bothered by
not having any control over the environment of the house. The situation became ever
more volatile as Ross’s increasing size made it difficult for Heather to have recourse to

	
  
more physical means of control (e.g. picking him up, and putting him in his room).
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Indeed, it was his physical maturation that fully convinced Heather that Ross needed a
disciplinary structure that she and her family were not equipped to provide.
When two of Maria Wagner’s students initiated false fire alarms only a couple
days apart, the misbehavior frame of deviance shaped the response of community
authorities. Before lunchtime on a regular school day Zach, one of Maria’s six students,
yanked the lever of one of the red fire alarm pull stations in the school’s hallway and set
off a school wide fire drill. When the fire police who responded to the call learned that
there wasn’t actually a fire, Zach was taken to a conference room in the main office for
questioning. Maria explains what happened next:
The boy was nonverbal, and they had him in the conference room, yelling
at him, saying ‘why did you do it?’ And this boy just smiles. That’s all he
did. Because he didn’t talk.
The fire police who responded to the drill interrogated Maria’s non-verbal student hoping
to determine why he pulled the alarm. Their reaction to the boy’s behavior was anchored
in the misbehavior frame of deviance because: (1) they asked the boy to account for the
reason he pulled the drill—a question that frames his behavior as self directed, and (2)
they posed their questions in an angry tone, an emotional valiance that often carries
punitive overtones. In response to the “yelling,” the boy—unable to speak—sat in a chair
smiling. The fire police interpreted this as a sign of obstinacy. They also interpreted it as
further evidence that the boy did indeed pull the alarm out of his own volition, and thus
felt more secure in their presumed definition of the situation. Despite this conviction,
once Maria arrived she convinced the police to let the boy off the hook: “I said, ‘No, no,

	
  
no, you don’t get it. Let’s just take care of him, and then I will talk to any questions
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you have.” Two days after Zach pulled the fire alarm, another student in Maria’s class—a
boy named Preston—did the same thing. This time around the fire drill set back the entire
district’s bus-pick-up schedule, and the fire police extended their framing of the situation
to include Maria: “’We cannot have this happening. You’re endangering lives,’ and it
was all directed at me [. . .] because I don’t have control of the two students that did it.”
Though Maria wasn’t the one who pulled the alarm, she was defined as misbehaving
because she was unable to stop her students from undermining the normal operation of
the school. Though the fire police were the ones asking the questions, Maria explained
that school administrators who were present did not try and defend her or her students:
“They were firing at me. My department head was standing there not saying anything.”
Besides disagreeing with the way that the police were framing the situation, Maria also
had major critiques of the social control strategy they advocated based on their definition
of the situation: “I just sat there saying in my head, ‘You guys have no idea what you’re
talking about.’ They said, ‘We need to come talk to your kids.’ I said, ‘That would be
great. You come talk to my kids.’” (If it is not obvious from this comment, Maria’s tone,
when she told me about this particular response, carried clear overtones of sarcasm).
	
  
HANDICAP: TOM, CHRISSIE, AND MARIA WAGNER
Tom Vogler’s belief that his younger brother’s aggression stemmed from a struggle to
communicate with the family shaped his interpretation of and response to Brian’s
tantrums. Around the time his tantrums began, Brian’s weight ballooned to 230 lbs. In the

	
  
first year of the tough period, Tom, a freshman standing 5’ 2’’, could do little more
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than get out of the way during Brian’s attacks. However, by his junior year Tom had
experienced a growth spurt, and his maturation gave him the courage to start assisting his
father during violent episodes. Yet, despite his willingness to help his father, Tom had a
different interpretation of Brian’s aggression:
A lot of the time it was provoked by pushing him too far [. . .] Me and
Jack used to play basketball in the hallway and we would ask Brian to
play, and a lot of the time he just did not want to play. We kind of
encouraged him, ‘oh Brian take another shot dude, pass the ball,’ and he
would all of a sudden get frustrated [. . .] he would usually give you a look
or he’d repeat something back angrily like ‘shoot the ball.’ He’d say it like
he really was pissed off. There were a lot of times where he would give
you a quick reaction, like he’d give you a pinch, or he’d give you a push.
Then it would be done. ‘I’m done, leave me alone.’ He probably learned
that from me and Jack. ‘These guys express themselves to each other by
hitting each other and wrestling’ so maybe he was just trying to emulate
that.
Tom framed Brian’s aggression as a reasonable response to the challenges associated
with his functional deficits. While Anderson viewed Brian’s attacks as mystifying (“why
would he attack his family?”), Tom believed that pinches and pushes were often
associated with clear situational stressors like being “pushed too far.” Moreover, while
Anderson viewed Brian’s attacks as unacceptable (“you can’t do this”), Tom viewed
them as stemming from Brian’s need to share reasonable desires that his disability made
it difficult for him to communicate in a non-deviant fashion. Tom expressed the
possibility that Brian might have started to use aggression to communicate because he
observed his brothers doing the same (for a discussion of sibling roughhousing as the
most prevalent form of violence, see Collins, 2008). Whether or not this was the case, the
handicap frame shaped Tom’s interpretation of his brother’s aggression.
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The handicap frame also shaped the tactics Tom used to respond to Brian’s

attacks. When Tom helped to control his brother’s tantrums, he would often start by
getting Brian away from Anderson:
I would never like try to hurt Brian or anything, it was just get him away
from my dad because, you know, sometimes those two would like go at
each other and it was not helping for my dad to like return fire because it's
not going to do anything. And I know he was just trying to separate, like
just trying to get him away and tell him like you can't do this, but a lot of
times it was just like you'd need to separate the two rather than like keep
them going at each other and like wear him out or something.
While Tom was not opposed to using his body to move Brian away from his dad, once he
transitioned Brian to another location he worked to keep himself out of his brother’s
reach. He would then use words to try and determine what was making Brian so
frustrated. “Brian, what’s wrong” he would ask. Sometimes Brian would answer, saying
things like “head hurts” or “don’t do that.” In pressing his brother to use words, Tom
worked off the assumption that Brian’s aggression stemmed from a struggle to
communicate. Physically isolating his brother and questioning him were changes that
Tom made to Brian’s social environment, and he hoped that these changes would allow
his brother to satisfy his needs using a less deviant mode of communication.
Chrissie Hamilton believes that a majority of her son Ross’s most challenging
behaviors represent determined attempts to communicate his social desires to those
around him. During the lunch I shared with Chrissie and Ross, I had an opportunity to
observe how persistent Ross’s perseverations—like requests for soda—can be. Chrissie
explained to me that she believes her son’s perseverations manifest themselves when
Ross feels excluded from social interaction:
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If I am with him, and I’m just talking to him the whole time, he can have a
glass of soda there and he won’t sip it at all [but] you’re there, and I’m
talking to you, and I’m trying to include him, but ah, and that happens a
lot, I think, you know, not so much at this [group home] because I think
they do engage, but in the other [group home] they would be in the room,
nobody would ever talk, and he is going to do something to get your
attention.

Chrissie interprets her son’s atypical behaviors as the only way—given his
impairments—for him to communicate a typical human desire. Chrissie points to the
reality that when she is alone with her son, he will not obsess over his favorite treats, like
soda, even if they are sitting right in front of him. She also states that Ross’s behavior has
improved since moving from his old group home, where a neglectful staff caused his
attention-seeking behaviors to increase. Given that most people desire social inclusion,
Chrissie sees her son’s problem behaviors as a reasonable response to the functional
deficits that characterize autism.
Maria’s preference for the handicap frame of deviance is driven by her desire to
integrate her students into the social life of North Point High School as much as possible.
When she talked to me about the homeroom period that North Point struck from the
schedule some years back, Maria implicitly illustrated the import she places in having her
kids interact as much as possible with other students in the high school: “It was
homeroom here until a couple years ago [. . .] that was one time they were out in the
mainstream [. . .] there were good role models around them.” Maria views interaction
with North Point’s “mainstream” students as important, both in its modeling of social
behavior for her students and—as she explained during another conversation—by
exposing typically developing students to individuals representing another form of human
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diversity. Her desire for inclusion is one of the forces driving Maria’s distaste for ideas
that might cause her students to be segregated. Included in this are applications of the
sickness and badness frame of deviance, definitions that tend to stigmatize individuals
labeled as rule-breakers (Conrad & Schneider 1992).
In cases where Maria is able to predict that one of her student’s—because of some
habitual behavior—is likely to invite negative attention, she looks to shape the school’s
social environment so that the social control strategy used is in accordance with the
handicap frame of deviance. For example, when Maria learned that a student assigned to
her class (Darrin) had, on several occasions, undressed and masturbated while in middle
school, she decided to notify school administrators and security guards:
Well first of all [. . .] I made everyone aware of it in the school that needed
to, like I needed to tell security and the head of security and then the
guards look at, found his picture to make sure that if I make a call to them
they knew who I was [. . .] [I] talked to the principal and I met with him
for a long time. Well, my supervisor and everybody, I mean, everybody
needed to know.
Maria let the security guards know who Darrin was so that if he was found doing
something inappropriate and someone called them about it they would understand that his
behavior was a result of his disability. She also explained to them that if they tried to
intervene in his public nudity or masturbation, it was possible that Darrin would strike
out at them. Once again, Maria explained to the guards that this behavior was to be
framed as a misunderstanding, and not further evidence of any malicious undercurrents
driving Darrin’s actions. Finally, Maria asked all of the security guards, in the event that
Darrin was caught masturbating, to contact her immediately so that she could respond to
the behavior according to the handicap frame of deviance. For Maria this means working
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with the school’s behavioral specialist to figure out a way to communicate with Darrin
when it is and is not appropriate to masturbate. What it does not mean—and what she
explained to the security guards—is trying to physically restrain Darrin once he has
already initiated the behavior: “ [. . .] according to the behavior specialist if you try to
stop it, it’s just not a good thing [. . .] [Ben: he’ll flip out?] [. . .] So she suggested [a
woman who Maria used to work with who still gives her counsel], you know, she told me
to tell the security guard and work with the behavioral specialist.” This is why Maria told
the security guards that if they intercepted Darrin acting deviantly, they should just call
her and she would handle it.
	
  
SICKNESS: MARGE, CHRISSIE, HEATHER, AND NORTH POINTS’S PRINCIPAL
The language that Marge Vogler uses to describe Brian’s tantrums is clearly a product of
the sickness frame. Marge links a majority of her son’s aggressive episodes to somatic
processes over which he had no control:
It is as if someone else comes into him, and he is not himself [. . .] To me
there was always something underlying, it wasn’t his personality, and
being medical [Marge is a Nurse], he always had these ear infections [. . .]
I think part of it was the way his head felt when he was on all of these
drugs.
Marge does not believe that Brian ever intentionally attacked his family. Rather, she
characterized the difference between his usual behavior and behavior during tantrums as
“a split personality type of thing that he isn’t there” but could see what he was doing. One
of the most compelling pieces of evidence supporting this interpretation was that in the
aftermath of his tantrums, Brian would sometimes go up to a person he had hurt and say

	
  
“’I so sorry,’ literally crying and making all of us cry.” Marge posits a reaction to
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prescription drugs as one of the primary culprits. These include Zoloft, first given to treat
Brian’s obsessive behaviors (e.g. vigorous hand washing), and Risperdal, given in
tandem with Zoloft when a psychiatrist suggested that the Zoloft might be responsible for
Brian’s aggression and weight gain. To support her view of Brian’s aggression as likely
caused by drug reactions, Marge points to the association between tapering his doses and
the virtual disappearance of tantrums. However, Marge also blames dietary allergies for
her son’s behavior. She told me that her son was diagnosed with Celiac’s disease and a
milk allergy, and that she noticed improvements in his behavior as she took wheat and
dairy out of his diet. Marge employed the sickness frame to interpret her son’s aggression
as the result of various biological processes. Drawing on the logic of this frame, Marge
“weeded” out the etiological factors that she believed were the source of the underlying
pathology.
Marge’s preferred social control strategy for dealing with Brian’s tantrums was
also shaped by the sickness frame. Marge learned how to handle patients with psychiatric
issues when she worked as an ER nurse: “the most important thing to do is de-escalate
the situation [. . .] put something in between you and the person, and talk them down as
opposed to getting physical.” Marge applied this tactic to her son, arguing that the best
way to handle his tantrums was to separate him from the rest of the family. As with
mentally unstable patients in the ER, Marge felt that using physical tactics with Brian
would only make things worse. While the use of words might seem contraindicated if
Brian was not himself, it is possible to make sense of “talking someone down” if we

	
  
interpret it as appealing to their true, though at the moment compromised, self.
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Essentially, Marge advocated a form of quarantine so that the processes controlling
Brian’s behavior might run their course while at the same time minimizing the damage
they did to others.
Though Chrissie and Heather Hamilton disagreed about how best to interpret and
respond to Ross’s behavior when he was younger, both women switched to a medical
frame of deviance to make sense of their son’s actions during his behavioral crisis.
Heather saw sickness as the only logical explanation for the profoundly self-destructive
behavior her son exhibited during his crisis:
It was just very self destructive [. . .] I think hormonally he was in a rage [.
. .] I don’t know if Chrissie showed you the pictures [. . .] you know he
gauged his skin down to the muscle. Uhm, by the time we got him to the
ER, he looked beyond what a battered child would look like if you took a
baseball bat to them. He had black and blues up and down his body from
pinching. He would just sit there, I don’t know how anybody could do
this. And would pinch his skin until it turned black [. . .] And then he
would start gauging, gauging until he was drawing blood, and then going
into his muscle. How do you not feel that? [. . .] No this was almost a
psychotic break of sorts [. . .] At one point we had him wearing a football
uniform [. . .] The paddings, the helmet, the shirt. He even had to wear it
to bed.
Heather compares Ross’s deviance during the crisis to a psychotic break. Following
through on the logic of the sickness frame, she grasps for some biological process—a
“hormonal rage” in this case—to explain Ross’s behavior. Placing him in a football
uniform demonstrates one strategy the family used to protect Ross from the processes
that had hijacked his body. Of course, it might seem contradictory that the Hamiltons
used a football uniform—essentially, an outfit meant to physically restrain Ross—when
Marge Vogler used the same definition of Brian’s behavior to justify avoiding physical
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restraint. Yet, Chrissie points to Ross’s own growing preference for physical restraint
during his crisis as evidence for starting to define him as sick:
[At first] there was an attention-seeking piece, but once it became kind of
imbedded as one of his routines, it became kind of a compulsion. So he
didn’t seem to be able to stop himself. That’s when we began to first see
the self-restraining behavior [. . .] where he would wrap his hands up in a
towel or anything to keep himself from hurting himself.
Chrissie believed that though at first Ross’s picking was similar to earlier attentionseeking behavior, soon his self-injury took on a life of its own. Ross’s attempts to restrain
himself or have others restrain him seemed to indicate that he required outside mediation
to stop his body from doing things that his true self did not want it to do. A particularly
stark example of this was when Ross, while in a psychiatric ward, came to prefer being in
a straight jacket. For Marge, her sense that Brian was not in control of his tantrums, that
his violence towards others were symptoms of an underlying pathology, made physical
restraint too punitive a response. Given Chrissie’s belief that forces beyond his control
drove Ross’s violence towards his own body, she determined that the best way to protect
her son was to interfere with his attempts to injure himself.
When Maria Wagner explained to the principal of the school that one of her
students (Darrin) was liable to strip naked and masturbate at the site of diapers and
objects that resembled them, the principal responded in a fashion that opposed the
handicap frame of deviance. On the advice of an ex-supervisor that she continues to
consult to this day, Maria decided to tell key school administrators about the potentially
problematic consequences of Darrin’s home program for his behavior in school:
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I met with [the principal] for a long time [. . .] he reacted like ‘what is he
doing here, why, he should not be in this school’ [. . .] ‘From what I
understand he was in middle school?’ ‘Did he do it in middle school?’

Despite Maria’s belief that Darrin’s behavior must be dealt with through effective staff
communication, the principal’s question as to why a boy who masturbates in public is
allowed in the school at all suggests a social control strategy shaped by a definition other
than the handicap frame. However, the certainty ends there as to the principals’ preferred
frame of deviance, as I did not schedule an interview with him and thus had to rely on
Maria’s sparse comments to chronicle his response. Removing Darrin from the school is
a social control strategy that, in this particular case, could be based on the logic of either
the sickness or the misbehavior frame. Specifically, principal might have viewed Darrin’s
behavior as pathological, and thus his response—“he should not be in this school”—
would constitute a social control strategy akin to a quarantine. Having Darrin quarantined
for sexually inappropriate behavior is analogous to the response of some court precedents
that frame those with certain forms of sexually deviant behavior as having a “highly
contagious disease” that society is justified in “quarantining, if they [threaten] to
contaminate the public at large” (Tucker, 1999: 226).
Despite evidence that the principal’s interpretation and preferred social control
strategy were shaped by the sickness frame, his question as to how long the behavior had
been going on—“did he do it in middle school?”—suggests the possibility that he defined
Darrin’s actions using the misbehavior frame of deviance. Emily Bosk (2013) has
demonstrated that youth with behavioral issues who are framed as sick and then fail to
‘get better,’ are at risk for having new episodes of the same deviant behavior reframed as

	
  
instances of badness. The principal’s question as to whether Darrin had engaged in
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public masturbation in middle school suggests that he was weighing the possibility that
his continued deviance was actually a sign of misbehavior. If the principal’s preferred
frame of deviance for Darrin’s public masturbation was misbehavior, then having Darrin
removed from the school—though apparently the same as a “quarantine”—would
actually constitute a punitive measure as opposed to a therapeutic or preventative
measure. If the principal had suggested what type of institution should replace the school
in coordinating Darrin’s daily care—a behavioral health unit, or a disciplinary school—it
might have provided more clues as to which frame of deviance he preferred for Darrin’s
case. Of course, the ambiguity of the principal’s preferred frame rests in this case on the
small amount of information we have about his views of Darrin. However, even if I had
been able to talk to the principal, it is possible that his comments would not have lain to
rest all ambiguity concerning his position. Indeed, in most of the cases that I explore in
this paper, stakeholders—despite various comments that suggested a preference for one
frame over others—provided evidence of considering interpretations and/or social control
strategies that were in accordance with opposing frames of deviance.
	
  
AMBIGUITY
Despite having compelling arguments for the frame that they chose, Anderson, Tom, and
Marge Vogler all mentioned interpretations and/or acted on strategies of social control
that contradicted the assumptions underlying their chosen frame. While Anderson’s
frame interpreted Brian’s aggression as self-directed, he also mentioned his belief that
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drugs probably did play some role in his son’s behavior. In so doing he acknowledged
that Brian’s behavior was at least partly due to biological processes that were outside of
his control. Moreover, looking back at Anderson’s comments about his son earlier in the
paper—specifically, his suggestion that the family might be doing something to “highly
piss him off”—suggests that his behavior might be a form of communication, an
interpretation inline with the handicap frame of deviance. Tom viewed Brian’s
aggression, and the way that he targeted his family, as the result of frustrations associated
with difficulty communicating. However, he also admitted that the few times he
experienced an injury during Brian’s tantrums led him to sympathize with his dad:
“[then] I kind of understood why my dad might get really frustrated.” Tom’s comment
highlights that if he was in his dad’s role he might be more inclined to see Brian’s
behavior as self directed and predatory. Moreover, though Tom didn’t mention this
explicitly, the reality that he primarily targeted his father complicates the interpretation
that his behavior was entirely a form of communication. Though Marge preferred to
frame Brian’s aggression as a symptom of an underlying pathology, she also told me that
it is possible that her son learned some of his aggressive behavior from students in his
autism class who got violent. I just so happened that around the time Brian began getting
violent he became the target of some aggressive behavior from another individual with
autism. Now, according to Tom—who suggested that Brian’s aggression might have been
a form of communication he learned from his brothers—imitation is a behavior best
interpreted by the handicap frame of deviance. Thus, Marge’s suggestion that Brian
imitated violence from his classmates is an interpretation that is based on the assumptions

	
  
of a frame different from the one she prefers. Besides providing interpretations that
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were at least partly in contradiction to their preferred frame of deviance, I encountered
instances in which ambiguity was based in the reality that the same piece of evidence was
used to support a different definition of Brian’s aggression.
The ambiguity the Voglers faced in trying to understand Brian’s behavior is also
nicely demonstrated by those instances when Anderson, Marge, and Tom all used the
same piece of evidence to support their chosen frame. One characteristic of Brian’s
tantrums that Anderson, Tom, and Marge interpreted differently was the persistence with
which Brian tried to make physical contact with someone during his tantrums. Anderson
viewed Brian’s determination as a sign that it was his son’s intention to hurt his loved
ones. Tom applied the handicap frame, arguing that Brian’s persistence showed how
strong was his desire to communicate with his family. Marge spoke of her son’s need to
make contact as a form of “physical feedback,” the result of the compulsions that shaped
his behavior. These different interpretations highlight the reality that the ambiguity of
deviance rests not only in the diversity of evidence, but also on the multivocality often
inherent in the same piece of evidence. 30
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In an example of a caretaker struggling between the sickness and misbehavior frame of
deviance, I overheard one father state in a conversation with friends about his adult son
with autism: “You know we had the knobs of every freakin door in the house changed [. .
.] we had combo locks, so what’s the big deal, but this is our son, if it was a stranger,
he’d be out of there [. . .] believe me, I’ve had times, and I am not proud of this, but I
have had times where I have gotten in his face, and screamed, because quite frankly, like
any other kid, he knows what he’s doing is wrong. Now some things are, some things he
is driven to do, but some things he just willfully does [. . .] You know he is bad too
sometimes, he is not good all of the time, and you know, you think you say, yeah, he
knows, and to sit there and say that he doesn’t, he doesn’t do bad things, is incorrect.”
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Though the rift between Chrissie’s framing and Heather’s framing of their son

Ross’s behavior continued to widen through his adolescence, both women did and said
things that acknowledged the logic of the other’s point of view. Chrissie’s view was that
Ross’s difficult behavior when he was young constituted his way of communicating a
reasonable desire for social inclusion. However, she admitted that sometimes his
attention seeking became manipulative or compulsive in nature. For example, she pointed
to instances when Ross, in the midst of a perseveration, would act in a way that suggested
a level reflexivity and devious intent: “when he’s doing things, like he’s doing it and he’s
looking at you, and then he’s doing it, and that’s probably manipulation.” Though
Heather had her commitments to the misbehavior frame, an interview with her daughter,
Meg, suggested that she was open to other definitions. Meg told me that when she was
young there were many times that Ross would go into her bedroom and destroy her
belongings. When she got angry with him, believing that he acted intentionally and
“knew what he was doing,” Heather would scold her and say, “you shouldn’t get angry at
him, he doesn’t understand.” This comment demonstrates Heather’s view that Ross did
not always know what he was doing, or act with the intention of doing damage. As Ross
got older and more difficult to manage, Heather had a harder time viewing his behavior
as free of intention. Chrissie’s interpretation of Ross’s attention-seeking behavior as he
grew differed in that she saw it as a further expression of his need for inclusion.
Despite agreeing that Ross’s self-injurious behavior during the crisis is best
understood through the sickness frame, both Chrissie and Heather behaved in ways and
said things that undermined this shared definition. When Ross entered his behavioral
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(Handicap and Misbehavior) and both started to define their son’s new deviance as
evidence of sickness. Despite showing increasing loyalty to this new definition, they both
said things which seemed to contradict the assumptions of the sickness frame of
deviance. For example, though Chrissie felt that her son was not in control of his
behavior during the crisis, she struggled, at times, with the implications of his behavior if
analyzed using her old preferred frame, the handicap frame. Meg attested to this conflict
when she told me about conversations she had with her mom while Ross was in the
hospital: “That’s what she said, that he was upset, you know. Whenever Ross is upset,
Chrissie gets very upset, just like, ‘he can’t communicate why he’s upset, so he’s doing
this, and I don’t know what he wants,’ and that like really like gets her.” Though at times
Chrissie interpreted Ross’s self-injury as out of his control, at other times she interpreted
it as a desperate attempt to communicate something—a message she was unable to
decipher. In these instances Meg would try to shift Chrissie back to the medical frame of
deviance by saying that “it is not because of you” and “we’ve got to trust the doctors.”
Though Heather framed Ross’s self-injury as a sickness, on more than one occasion she
described his behavior as beyond explanation. While this section has explored the
ambiguity that undermines definitions of deviance, Heather’s statement suggest that the
inability to even apply a frame might be the ultimate form of ambiguity (Frank 1995).
Despite her steady resistance to the frames of deviance preferred by some school
and community authorities, Maria Wagner’s interpretations of student behavior did not
always fall in line with the assumptions of the handicap frame. Maria’s approach to her
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student’s deviant behavior stresses communication with them, and modifications to the
social environment around them. However, some of the comments she made concerning
actions that got her student’s in trouble demonstrate that she is ambivalent about whether
the frame she prefers is always a valid definition of a student’s deviant behavior. For
example, while talking to me about Preston—the student that initiated a fire drill two
days after Zach, and set back the entire school district—Maria described her response to
the angry questions of school and community authorities thusly:
I didn’t respond. They were firing at me. My department head was
standing there not saying anything. And then my supervisor wasn’t there. I
just – because I knew, Ben, I knew what I was doing was okay. I was
confident in myself that I would be able to handle whatever this is and not
the way that they would handle it [. . .] I’m not going to let them upset me,
because I know the boy. The boy might have done it on purpose, but not
really, I don’t know.
Though Maria’s comments suggest that she is confident in the assumptions that guide her
social control strategies, her reflection on the motivations shaping her student’s deviant
behavior introduce a line of doubt concerning her analysis of the situation. Specifically,
Maria claims that she “knows the boy,” that her view of his behavior in this particular
instance is backed up by a substantial catch of evidence collected over the course of a
long student-teacher relationship. However, the comment “he might have done it on
purpose” contradicts the assumptions of the handicap frame while at the same time
supporting the misbehavior frame preferred by the police. The follow up comment “but
not really” moves her interpretation back into the realm of handicap—despite elements of
self-determination, the behavior occurred in the context of larger structural forces that the
student, because of his handicap, didn’t understand and couldn’t accommodate. However,
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definition for her student’s behavior squarely in the unknown. It is an admission that her
preferred interpretation and control strategy are shaped by a frame whose fundamental
assumptions, at least in this instance, she questions.
Though, during our interview, she didn’t address the specific incidents that have
been the focus of our discussion of Maria Wagner’s students (e.g. the fire drill fiasco),
Rachel Davis (Maria Wagner’s Supervisor) provided me with a compelling example of
the ambiguity school administrators face when trying to frame and respond to the deviant
behavior of student’s with autism. Rachel Davis is a special education supervisor at
NPHS. In her professional role she is responsible, along with a co-supervisor, for
overseeing all of the teachers and programs serving the 580 students at the high school
who have an Individual Education Plan (IEP). Though they have a good working
relationship, Rachel and Maria have not always seen eye-to-eye on how best to control
the deviant behavior of students with autism. Indeed, Maria mentioned a couple cases in
which she had pushback from Rachel concerning particular precautions she wanted to
take in order to minimize the likelihood of behavioral issues. For example, Maria wanted
to have an extra aid—an individual who knew her students well—accompany her on a
lengthy class trip, but despite the logic of having someone who knew the students (more
able, because of their knowledge, to act as a “social prostheses,”) Rachel objected
because of budgetary constraints. Though Rachel didn’t comment on this episode, some
stories she shared with me demonstrated her struggle to employ the right frame when
faced with deviant behavior. One example stems from her discussion of helping to
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organize the people required to support a girl with autism in a community vocational
program:
That was a huge experience for me. I was so amazed at how hard it was to
do. How labor intensive it was. How many people it involved getting from
place to place and getting people where they needed to be [. . .] I think she
[the student] made the transition and it was a combination, with her, in
particular, she was having—she didn’t have a job coach with her, she was
using the supervisor there, and she was doing pretty well, and then I think
they brought in the chocolate [candies] and she couldn’t resist [. . .] I don’t
know how much she did it, but then I started thinking, and again, this was
after she left us, so I don’t have any witnessing, so how many are you
allowed to eat when you’re on this spectrum and how many are you
allowed to eat when you’re not? I don’t know. But that was not
acceptable. I understand that. They’re in business. So that was kind of her
chance for meaningful work.
Rachel recounts the effort and logistics that went into placing a female student with
autism at a job in a factory that makes candy. While some special education students have
the funding for a one-on-one job couch when attending a vocational position during the
school day, this individual did not and was overseen by the onsite supervisor. Rachel
notes that while the girl started out doing well, once she started to eat the candies (she
couldn’t resist the chocolate flavor) the job site explained that they were not going to
tolerate her rule-breaking. Though the employer framed the student’s deviance as
misbehavior, Rachel’s view was more ambivalent. On the one hand, Rachel states that
she “doesn’t know how much she did,” thus implying that maybe it was not correct to
frame her behavior as self-directed and justifying punishment. On the other hand, her
question “how many are you allowed to eat when you’re on the spectrum?” presents the
possibility that at some point handicap (or sickness) is no longer an acceptable definition
for deviance. Rachel also notes that the girl’s employer has the right to protect their
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interests, and as supervisor she is not only responsible to individual student’s but also
to the school’s reputation in the community (since the school relies on community
business to provide employment opportunities for developmentally disabled youth).
Though she laments the harsh reality that this opportunity might have been the girl’s only
one for what she labels “meaningful work,” Rachel exposes questions of validity that
often lurk in the assumptions upon which interpretations and social control are based.
Through her story, Rachel also demonstrates how conflict and negotiation over frames
becomes only more complicated when people liable to behave deviantly operate in social
systems with distinct goals that are still trying to coordinate their activities with one
another (in this case, a school and community businesses).

CONFLICT & NEGOTIATION
Despite the reality that Tom, Marge, and Anderson Vogler all applied a different frame of
deviance to Brian’s aggression, only Marge and Anderson struggled over conflicting
social control strategies; Tom’s decision to start assisting during tantrums took pressure
off his dad while conforming with his mom’s preference for de-escalation. While
Anderson felt that his psychical approach to Brian’s tantrums was justified by his frame,
Marge’s belief that her son was not in control of his behavior brought her into conflict
with her husband: “Anderson and I have big disagreements sometimes about how to
handle him and how to—because he was a lot more physical [. . .] that’s not the way to
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do it when they’re in that state.” The difference in their approaches continued to be a
matter of dispute until Tom started assisting his father in controlling Brian during
tantrums. Though Tom believed that his brother’s aggression constituted an attempt to
communicate, his social control tactic was similar enough to his mom’s that she was
satisfied. For his part, Anderson was grateful that he no longer had to shoulder the burden
of Brian’s abuse on his own. This example demonstrates the reality that though different
frames are associated with divergent interpretations of deviant behavior, distinct
definitions do not necessarily lead to mutually exclusive strategies for social control.
Heather and Chrissie Hamilton used distinct frames to understand Ross’s
problem behaviors when he was young, and this led to conflict between the two women.
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In another example of a caretaker negotiating with other caretakers about the best
social control strategy, the director of a day program for adults with autism told me about
her attempts to convince her staff to use the handicap frame of deviance over the
misbehavior frame (my attribution): “I explain to them that we are all communicating
non-verbally all the time. Where we look, how we say it, the rate of our speech,
everything from the tip of our head to the tips of our toes, we’re communicating, and so
are the people we are working with [for useful elaboration, see Birdwhistell 1970]. Most
of the people that we support downstairs have some sort of impaired verbal ability. So,
those non-verbal communication skills are often times more advanced in them then they
are in us. So, a lot of it I would say to be involved is really just studying people. [. . .] I
think when somebody is acting aggressively towards you, or is acting in a way
behaviorally that makes you very uncomfortable, you feel threatened, you feel scared, it’s
inconvenient. And those are all things that we can bring with us into a situation. But I
think the thing that we have to understand with that, is when somebody is driven to that
point, it is much more frustrating for them then it is for us. I might be at a five out of ten,
but if you are driven to the point where you have to yell at me, or rush at me, or shake
me, or grab me to communicate your point, you are at a ten out of ten. And I guess one of
the things is that we all get there, you know, one of my favorite things is cell phone
customer service. You know how many times have I screamed at somebody. After the
fact, you know, you feel horrible, you feel about this big, you’ve probably just ruined
someone’s day over something you had a million other choices of ways to deal with. And
I think that, uhm, that they do get very frustrated. They’re just trying to communicate
with us and we are not getting it.”
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approached parenting: “Heather wanted [there to be consequences] when [Ross] did do
something bad [. . .] Chrissie was, well, she was a more positive reinforcer.” Ross’s
problem behaviors were a common source of consternation in Chrissie and Heather’s
relationship. In one story that Heather shared, the family was at a restaurant and Ross was
acting out. Heather wanted to leave, but Chrissie wanted them to stay. Heather agreed to
watch Ross while Chrissie and the two other kids got food; just as Chrissie got back to
the table Ross urinated while sitting in his chair. Heather told me that she felt they should
have left the restaurant the moment that Ross started acting out: “I fully, fully believe that
other people in restaurant had the right, because they were paying for their quiet meal, to
not have to experience Ross.” In other words, if Ross’s behavior broke the implicit social
rules of that situation, he should be removed. Though Chrissie did not comment on this
specific incident, her conversations with me communicated that in her opinion Ross
deserved to be integrated into as many typical situations as possible. Rather then taking
what seemed to her as punitive measures, Chrissie defined his behaviors as linked to his
disability. Though he might have had some control over them—they derived from typical
desires, like attention—his handicap made him unable to achieve them in a socially
acceptable manner. Thus, his desires needed to be accommodated as best as possible
through the prosthetic work of the family: trying to control his behavior as best they
could, but not punish him for wanting what was natural. Both Chrissie and Heather
shared with me how difficult there distinct definition of Ross’s behavior made their
relationship: both women discussed many times the damage it did to their relationship,
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and the desire to bring it to an end. However, when Ross was a child, it was easier for
them to work it out, or at least live with their differences. As Ross got older, he became
more difficult to manage, and the normative expectations of society began to weigh more
heavily. For example, while Chrissie thought that Ross should be included in all family
activities, Heather became more concerned that his presence was disrupting any
semblance of a normal life. One of the biggest issues was Heather’s increasingly insistent
calls to seriously consider placing Ross in a residential setting. Eventually the women
separated.
Though Tom, Marge, Anderson, and Jack Vogler agreed that they wanted to keep
Brian at home, all members were faced with the cost of what Marge described as
“keeping it in the family.” Despite the anxiety, work, and injuries associated with Brian’s
tantrums, Anderson, Tom, and Marge agreed that the most troubling aspect of the
violence was the effect it had on Brian’s younger brother, Jack. When we first talked
about the tough period, Marge told me that Jack was “traumatized” by his brother’s
attacks. She described how Jack would flee the room if Brian entered, whether or not he
was showing signs of aggression. Tom shared a memory in which his brother ran away
when Brian tried to hug him. Anderson recalled a family trip to a restaurant when Jack
jumped up in his seat at a noise reminiscent of Brian, even though his brother hadn’t
come along: “it was as if he was back on the battlefield.” The possibility of placing Brian
in a residential setting was raised several times, and most strongly advocated by Marge’s
mom. However, Marge and Anderson decided that since Brian was only violent at home
and they felt capable of handling his outbursts, the decision would be contingent on the
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feelings of Jack and Tom. When Marge brought up the option of sending Brian away
to her two other sons, both pleaded with her not to: “Mom he is sorry, just let him stay.”
Marge and Anderson agreed, despite their differences of opinion, that if only they could
keep working on it as a family they would figure out how to stop their son’s aggressive
behavior. As time wore on, and Brian’s behavior did indeed get better, Anderson
increasingly started to open up to the logic of his wife’s point of view. However, it is
possible that their ability to negotiate was contingent on the reality that Brian’s behavior
improved.
In the wake of Ross’s crisis, Chrissie and Heather Hamilton increasingly came to
see Ross’s self-injurious behavior as evidence of a pathological state. She tells me a story
she will never forget. Ross’s crisis began in the aftermath of Chrissie and Heather’s
separation. While Chrissie took on primary responsibility for Ross’s care after she
separated from Heather, Heather still came to visit her ex-partner and Ross while the
latter was being shuttled from one hospital to another. Though both women have complex
feelings concerning their relationship, they largely agree that Ross’s behavior during the
crisis constituted a sickness. About a year after it started, Ross came out of his crisis and
started acting like his old self.
Though both the fire police and the principal framed the deviant behavior of her
students differently than Maria Wagner, eventually the teacher’s view largely won out
through committed negotiation and despite her own reservations concerning the validity
of the handicap frame. Though she disagreed with the frame of deviance the fire police
applied to both Zach and Preston when they initiated fire alarms, Maria agreed to allow
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concerning alarm protocol. When the police came to her classroom they found
themselves confronted with a group of students who had special needs, and, unsure how
to proceed, looked to Maria for guidance:
I said to them, I said, ‘Okay, I will be Oprah, and I will ask you questions.
I’ll ask you questions,’ and then when I asked them questions, then they
would be talking and the kids could hear it [. . .] so instead of we’re not
talking at them [they could just overhear it] [. . .] the fire police, and the
policemen, they were fine, because they felt like they talked to them, and
the kids were fine, we certainly did other things before that [to prepare for
the police to come talk].
Despite framing some of the students’ recent actions as misbehavior, the police required
advice from Maria about how best to overcome communication barriers in order to
attempt social control. In looking to Maria for help communicating the police responded
to her as a “social prosthetic,” and in so doing implicitly changed their response to the
students from one shaped by the misbehavior frame to one shaped by the handicap frame.
Maria decided that rather then talking directly at her students—many of whom had
various issues interacting in the typical manner that the fire police might expect when
giving a presentation—she would pretend to be a talk show host and interview the fire
police. This would allow the fire police to share important safety information to the
students in the classroom, and at the same time allow these particular students to get the
information in an indirect way that would not be as threatening as a direct lecture. In the
case of Darrin—the student who masturbated in public—though the principal of the
school was at first incredulous about the boy’s attendance, Maria eventually convinced
him to let her deal with the situation in her way.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter explored how caretakers of adults with autism engaged in conflict and
negotiation over the application of popular frames of deviance in the context of the
ambiguity and complexity of situations and the stakes surrounding interpretation and
social control. The assumptions upon which frames of deviance are built shape the way
that social actors interpret and respond to deviant behavior. Actors advancing particular
definitions of deviance select from the complex array of social facts to support their
preferred definition. The messiness of lived reality challenged the application of available
frames of deviance, despite the historical and empirical roots on which these different
frames are based. This includes the reality that the same piece of evidence can sometimes
be used to support different definitions of deviance. For example, Marge, Tom, and
Anderson all interpreted Brian’s perseverance when attempting to inflict physical damage
through their preferred frame of deviance. Moreover, different definitions of deviance
can sometimes be employed to justify similar social control strategies. For example,
though Marge and Tom applied different frames of deviance to Brian’s tantrums, their
strategy of isolating Brian and trying to talk to him were essentially the same. Finally,
sometimes individuals advancing the same definition of deviance will end up endorsing
opposing social control strategies as necessitated by the particulars of the case in
question. For example, though Marge used the sickness frame of deviance to determine
that Brian needed to not be restrained when trying to harm others, Chrissie and Heather
used the sickness frame of deviance to justify restraining Ross when he was trying to do
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struggling to interpret and control the maladaptive behaviors exhibited by individuals
with autism, the conceptual material it explores is applicable to caretakers struggling with
a wide variety of deviant actions.32
Though this article deals with a relatively unique form of deviance, previous work
has highlighted the social construction that goes into a wide variety of social control
efforts. The individuals whose behaviors are the concern of the caretakers in this paper
are, because of their autism, unable to offer reflections on their own actions. The
analytical upside to this lack of reflexivity is that it allows us to focus on the definitional
struggles and negotiations of the audience. The downside is that it raises the question of
how generalizable this paper is to cases where caretakers frame the actions of individuals
whom can offer analysis of their own deviant behavior. Yet, prior research has
demonstrated that individuals who have the ability to frame their own deviance are not
necessarily more insistent on or consistent in their definitions (Thoits 1985). Moreover,
the frames used by others to define the deviant behavior of an individual can have a
profound influence on how that person comes to understand and respond to their own
deviance. For example, Susan Sontag (2001) illustrates how popular metaphors of illness
can still influence the sick person’s belief about whether they are to blame for their
condition or not. The availability of multiple definitions for deviant behavior also
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Though I explored the application of three frames that were most obvious in my data
and strongly supported by the literature, other types of “metaphors,” “interpretive
packages,” or “historic perceptions” have been suggested for popular social problems
(including specific to views of developmentally disabled individuals) (Barry et al. 2009;
Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Wolfensberger 1972).
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influences the interpretations and social control strategies of caretakers. Family life is
often the context for conflict and negotiation over how best to frame and respond to
troubling behavior. This remains the case even for caretakers that are faced with deviance
from a loved one who is not diagnosed with a biologically based condition (Garfinkel
1967). Thus, in limiting its focus to those who do the framing this paper provides insights
into the struggles that beset a diversity of caretakers dealing with deviance. Moreover, in
placing the struggles of families and professionals next to one another, this paper also
suggests that the dynamics that shape private settings (e.g. a home) and public settings
(e.g. a school) are not as different as popular representations would have us believe.
Popular representations of the professions tend to focus on the abstract knowledge
of a specialty and the ideal of practice; often brushed over is the pragmatic reality of
solving problems that in their complexity, ambiguity, and multivocality share much with
the everyday exigencies that animate people’s private lives. The academic knowledge or
“cognitive structure” that various professions formally endorse is used to shape, through
training, the assumptions that individual practitioners use to guide their problem solving
in the work place (Abbott 1988). In the sense that these cognitive structures guide
definition, interpretation, and response (“diagnosis,” “inference,” and “treatment” are the
terms used by Abbott 1988), they work in ways similar to the frames used by the
stakeholders in this paper. Indeed, all of the frames featured in this article draw from the
academic knowledge of a variety of influential professions. For example, the sickness
frame of deviance is generally associated with the medical profession, while the handicap
frame is more closely aligned with the realm of education. That being said, professional
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concerns (sometimes characterized as informal, Dalton 1959) that can shape action in
ways different from how a given profession’s formal academic knowledge might
prescribe. For example, in some cases doctors might see a patient’s issues as stemming
from self-determined misbehavior (e.g. an obese person refusing to diet) as opposed to
some underlying pathology. Though the interpretations and social control strategies of
educational professionals at North Point were sometimes shaped by the handicap frame
(Maria), at other times they were guided by the misbehavior and sickness frames of
deviance (Principal, Rachel). Moreover, in relations with other occupational groups
(police) and institutions (community businesses), these professionals had to weigh
opposing concerns—contexts that shaped and challenged their choice of frames—much
in the same way that caretakers do when dealing with developmentally disabled loved
ones. Like the conflict and negotiation that occur among families, professionals, through
the pragmatism often required to solve issues on the job, often face the limits and
ambiguity of different definitions of deviance. This is often the reality whether or not the
frame they chose to define a particular case is aligned with or opposes the cognitive
structure associated with their profession (Feudtner 2003; Abbott 1988).
Despite the window into the pragmatic nature of professional work afforded by
my comparison of framing in private and public settings, families are not like
professional institutions to the extent that the deviance they must deal with is personal
and invades the most private parts of their lives. The experience of families helps to
highlight the ways in which professional problem solving does not always occur in the
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differences between a professional’s and a family’s experience of deviance. For one,
professionals often have the option of going home at the end of the day. The impact that
this temporal control has on the degree of stress and anxiety associated with problem
solving is significant. Several of the families in my study pointed out that they are faced
with deviance all the time, and that when it is severe it can become all consuming.
Another difference is that the personal nature of problem solving in families makes the
stakes high. A loved one whose deviance is severe can undermine the functioning of
one’s family, a social system that for many people is the emotionally defining one in their
lives. It is for this reason that the struggles over the definition of deviance that happen in
the home are imbued with tensions that are often beyond concerns over whether it is in
line with a particular academic dogma. What is of the upmost importance for families is
overcoming problems while at the same time protecting individual members and the
social system that binds them together.
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CHAPTER 4

Purity and Delight: Elements of Innocence and Humor in Interactions with Adults
with Autism

INTRODUCTION
In the relatively sparse theoretical landscape specifically relevant to some of the more
painful experiences of those caring for adults with autism, “chronic sorrow” has stood as
an important framework for thinking about the existential angst that sometimes afflicts
people responsible for individuals who are significantly disabled. The concept of chronic
sorrow was first introduced by Olshansky (1962) to account for the emotional and
psychological reactions of parents who found themselves with an intellectually disabled
child. In contrast to the linearity and eventual resolution suggested by the five-stagemodel of mourning (i.e. Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, Acceptance), caring for a
loved one who continues to exist but with extraordinary needs can lead to a “grief that is
ongoing” and “wounds” that are often “unmending” (Roos 2002:XVII; Kubler-Ross
1969). Though originally formulated to describe the experience of those raising a child
with a developmental disability, the concept has been applied to the experience of a
variety of types of “other-loss” (e.g. parkinson’s, schizophrenia) and even types of selfloss (e.g. multiple sclerosis, spinal cord injury) (Lindgren 1996; Davis and Schultz 1998;
Mairs 1989; Reeve 1998). One of Susan Roos’s goals (2002) in writing the first booklength treatment of chronic sorrow was to educate clinicians and the public about the
characteristics of mourning that often accompany a “living-loss.” In so doing she wanted
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conceptions of grief, and the further damage that can derive from pathologizing
individuals who continue to struggle with conflicted emotions regarding their own or
another’s impairments (Roos 2002). The emotional struggles of loved ones of children
and adults with autism chronicled in the ever expanding number of family memoirs on
the topic is a testament to the validity of the concept of chronic sorrow (Greenfeld 1972,
1978, 1986). Despite this value, however, chronic sorrow can be categorized among the
large body of academic research and popular representations of autism that define it in
relation to what it is not or how it is lacking (Happé, Briskman and Frith 2001; Maynard
2005; Ortega 2009). Though discussions of autism couched in a negative valance have
their place, in order to accurately characterize the experience of caring for an individual
with the condition it is important to explore both the negative and positive aspects of
interacting with adults with autism.
Though a crucial component of the experience of many caring for an adult with
autism, the concept of chronic sorrow, along with many of the other more negative
characterizations of the condition, brush over some of the more positive experiences that
caretakers describe in their interactions with the socially atypical. One of the central
themes in the concept of chronic sorrow is fantasy, “what could have been or should have
been (and maybe will be, after all)” (Roos 2002:27). In the case of autism, grief can
derive from a comparison between an atypical adult offspring and his/her typical peers.
Such comparisons highlight things that have been missed because of atypicality and
dependency (e.g. college, marriage, grandchildren) and things that remain (e.g. caretaking
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duties, extreme fear of the future) (Roos 2002; Pillemer and Suitor 1991). However,
those caring for adults with autism also speak about the lighter moments and interactions
that constitute their relationship with them. Despite focusing on how chronic sorrow
captures a good deal of the experiences she has had with her adult daughter with autism,
even Roos (2002) recognizes aspects of their relationship that words like sorrow and
tragedy fail to capture. For example, in the conclusion to her book she states that she is
aware of the “wide range of experiences in my life that have occurred as a direct result of
being the mother of a child who is ‘atypical’ [. . .] These experiences have ranged from
absurdly funny to tragic [. . .] [and] are reflective samples of a life that matters and of
circumstances that are complexly challenging and rewarding” (241). The previous
chapter of this dissertation explored the struggles of caretakers to understand and respond
to problem behaviors, and features descriptions and analyses of very difficult scenarios.
However, to describe such “tragic” scenarios without describing and analyzing “absurdly
funny” or positive scenarios would be to do a disservice to the complex experience of
caring for those who are atypical. Alongside sorrow and struggle, family memoirs about
those with autism are filled with descriptions of wonder, surprise, and joy associated with
caring for someone who is atypical (Moore 2004). Among these, descriptions of the
humor and innocence (or purity) caretakers associate with individuals with autism feature
prominently in stories and discussions (Gilpin 2012).
Due to their atypical psychosocial development and social behavior, many adults
with autism undermine normative expectations in ways that have the potential to be
experienced by caretakers as innocent and/or humorous. Many adults with autism—
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“independent adulthood” (Wing 2001:69). Existing in a state of dependency places those
with autism in a large camp peopled by a variety of individuals who rely on the support
of others to navigate routine tasks and social situations. However, quite different from
many other forms of dependency in which the mind still develops typically, individuals
with severe autism often do not understand and do not orient themselves to the norms of
typical, everyday social interaction. Taken from a sociological standpoint, the atypical
social interaction that is one of the defining aspects of autism derives from a style of
thinking that makes the rules of social life, thoughtfully explored by microsociologists,
difficult to comprehend (Goffman 1959; Garfinkel 1967). Taken from a biological
standpoint, trouble perceiving the social rules that typical people innately perceive and
follow is linked to the neurological differences that characterize the brain of someone
with autism (Frith 2003). In line with this chapter’s goal to explore some of the positive
aspects of caring for an individual aging with autism, I will focus on experiences
described by caretakers as innocent and humorous and attributable to the atypical
development and social behavior of adults with the diagnosis.
Humor is defined as the tendency of certain cognitive experiences to provoke
laughter and provide amusement (Polimeni and Reiss 2006). Innocence usually refers to a
lack of understanding of the ways of the world stemming from lack of experience with or
the inability to understand wrongdoing (Heywood 2001; Midelfort 2000). With respect to
the complexity and symbolic weight of both concepts, the social dynamics that lead
people to describe phenomena as either humorous or innocent have received relatively
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1994; Fine and de Soucey 2005; Reay 2011; Nolan 2013; Shifman and Katz 2005;
Tavory 2014; for innocence, see Davis 2005). As the results of this chapter will make
clear, the innocence of many adults with autism is linked to the ways in which they do
not orient themselves to their social environment according to the expectations associated
with typical psychosocial development (Erikson 1968). As for humor, one important
mechanism are the stark incongruities between the behaviors of those with the condition,
and the increasingly rigid social expectations placed upon individuals as they enter into
adulthood. In the discussion, I will consider the risk and rewards of exploring aspects of
the experience of caring for adults with autism that seem to clash with political
correctness and might possibly by viewed as offensive. I will also consider how the
positive experiences described by caretakers in this chapter gain further traction when
considered alongside the increasing value that modern society places on authenticity and
purity in social interactions and relationships.

FAMILIES
The Barclay family consists of Warren (54), Winnie (51), Tyson (19), and Taylor (21).
They live in a charming house, with a big back yard, two dogs, a vegetable garden, and
an above ground pool, all set in an area that is best described as a rural/suburban mix
about an hour outside a large northeast city. Standing at about six feet tall and weighing
close to 180 lbs., Tyson is a healthy looking boy with short, light brown hair and hazel
green eyes. Diagnosed with Autistic Disorder, Tyson is mostly nonverbal. However, one
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would be hard-pressed to describe him as quiet. When around the house, he can often
be located by listening for the variety of noises that come out of his mouth. The most
common is a throaty “Auugghhhh,” or “Eggghhhhhhhh,” but also includes “weah-weah,
weah-weah,” (half-way between wee-wee, and wah-wah) and even something
approximating “wungah-wungah.” As described by his mom, Tyson is a man of simple
pleasures. One of his favorite activities is to sit in a blue canvas collapsible chair, set up
next to the kitchen table and in front of a television placed there especially for him, and
watch a variety of Disney movies. Just as often he will forgo the chair, standing behind it
to flap his hands while watching the Jungle Book, or rock back and forth with one hand
holding down an ear while playing a game of Wii Bowling. Tyson is by no means solely
focused on the images of the tube, however. He can be quite curious, especially with
strangers. I remember my first visit to the Barclay residence in the summer of 2011 when
Tyson slowly came out the sliding class door, and hesitatingly stepped towards his
mother and me as we talked on the back porch. Eying him with a smile his mother said,
“hi their cutey, what to come say hi?” I also remember Tyson’s tendency to look over at
me, one hand to his ear, and give a coy smile, the many times I observed him during the
course of the week in 2013 that I lived with his family.
When I lived with the Lane family, Evan was 61, Kate was 58, Ziggy was 25,
Rebecca was 23, and Arietta (Kate’s mother) was 86. The Lane’s live in a beautiful home
tucked away in the woods of a new, gated community in a rural area about two hours
north of a large northeastern city. Though the family used to live in a suburb in a
neighboring state, they moved to their present location in order to be close to Ziggy who
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now primarily resides at a large, impressive residential center for individuals with a
variety of developmental disabilities. Rebecca lives in the city two hours south of her
parent’s new home, and was never present for my stays (though I have met her before).
Ziggy is a gentle person. He has a good deal of working language, but he rarely if ever
initiates social interaction. Though he can often be heard speaking to himself in a variety
of understandable and indecipherable language, when spoken to by others his response is
usually short. For example, sitting next to him one day in a chair in his room at the
residential center, I listen to him as he sings a song to himself, “she’ll be coming around
the mountain when she comes, she’ll be coming around the mountain when she comes…”
When I ask him if he likes his room he looks at me and says, “yessssssssss” in the long
drawn out way he does when answering questions in the affirmative. When I ask him
another question that can’t be answered with a yes or a no, he sits looking at me and after
some silence starts speaking to himself again. Though he rarely initiates social
interaction, Ziggy does have pretty good receptive language. He can understand a variety
of directions and perform a number of tasks. For example, at his residential center and
with the oversight of staff, Ziggy packs seeds into cartons in the greenhouse, organizes
plastic wrap to be used for the bakery’s bread, and funnels tea into organic tea bags sold
in the campus store. He is a great singer, having memorized the words to a number of pop
songs. On the several occasions I drove him around in my car, I would place a CD in the
player—usually Elton John—and enjoy the ride as he sang word for word and on pitch
songs like ‘tiny dancer’ and ‘rocket man.’ I would also laugh as Ziggy performed a move
I call his ‘conducting,’ twisting his wrist back and forth, fingers to palm, as he bounced
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music.

INNOCENCE
While a typically developing child takes concrete steps to pull away from the family unit
in adolescence and early adulthood, in these stages of life individuals with autism—
though at times difficult, and demonstrating some reluctance to accept adult authority—
do not exhibit the same kind of psychosocial transformation. Adolescence has been billed
as a period of increased storm and stress in which the developing youth pulls away from
parents and family, challenges authority figures, orients themselves to peers, and in so
doing starts creating an adult identity (Coleman 1961; Erikson 1968; Milner 2006).
Despite taking pains to highlight the variation associated with space, time, place, and
personality, the modified “storm and stress” thesis still conceives of adolescence and
young adulthood as a period in which conflict with parents, mood disruptions, and risk
behavior (e.g. dangerous driving, risky sex, drug abuse) are more likely than at other
stages of development (Arnett 1999). Though the puberty of individuals with autism can
come with its own significant issues (see previous chapter), breaking away from family
and the assertion of independence is noticeably atypical. If increased tantrums and
masturbation may be linked to reluctance to accept adult authority and normal physical
changes, descriptions of the behavior of adolescents with more severe forms of autism
attest to their atypical social and psychosocial development (Wing 2001). Such
descriptions include a continuing immaturity, and behaviors akin to that of a “small
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child” (Wing 2001:141). Of course, with respect to typically developing adolescents,
while pulling away from one’s family is natural, the phenomenon is still marked by
ambivalence on the part of parents (Demo, Small and Savin-Williams 1987; Pickhardt
2013). On the one hand, parents want to encourage youth to move away from the parental
nest, knowing that steps taken towards independence are important for future selfsufficiency (Newman, 2012). On the other, the forms that such steps take often come in
the guise of rebellion, and it is natural for parents to also secretly (or not so secretly)
crave their children to “remain with [them] for as long as possible” (Newman 2012).
Though extended adolescence and the effects of the 2007-2009 recession might have put
a damper on this desire (especially once an increasing proportion of parents had grown
children returning to live with them), neither changed the reality that as a child matures
parent’s sometimes (or often) experience nostalgia for the past and a desire to return their
offspring to innocent state of young childhood. Parenting books and blogs are filled with
concerns such as ‘my child used to be admiring (even adoring) of me but now is critical
and wants more time apart with friends’ or ‘my child used to like my attention and
affection but now is embarrassed to be seen with me or to receive affection’ (Cline and
Fay 2006; Pickhardt 2013). To the contours of this experience, an interaction I observed
one Sunday morning between Winnie Barclay and her son Tyson provide a stark contrast:
I enter the kitchen to find Tyson walking over to his mother as she stands
at the sink washing dishes. He slowly reaches out and places his hand on
her arm, and then pulls back as she turns around. She asks, “do you want
me to sing to you?” After a couple seconds pause, Tyson pulls his chin
into his chest and jerks his head up and down. Winnie starts to sing:
“Chim chim-in-ey, chim chim-in-ey, chim chim cher-ee! A sweep is as
lucky, as lucky can be…” As Winnie sings, she places her finger on her
son’s belly and a large smile forms across his mouth. As she arrives at the
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end of the first stanza, she pokes his belly and Tyson belts out a loud
“EGGHHHHHHHHHHH” and smiles. When she gets to the end of the
song, she says “yayyyy!” At this point, Tyson tenses his upper back and
claps his hands furiously. As his mom turns to do dishes again, Tyson
stands there smiling and after a couple moments slowly reaches his hand
out and taps his mother’s arm again. She turns and they repeat the ritual.
Then she tells Tyson “that’s it!” and he returns to his TV, which, at the
moment, is about halfway through the movie Mary Poppins.

Tyson loves to have his mother sing to him. Indeed, singing in general is something that
he finds to be highly motivational (e.g. as a young child, in-home therapists that worked
with Tyson would reward him with songs for tasks well performed). This is not unlike a
lot of individuals with autism, who seem particularly inclined to like music and tend to
have musical cognition that is pronounced or, at the very least, not impaired (Heaton
2010). While a love of music might be common for many teens, typical adolescents
become highly sensitized to behavior that is age appropriate and approved of by their
peers (Milner 2006). Conformity and independence being increasingly powerful forces,
musical choices and listening rituals are not often engaged with the participation of
parents in mind. With many individuals with autism, concerns about age appropriateness
are often not on the radar (Moore 2004). Moreover, the common tendency to prefer
rituals and objects with which one is familiar means that songs, stories, and movies from
childhood often remain of interest (Moore 2004). To some parents, the desire on the part
of an atypical offspring to continue to engage in rituals and activities generally associated
with youth can be a pleasing attribute of caring for an adult with autism.
Though it clashes with the expectations surrounding typical development,
continued engagement in the rituals and paraphernalia of childhood can lend a charming
innocence to relationships with an adult with autism. One of the joys of having a child
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who doesn’t mature out of activities that are often enjoyed by children is that parents
can still engage in highly satisfying rituals. Books about raising young children describe
in detail the joy that is involved in singing nursery rhymes, sharing cartoons, and
connecting to the material culture of youth (Gilman 2011). Indeed, the attraction of the
innocence and authenticity of childhood is one of the central themes of a major
movement in western poetry and philosophy (Russell 1945). Of course, the behavior of a
young child with autism is in many ways different than the behavior of the youth
glorified by the romantics. Indeed, some have argued that young children with autism are
actually more adult-like then typical individuals their age (Gilman 2011; Moore 2004).
However, at the point that typical youth enter into the intense social development of
adolescence and begin to fight for independence and an adult identity (Hogan and Astone
1986), the atypical development of many adults with autism makes them seem
increasingly more similar to young children than to their peers. To the many parents for
whom the world of young children remains a joyful realm, the continued immaturity of
aging loved ones with autism can act as a gateway to a seductive, if atypical, form of
being. As Winnie Barclay explained to me during an interview:
There was this guy we knew and he told us about this family he worked
with where the dad looked at him once and said, ‘you know, I am the
luckiest dad in the world, because my daughter is going to be my little girl
for ever’ and I thought, ‘Oh my god, that is so interesting,’ I think that that
interaction, I do that all the time, you know. I’m the only one who sings to
him anymore, why, because I love that.
In the comment of a parent who delights in the continued innocence of his little girl,
Winnie finds something true about caring for an aging child who does not develop
typically. Though her son’s atypical psychosocial development will lead to continued
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dependence in adulthood, it also means Tyson continues to partake in rituals usually
reserved for young children. Winnie explains that she thoroughly enjoys such interactions
with her son, and that the joy of ‘holding on to my [child]’ is a sentiment that resonates
with her own experience. Other parents have pointed out the disinterest in age appropriate
rituals expressed by adolescents and adults with autism (as well as the many “autistic”
families “in thrall to the Disney empire”) (Moore 2004:231-232). Though Winnie
understands that Disney movies and singing are no longer appropriate for a nineteenyear-old male, she finds herself conflicted about clamping down on rituals and objects
that both she and her son enjoy. In her back and forth with an aid and family friend who
continues to work with Tyson, voice is given to the tension between encouraging age
appropriate behavior and letting the individual with autism behave as they desire.
In struggles over the importance of age appropriate behavior, professionals and
loved ones of those with autism demonstrate the tension between social norms and the
idiosyncrasies of parent relationships with aging children with autism. Parents of adults
with autism usually appreciate the benefits of age appropriate behavior. However, when
the joy and innocence of a loved one with autism is associated with age-inappropriate
behavior, parents are faced with conflicted feelings about the value of conformity. In the
early years of Tyson’s life, teachers who conducted Applied Behavioral Analysis33
sessions with him often rewarded him with songs when he performed well. This reward
was linked to Tyson’s own requests, as evidence by his sticking the picture of a person
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ABA is a method of behavior modification used for both educational and social
purposes in which an instructor or therapist shapes an individual’s actions by rewarding
what is desired and ignoring/punishing what is undesired (Feinstein 2010).
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34
singing on his PECS board when he finished an assignment and one of his teachers
asked, “what have you earned?” Winnie explains that her main requirement for
professionals working with Tyson when he was young was that they would be able to
sing songs to him. However, as he got older, Tyson’s staff decided that they needed to
limit singing in order to find more age-appropriate reinforcers. At present, the
professional who continues to work with Tyson outside of school is Claire Smalls. Claire
is a habilitation expert who has worked with the Barclay family for years and in various
capacities. Generally, habilitation constitutes services to help a person learn, keep, or
improve skills and functional abilities that may not be developing normally. In the case of
adults with autism, habilitation out in the community includes encouraging behavior that
supports independence and social appropriateness. Given her responsibility to teach and
encourage Tyson’s integration into the community, Claire continues to work on shaping
his behavior to be more age appropriate. When I joined her on one of her outings with
Tyson, Claire told me about her efforts to try and shape his habits and impression
management:
Now you will see the difference between my music and their music. I try
to make Tyson very age appropriate. No we don’t listen to Disney Music [.
. .] I also tried to introduce him to Glee. Cause he really likes music, I’m
like, you know what [. . .] let’s not sit and watch Disney Movies, let’s
watch age appropriate things.
While we are walking across the parking lot to a thrift store—a place that
Claire often brings Tyson to on their outings—she tells me that when he
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Picture Exchange Communication System is a form of augmentative and alternative
communication for individuals with a variety of communication, cognitive, and physical
impairments. Often used by those with autism, the system involves the use of picture
symbols (e.g. photographic, graphic) in order to communicate with partners through the
exchange of said symbols (Schwartz, Garfinkle and Bauer 1998; c.f. Banda 2005).	
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was younger Tyson used to carry around a book about a little princess or
Disney magazines. As he got older, Claire decided that she was no longer
going to let him carry such items around. She tells me, “people see a boy
his age carry around a princess book, or a pink magazine and they will
think some pretty bad things about him.”

One of Claire’s main goals when she spends time with Tyson is to shape his behavior so
that it is more age appropriate. Claire also introduces gender inappropriate behavior as
another type of conformity that is little on the minds of many individuals with autism
(Moore 2004). In his memoir of his teenage son, Robert Hughes (2003) describes how
Walker’s favorite Disney movies included The Little Mermaid, Cinderella, and Alice and
Wonderland. Though Claire is aware of Tyson’s indifference to conformity, she views a
more typical presentation of self as important to her general goal of promoting his social
skills. While Claire and Winnie have a strong and trusting relationship (they easily qualify
for the designation of fictive kin [Stack 1974]), the former describes what she views as a
subtle struggle to convince the latter of the importance of age appropriate behavior. And
though Winnie appreciates Claire’s point of view, she still feels torn by her desire to let
Tyson do what he enjoys. She also admits that his enjoyment of childlike activities is
something that she takes pleasure in as well.
Though parents of adults with autism appreciate the value of continuing to
encourage social development, they are often faced with the reality that their joy and the
joy of their child is partly linked to the child’s continued innocence. Even if parents
understand the importance of a child developing normally, it is not uncommon for parents
to fantasize about a child remaining young and innocent forever. As one mother describes
in a book about parenting, “[my daughter] cried about growing up [. . .] she wanted to stay
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little, and, to be honest, I wished she would too” (Ruiz 2013:272). In her description
of her son’s desire to have her sing to him, Winnie expresses both an understanding that
such behavior is no longer age appropriate and that, despite this, she continues to engage
in the interaction, social norms be damned:
[Ben: And he’ll ask you to sing?] Yes, he’ll say ‘sing.’ [Ben: Oh he says
sing?] ‘A-sing, A-sing.’ And then I sit there and I’m thinking ‘he’s
actually saying the word, how can I not do it.’ [Ben: yeah, it’s impressive]
It is! And it is so highly reinforcing for him, but they, I’m the only one,
and I know it’s wrong, like I know it’s inappropriate, but, so I’m really
trying to taper that off [. . .] He’s nineteen and I am singing him Disney
songs.
A few moments after I observe Winnie singing to Tyson, Winnie takes
another opportunity to compare her opinions to Claire’s: “you see, Claire
tells me ‘I never sing to him’ and I understand what she is saying, but I am
his mother. And that is the challenge, is that I don’t always want to be so
stuck on him being appropriate. Sometimes I just want to be his mom. And,
you know, no one else lets me sing to them.”
In describing her struggle with Claire, Winnie admits that she understands where her
friend is coming from. However, being Tyson’s mother—a role that she partly associates
with valuing his happiness, in whatever guise it may come—Winnie doesn’t want to
always choose “being appropriate” over giving him joy. This is echoed in the comments
of other parents of children with autism who explain that “their joy is my joy” and “as
long as [they] are happy, I’m happy” (Jones 2011:126; Moore 2004:274). Of course,
Winnie demonstrates that her desire to sing to Tyson doesn’t simply derive from his and
her own joy. Indeed, in describing the degree to which her son desires to be sung to—
“he’s actually saying the word”—Winnie also highlights the complexity and
contradictions of the project of encouraging more ‘socially appropriate’ behavior in
adults with autism.
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Though childlike rituals between parents and adult children with autism might

challenge both age and gender appropriateness, when they initiate an interaction that is
enjoyed by all parties involved those with autism suggest a general sociality that goes
against classic definitions of the disorder. The desire on the part of a nineteen-year old
boy to have his mother sing Disney songs to him would seem to many people an
inappropriate or, at the very least, highly odd request. Claire surely believes so, and gives
it as her reason for discouraging Winnie from sing-a-longs with Tyson. However, when
he initiates a social interaction that is mutually enjoyable to both him and his mother,
Tyson is behaving in a way that is generally at odds with popular conceptions of autism.
One of the two characteristics that Kanner (1943) emphasized above all others when he
wrote the first scientific description of autism was an “extreme aloneness, from the
earliest days” (242). This is particularly true of those with more severe forms of autism,
many of whom are non-verbal or struggle to use language (Wing 2001). In noting that
“he’s actually saying the word,” Winnie is commenting on the degree to which Tyson
desires the interaction, given that her son rarely uses language in an appropriate manner.
However, in remarking on Tyson’s use of words to initiate their singing ritual, Winnie
also implicitly suggests that her son is performing a feet that is “impressive,” given his
condition, and should, at least sometimes, be rewarded with her songs. While the
heterogeneity of the autism spectrum has long been noted, continuing evidence that
avoidance of social interaction often remains one of the disorders defining characteristics
means there is an argument to be made that it should be encouraged in all its forms.
Though they do agree with professionals about the importance of age and gender
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interactions with adult children given that it goes against the ‘aloneness’ that is one of the
major defining aspects of the disorder.
As individuals who have themselves developed in a typical manner, parents who
experience joy in the innocence of an adult child with the diagnosis usually express
conflicting views about the value of age and gender-appropriateness. Interactions with
professionals represent one scenario in which parents struggle to determine their opinions
of the relative importance of reinforcing age and gender appropriateness. However,
parents do not require the intervention of professionals to find themselves in a
conversation over values. As individuals who have themselves developed typically and
likely never imagined the future that lay in store for them, they have plenty of past
experiences against which to judge their present ones. Thus, parents often find themselves
ruminating on the behavior of their adult child with respect to how it might look to
outsiders—outsiders who they once were themselves. Take Kate Lane’s description of her
twenty-five year old son’s habit of routinely kissing her on the cheek:
Ziggy’s a piece of cake. My big problem with Ziggy is that he loves to
kiss me too much and what do I do about that. Do I let him or is it
inappropriate. It’s his way of communicating with me and he doesn’t do it
to anyone else. It’s not like he is indiscriminate and does it to grandma and
does it to dad and does it to Rebecca. It’s just me, but I’ve been his
primary caregiver. So it’s complicated, but in the scheme of having a child
on the spectrum, Ziggy’s been a total delight. You just have to love this
kid to pieces.
At various points during the day I observe Ziggy walk over to his mother,
bend down, and kiss her on the cheek. For example, last night when Evan
and Kate sat down with their son to have him show me his Hebrew
reading skills, at the end of reciting one paragraph, Ziggy got up several
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times, leaned over his dad, and kissed his mom on the cheek. A couple
times when he did this, Kate said, gently, “ok, Ziggy, that’s enough.”
I am having a conversation with Kate after dinner, and in association with
a discussion about Ziggy kissing her in public she tells me a story about
an experience she had years back. “I was at a conference for one of the
autism organizations, and Ziggy was still very young—maybe six or seven.
At one of the forums I saw a mother with an adult child with autism who
looked like he was in his mid to late twenties. The son was lying across his
mom’s lap. It reminded me of Michelangelo’s Pieta, a full-grown man
being cradled by his mother. Maybe she felt more comfortable allowing
him to do that given the social context we were in, but I remember my
reaction as being a little repulsed. I thought, at his age that is no longer
appropriate. I reflect on that now because my twenty-five-year old son
often kisses me in public.

Among the multitude of rituals with parents that aging youth are apt to discourage,
physical signs of affection—particularly kissing—rank among the top. This is not to say
that adolescents don’t like affection—quite to the contrary, they are still dependent on
their parents and still want to be cared for by them. However, given the increasing value
of independence and peer approval, the affection of and dependency on parents is
associated with mounting stigma (Milner 2006). The adolescent who gets a ride from
parents to school, but asks them not to drop her off directly in front of the building,
illustrates weariness about being seen as childlike or too close to her parents. In another
example, Pickhardt (2013) describes the need of the adolescent male to increasingly avoid
physical affection from mom, not because he doesn’t love his mother, but because he is
working on developing a “growing maleness” (97). While they should and often do view
this rejection as a part of natural development, parents also complain about the once
adoring and affectionate child avoiding contact (Pickhardt 2013). Against the heightened
sensitivity to appearances expressed by a typical teen and young adult, Ziggy’s continued
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contrast. Though Kate describes her son as someone “you just have to love to pieces,” she
is very conscious that his kissing is, to some degree, an issue. Indeed, as a reflection of
how inappropriate the behavior might look to others, Kate references her own repulsion at
seeing a young man lay in his mother’s lap at an autism conference in a manner that she
describes as “no longer appropriate.” Though her evocative comparison to the sexually
neutral scene of the Madonna and child might suggest otherwise, it is likely that Kate also
understands the nuances of gender that might further add to the seeming inappropriateness of her son’s continued kissing. Despite this awareness, Kate also finds
herself faced with the tradeoff of discouraging age and gender inappropriateness or
encouraging a joyful innocence and generally social behavior.
Though affection—particularly in public—might be viewed as increasingly
inappropriate among adult children and their parents, on another level the reality that the
deficits of autism include such affection makes it difficult for parents to want to punish
what some might argue should be encouraged. As she expressed above, Kate understands
how off Ziggy’s displays of affection might look to others, particularly to strangers out in
public. However, in talking to me about the differences in behavior that characterize her
two children, she highlights the contradictions that she faces in deciding how to respond
to her son’s kissing:
Rebecca, my normal, typical kid, is very rational, very cool kid. She’s not
a lovey-dovey type [. . .] She’s kind of an independent, self-contained type
person. She always has been. Well not always, from about the age of 12. I
always joked with Evan, I said, ‘I need the autistic kid who kisses me, tells
me he loves me.’
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It’s a very complicated emotion. I recognize that a lot. A very complicated
emotional equation, because you know that you have to let them be more
appropriate and help them, because they get stuck on this stuff, and at the
same time, they’re childlike. Ziggy’s twenty-five. He’s going to be older
sometimes than his staff. I have to play that in my mind. Lately, when he
sings Old MacDonald Had a Farm, I say, ‘Ziggy, you know, that’s a baby
song, why don’t we sing a Beatles song or why don’t we sing Elton John,’
and try and just gently redirect him. I’ll start with a couple of lines of
another song and he’ll usually pick up and about ten minutes later he goes
back to Old MacDonald. It’s harder I think for the mother to make that,
because usually the mothers been the one to put them to bed, to shower
them.

In comparing the behavior of her typically developing daughter and her son with autism,
Kate provides another example of the tension between discouraging ageinappropriateness and encouraging sociality. Just as in the case of Winnie singing to
Tyson, Kate finds in her son’s behavior a desire for affection that her typically
developing daughter avoids. While few would argue that it is off that Rebecca is an
“independent” and “self-contained type,” Kate still finds it humorous that her son with
autism is the one that provides the affection that she enjoys. Of course, despite finding
her son’s innocence enjoyable, Kate experiences conflicted emotions concerning his
kissing. In what she describes as a very complicated “emotional equation,” Kate notes
that her enjoyment of Ziggy’s affection is often undermined by a sense that she should
encourage more age and gender appropriate behavior. Kate observes that though Ziggy
still kisses her and sings children’s songs, he is older than some of the aids that work with
him at the residential campus at which he resides. This further compels her to want to
promote age-appropriate behavior, a goal she is ‘gently’ trying to introduce despite the
joy that her son’s innocence sometimes brings. And yet, Kate continues to allow Ziggy to
kiss her without too much reproach, since she loves him dearly and desires to let him be
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who he is. In highlighting the humor see sees in the incongruity of a parent looking to
a child with autism for affection, Kate suggests one of the other dimensions of the
disorder that allows caretakers to experience joy.
HUMOR
One characteristic of the behavior of those with autism that can contribute to the
humorous quality of their actions is the tendency to follow specific guidelines concerning
socially appropriate behavior as enforced by others while at the same time demonstrating
a lack of awareness of the larger social convention these guidelines are meant to convey.
Researchers across various disciplines have agreed that one of the basic components of
humor is incongruity (Fry 2002). As expanded upon by Paulos (1980) “incongruity is
intended in a wide sense, comprising the following oppositions: expectation vs. surprise,
the mechanical vs. the spiritual, superiority vs. incompetence, balance vs. exaggeration,
and propriety vs. vulgarity” (p.102). As one of the hallmarks of the condition, literalness
of interpretation often leads to scenarios in which the behavior of an individual with
autism reflects stark incongruities. For example, in her book The Funny Side of Autism
Lisa Masters (2010) shares an anecdote in which a ten-year old with the diagnosis was
given turkey bacon, and then explained that at his house they get their bacon “from
America!” (40). In this comment a child with autism shows the incongruity of a mind that
grasps a relatively sophisticated geographical knowledge, while at the same time
struggling to understand the contextual nature of words and their usage. Another form
that literalness of interpretation can take is the difficulty with generalization that is
common to autism. Trouble generalizing can be classified under “weak central
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atypicalities characteristic of those on the spectrum. While weak central coherence is
responsible for several of the comparative strengths of the “cognitive style” of autism
(Happé 1999), the ways in which it leads to trouble integrating diverse information at
different levels of abstraction contributes to some crucial incongruities in the behavior of
those diagnosed. Such incongruities, in turn, create the potential for experiencing the
behavior of those with autism as funny. Take the following example relayed by Kate
Lane concerning her son Ziggy:
Now what does privacy mean? Privacy is a very abstract concept. I had to
bring it down to something very concrete, so for him, privacy means he’s
in his room alone without mom or dad or anyone else interfering in his
space.
Now Ziggy’s a stitch sometimes [. . .] he makes us [Evan and I] laugh so
much. He will not—I taught him, and he’s learned the lesson well, he
won’t get into his pajamas with me in the room. So he’ll say, “I need
privacy.” I’ll say, “absolutely.” I go out and he closes the door and then
he’ll go buck-naked to the bathroom. He doesn’t really get it. I’m allowed
to be with him when he’s naked in the shower, but not when he’s changing
into his pajamas, because I taught him that, but I still needed to be in the
shower with him, so it’s just so inconsistent.
You know, you laugh and it’s very healthy to laugh, to be able to see just
some of the humor in it and you’re laughing with love [. . .] He’s just so
funny, you’ve got to love this kid.
Here Ziggy illustrates weak central coherence by following closely his mother’s
application of the social rule of privacy to changing alone in his bedroom while at the
same time failing to extrapolate that specific application of privacy to the underlying
concept and other contexts in which it applies. In highlighting that it is hard to explain
what exactly privacy is, Kate demonstrates how the typical human brain intuitively
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someone with autism, these abstractions are often very difficult to grasp or remain
entirely mysterious (Grandin 2006). In relating Ziggy’s inability to translate the lesson
about changing to the concept of privacy, Kate also demonstrates how the behavior of
someone with autism can lead to stark incongruities. In this case we see the incongruity
being propriety (i.e. please let me change in private) and impropriety (i.e. I am going to
walk buck naked to the bathroom). Given the relationship between incongruity and
humor, it is not surprising that Ziggy’s behavior could be viewed by both his mother and
father as funny. Of course, the definition of humor also has important relational
components. Humor involves reciprocity, or the sharing of laughter with others in
relation to the object that is deemed humorous (Lyons and Fitzgerald 2004). While Evan
and his wife share laughter with respect to the incongruities of their son’s behavior, the
reality that Ziggy does not laugh, nor seems to understand the incongruities of his
behavior, why it might be funny, or even that his parents are laughing, might lead
observers to question whether this is humorous and whether laughter is appropriate. To
this implication, Kate responds that it is very healthy to laugh, and that she and her
husband laugh with love. Through their laughter, Kate argues that they express an
appreciation of their son’s uniqueness, and in so doing view their atypical relationship
with him as one possessing joy and affection.
Despite creating the potential for embarrassment, consternation, and even social
ostracism, to those who care for individuals with autism the incongruities of behavior that
persist into adulthood can be viewed as moments of hilarity in which to express
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individuals naturally extrapolate the contours of social norms from specific cases in
which those norms are applied. For example, when an adolescent is teased for, say, being
physically disabled, they tend to understand the expectations against which they are being
judged (Goffman 1963). Individuals with autism, however, struggle to understand the
norms surrounding behavior in a given context, and thus find themselves the target of
hostility for actions whose norm-breaking characteristics are a mystery (Koegel and
LaZebnik 2009). Even when an individual with autism learns that a certain behavior is
unacceptable (e.g. you should change in private), they can easily miss the larger
implications this has for impression management (e.g. one should avoid nudity with
others present, except in very specific situations). As attested to by those with autism who
can describe their experience, this weak central coherence can lead to the sense that
consequences happen but for reasons that are unclear. In a telling quote, Gunilla Guijan
states “I always felt that there was something I didn’t really understand [. . .] even when I
understood quite a lot, there was always something left—the actual way it all hung
together. I made a huge effort [. . .] the world was an ever changing mystery, things
happened suddenly. How? Why?” (Gerland 1997). If this lack of social understanding
can be baffling to those with autism, it can also lead to upsetting situations for typically
developing individuals who are close to them:
During one of our conversations, Kate tells me another story about
Ziggy’s difficulty with the concept of privacy in connection with his sister
Rebecca. One time she was home babysitting her brother, and he came out
of his room naked because there was no underwear in his drawer. Though
he knew how to put on underwear, Kate had forgotten to fold his recently
washed underwear and put it into his dresser. This was very upsetting to
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Rebecca, who called her mother to report the behavior. Kate told me that
she herself wasn’t very upset by her son’s trouble understanding.
I am sitting with Kate, and she is telling me about some of the funny
incidents that have occurred in her determination to teach Ziggy about the
concept of privacy. One example she gives is she and Evan’s efforts to
convey to their son the importance of knocking before entering someone’s
bedroom. They taught Ziggy that he should always knock on the door and
wait for someone to say “come in” before going in. One time when Kate
was in her bedroom changing, Ziggy barged in without warning and
without knocking. Kate gave her son a look of surprise and told him to
“go back out and knock.” In response, Ziggy left the room, knocked on the
door, said “come in,” and then went back into the room before Kate had a
chance to finish getting dressed.

Besides leading to upsetting scenarios for loved ones in public situations (Gray 2002a),
failures to follow the rules of impression management can leave family members’ sense
of social propriety challenged even in the context of the home. As Rebecca’s negative
response to her brother’s nudity illustrates, the potential for upset seems particularly
heightened when the proprieties around opposite-sex sibling interactions are undermined.
In approaching his sister in the nude because he didn’t have underwear in his draw, Ziggy
threatened the code of conduct through which people defend against the sexual
possibilities implicit in social interaction, particularly those where sexuality is highly
taboo (Goffman 1959). Though Kate appreciated her daughter’s upset at Ziggy’s nudity,
she described her own feelings as to her son’s inability to understand privacy in relation
to his sister as “not very” upsetting. Indeed, when Ziggy placed Kate in the
uncomfortable position of being seen nude by her twenty-five-year old son, rather than
become upset at the social impropriety the scenario suggested she saw the situation as
humorous. In relaying the incident, Kate took particular delight in Ziggy’s creative workaround of waiting for someone to say “come in” by saying “come in” himself. In so
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doing, Ziggy once again demonstrates the incongruity of a mind that follows explicit
guidelines to the letter while missing the social concept the guidelines are meant to
convey. Finding hilarity in Ziggy’s behavior is not meant to say that this reaction is
inherently better, but rather to demonstrate that it is one of the situational possibilities
open to those who care for adults with autism. While these cases of incongruity have
been used to illustrate the humorous potential of the behavior of those with autism, in not
expressing embarrassment at either his own nudity in front of his sister or his mother’s
nudity when he barges into her bedroom, Ziggy’s actions also fit with the theme of
innocence explored earlier in the chapter. The mingling of innocence and hilarity that can
be viewed in the socially atypical behavior of adults with autism demonstrates how the
themes of this chapter often run hand in hand.
The innocent valence of the funny actions of those with autism demonstrates the
joy that can be experienced in the behavior of an aging child who disregards social
expectations. Much of Goffman’s work shows how individual concerns over the
judgments of an audience shape individual efforts to align behavior to situational
definitions, the flow of interaction, and the whims of social approval (Goffman 1959;
Collins 2004). The pressures of conformity that increasingly orient adolescents to their
peer group can be analyzed as lending a developmental angle to Goffman’s focus on
impression management (Kinney 1993). While the behavior of young children often
demonstrates that they see their families as their most important reference group,
adolescents and young adults increasingly orient themselves to the judgments of their
peers (Milner 2006). While this development is related to the rejection that parents
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sometimes find painful, it is also an important step in pushing an individual to enter
the wider world and one day create a family of their own. In comparison to the
overwhelming interest a teen will take in their peers (particularly those of the opposite
sex), consider the following story that Winnie Barclay told me involving her son Tyson
(19yrs old):
At dinner this evening, Winnie tells me a story in order to illustrate her
son’s attractiveness. The family had taken a trip to the beach, and they
were walking down the boardwalk. Tyson was in his bathing suit, but had
his shirt off and was walking ahead of his mom, dad, and brother. Winnie
tells me that at first look you wouldn’t know Tyson has autism, unless you
saw him doing some of his odd behaviors. There were these two girls
walking towards them, a little younger than Tyson, and they were smiling
at him and whispering to each other. Just as they were about to pass him,
Tyson lifted his hand, put it close to his face, and belted out one of his
“EGHHHHHHHHH” noises. Winnie tells me, laughing, that both girls
were in shock. Their jaws dropped, and they just looked at her son wide
eyed. She tells me that “it was hilarious.” Continuing to laugh, Winnie
explains that when it happened she was thinking “teaches you girls for
thinking dirty thoughts about my son!” She goes on to argue that she is
sure that, to this day, those two girls haven’t forgotten the experience.
In failing to register the attentions of two similarly aged females, Tyson engages in
behavior that is quite different from the average adolescent male. Whispering to one
another and smiling at him, the two teenage girls tried to attract Tyson’s attention and
instigate in him some recognition of the sexual possibilities of the situation. In lifting up
his hand, holding it to his face, and expelling a non-communicative noise into his palm,
Tyson entirely undermined the definition of the situation the two girls were trying to
establish and left both of them “in shock.” He also demonstrated how the ability (though
unknown to them) of those with autism to be mistaken as typical enhances the possibility
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“hilarious.” Moreover, in undermining the aims of these two women whose “dirty
thoughts” tried to ensnare her son’s attention, Winnie suggests that her son’s innocence at
the attention of individuals of the opposite sex is something she enjoys. Rather than focus
increasing attention on the judgments of those his age, Tyson remains impervious to the
social pressures of his peer group. He remains ever her baby. Moreover, though Tyson’s
behavior in this instance seems easily characterized as innocent, even instances in which
his behavior has more potential to be defined as devious carry the potential to be viewed
as humorous.
Though some forms of norm-breaking behavior seem shocking enough to
undermine viewing them as either innocent or funny, both are still options on the part of
the caretakers of those with autism tasked with their control. Aggression and
inappropriate behavior rank among those actions that the developmental disabilities
literature categorizes as maladaptive or problematic (Clarke 1996; Shattuck et. al. 2007).
Many, though not all, of the more severely disabled on the autism spectrum exhibit an
increase in difficult behaviors in adolescence and young adulthood (Wing 2001).
Sociological research has demonstrated the challenge such behaviors pose to caretakers
when they are engaged by adolescents and adults with autism, focusing specifically on
the conflict and negotiation that surround the framing and social control of such actions
(DiCicco-Bloom 2014). One reality that makes the problem behaviors of adults with
autism particularly challenging is that as adults they are more strictly held to the
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Passing as typical is not possible for someone with, for example, Down’s Syndrome.
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the danger and negative attention that can potentially be attracted by—for example—
public displays of nudity not withstanding, parents and other caretakers in my study still
noted the potential for hilarity at the inappropriate acts of adults with the condition. Take
the example of the comments below, in which Winnie describes her reaction to Tyson’s
proclivity to take his penis out of his pants in order to avoid activities in which he didn’t
want to participate:
No, he doesn’t take his pants off. He would pop his penis right over the
top of his pants. We can’t quite figure out how that worked. I’m not a
man; I don’t know, but people told me it was quite an amazing feat what
he was doing, and then you’re trying to stuff it back in and he’d take it out.
We were able to isolate the fact that he did it basically for two reasons.
One was for the shock value of it, so if this were a year ago, when he saw
you, he would walk up to you and give you deadly good eye contact with
it out and shake it at you [. . .] Then the other was he knew that that was
how he could get out of a situation [. . .] I said to them [some staff at
Tyson’s school] because they really thought that it was something very
sexual and I’m like, “I don’t think this is sexual. He knows that if he wants
to have a moment, he can go up to his room. He understands that whole
situation.” So I said, “it’s not that. Look at what he’s doing. Look at his
face.” It was like this, it was really, I’m sorry that we went through it but it
was a fascinating thing to look at and he stopped if you gave him no
feedback. So if you could just put it on extinction36, he would just stuff it
back in and walk away like, humph! [. . .] And so I was able to get it under
control at home and Claire got it under control, but it was very interesting,
every time new staff came in the room at school, there it was [. . .] Then,
he also learned that, okay, well, I get no feedback in this environment, but
what about if I’m in the community and so that became a real, you know,
obviously— So we got it under control in all these different environments
and then what do we do about this. We went to the zoo one day and this
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An extinction procedure occurs “when reinforcement of a previously reinforced
behavior is discontinued; as a result, the frequency of that behavior decreases in the
future” (Cooper, Herron and Heward 2007:457). In this case, the extinction procedure
consisted of ignoring Tyson’s self-exposure in order to undermine the function the
behavior was believed to be serving (i.e. getting attention, getting out of activities).
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was so funny. It wasn’t funny, but [. . .] We had had this kind of
wonderful day and Warren and I are sitting there kind of just feeling like
we’re the best parents in the whole world. Taylor was down there with his
friend Max, and Tyson had been with us. We met them at the gate and
Taylor said, “I saved the gorillas just for you guys. We can all go
together.” And we’re like, “okay,” and Tyson was expecting to leave and
all of a sudden we turn back in the zoo, and it was as though just the genie
was out of the bottle as it were. It was awful, and Taylor is wanting to do
this with us and so I looked at Warren and I said, “take Tyson back to the
car.” If you know where the zoo is, you know you go down the road there
to get to the parking lot and of course there are police everywhere,
everywhere.
Turner [a teacher at Tyson’s school] has known him since he was this big
[. . .] he said “hey, no way. I’m going to come and observe him and I’m
going to look at the context,’ and that’s when he just said “this has nothing
to do with sexuality. This is definitively attention-seeking.”

Winnie along with some of the staff she viewed as more supportive at Tyson’s school
determined that he was taking his penis out of his pants in order to get attention or in
order to get out of activities he wanted to avoid. Both motives are described as some of
the common drivers of inappropriate behavior among adolescents and adults with autism
(Wing 2001). Though the analysis of conflicts over framing explored in the previous
chapter would likely apply to this scenario, it also demonstrates the potential to find
humor in some of the more transgressive acts of those on the spectrum. While the zoo
debacle was definitely “not funny,” it was also, according to Winnie, “so funny.” Here
we see another property of humor that is both intensely sociological and particularly
applicable to caring for an adult with autism. As explained by Reay (2011), “the
highlighting of incongruities [. . .] makes humor ideal for exploring [. . .] risky topics [. .
.] when people react to incongruity with smiles, laughter, and/or elevated mood, they are
managing a potentially disruptive experience: that of the world not making as much sense
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application of a rule in one scenario but is unable to extrapolate that rule to other
scenarios provides an opening for loved ones to experience humor. In another example of
a world making less sense than is typically assumed, a behavior that on its face seems
significantly deviant—an adult male taking out his penis and shaking it at people—can be
viewed as both highly attuned to other people’s behavior (i.e. “he’d give you deadly good
eye contact and shake it at you” “for the shock value of it”) while at the same time being
totally innocent of the larger implications (e.g. “they really thought it was something very
sexual,” and “of course there are police everywhere, everywhere”). As Winnie explains,
Tyson’s ability to get his penis out of his pants and use it in such an effective way was
“fascinating.” It demonstrated real creativity and observational powers. Yet, in likely
missing the larger implications of such behavior—for example, how dangerous it was to
do so in public with police around—Tyson also demonstrated innocence as to the broader
social effects and possible consequences of his actions. Wing (2001) has explained that
adults with autism have a “lack of appreciation of social taboos” that can often lead them
to, for example, remove their clothes or urinate in public “in all innocence” (108). What
Winnie shows us is that in being so cunning, on one level, and so innocent, on another,
the inappropriate behaviors of adults with autism provide another zone in which
incongruities—though often troubling—can also lead to situations that are humorous.

CONCLUSION

	
  
This chapter has explored the innocence and humor that caretakers sometimes read
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into the atypical and incongruous behavior of adults with autism. Caretakers associated
innocence with things like an adult with autism’s failure to align their behavior with age
and gender appropriateness, norms that typically developing peers increasingly see as
very important. Caretakers associated humor with some of the behaviors associated with
the cognitive style of autism known as weak central coherence, in which individuals with
the condition will—for example—follow guidelines taught in relation to specific
scenarios while failing to extrapolate these to underlying social concepts and their
application elsewhere. It is also clear from caretaker comments that humor and innocence
often run together. This was illustrated by an adult with autism who entirely missed the
cues of two individuals of the opposite sex on a boardwalk, and then yelled into his hand
in a manner that both shocked his audience and undermined the definition of the situation
that had guided that audience’s behavior. It was also illustrated in the incongruity of the
effective (if vulgar) technique of flashing one’s penis to get out of unwanted activities,
while at the same time demonstrating a profound innocence of the more dire implications
of such behavior if done in the wrong place and at the wrong time.
Some might argue that the topic or presentation of the themes of this chapter are
offensive, in that they might be viewed as romanticizing or making jokes out of
something as serious as life-long dependency and severe disability. However, one of the
issues of the literature on autism is that it tends to ignore the complexity of the experience
of those who care for individuals with the condition. In his book on politics, Michael
Lewis (1998) remarked that politicians who mix seriousness and humor on the public
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stage tend to be written off as wacky or troubling. He laments the way in which this
leads the most sincere and complex individuals to be defined as phony, while the sound
bites of phonies tend to gain traction as representative of serious and respectful minds. I
would like to suggest that autism—being a disorder that is as politicized as it is
complex—sometimes falls into the same realm. It is a serious thing that can only be
discussed in hushed tones, even though we know that in real life the things we care about
most are often experienced with mixed and complex emotions (Ellis 1991). However,
given the reality that the data of this study is built on the words and experiences of those
who most would argue have a right to speak about autism, the significant presence of
humor and innocence in my fieldnotes, interviews, and observations seems to overwhelm
the potential political incorrectness of discussing these themes.
Parents have been remarking for decades about the joyous, fascinating, and funny
side of individuals with autism. In addition to my data a variety of memoirs were used in
this chapter in order to show the relevance of innocence and humor to the experience of
caring for individuals with autism. Though they describe everything from the significant
burden of care to the relatively paltry services for those with autism after they turn
twenty-one (Greenfeld 2009a), families have also remarked and remarked often about the
more enjoyable though less explored aspects of loving someone so atypical. In the
introduction to her recent publication The Funny Side of Autism, Masters (2010) puts it
thusly:
For one, I think it is important to show a side of autism that is hardly, if
ever, portrayed [. . .] As hard and exhausting as it is, there are moments
that catch you off guard—funny moments that show you how sweet and
innocent autistic children are, and how they are just as desperately trying
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to comprehend our world as we are trying to comprehend theirs. Often,
they make you ‘see’ things you would otherwise take for granted. I’ve
found that these moments are what fuel me to go on, and I sincerely hope
they will do the same for you (ix-x).

Masters describes the difficulty and exhaustion that are associated with the care of an
individual with autism. However, she also remarks on the funny moments and the
innocence of children with the condition. This chapter demonstrates that the same is true
for experiences with adolescents and adults with the condition. It is possible that the shift
away, in the point of view of families, from the significance of problem behaviors and
towards, for example, anxiety about the future (Gray 2002b), might be partly connected
to loved ones changing their understanding of atypical behavior. As one mother states in
response to the idea of seeing someone with autism being funny, “there have been so
many days—especially those immediately following my son’s diagnosis—when if
someone had mentioned the ‘funny side of autism’ to me, I might have punched them in
the nose. But now, a few years into the journey, I’d be glad to talk about the lighter side
of autism to anyone who wants to listen” (Katherine 2011). As she and her husband have
aged, they have learned that if they “don’t laugh” they might “cry instead.” While this
perspective on laughing defines it more as a coping method, I would argue that some of
the laughter reviewed in this chapter is unadulterated—in moments, or in years—by pain
underneath. As one mother in my study explained, “listen, autism is not funny, but people
with autism are!” Of course, the complexity of emotions—like humor in the midst of
sorrow—is one avenue for future research among those caring for developmentally
disabled individuals and others in relationships whose challenges would at least make
them eligible for the “living-loss” explored by Roos (2002).
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Then again, autism can be very sad and stressful for those caring for individuals

with the condition. As one father of a son with complex comorbidities (e.g. severe
epilepsy) explained to me, “since I am the one who works I get a break, but my wife
doesn’t; she has talked about the possibility that one solution for her son’s future, which
terrifies her and she constantly thinks about it, is that she would take her son’s life and
her own.” Lest these possibilities be viewed as only an exaggeration, there are reports of
cases in which parents of individuals with autism have killed them (and sometimes
themselves) to protect them from a dark future (Wood 2006; McGovern 2006; c.f.
Silverman 2012). The Chronic Sorrow literature does a good job exploring some of the
larger social factors that lead to the pain associated with relationships with individuals
who develop atypically. Despite the sorrowful parts of the experience of caring for
someone with autism, my data also attests to the reality that innocence and humor are part
of the picture as well. In order to put those elements into the context of a larger social
narrative, I end the chapter with a short discussion of the relationship between innocence
and humor in interactions with those with autism, and the search for purity and
authenticity in everyday modern life.
In failing to orient themselves to the strictures and codes of everyday social
interaction, individuals with autism can be seen as acting out an authenticity and purity
that remains attractive to typical individuals who are highly aware of the pressures of
social life. In descriptions of autism, scholars have noted the enchantment that surrounds
those with the disorder, both in current descriptions and historical anecdotes (Frith 2003).
A variety of analogies and narratives seem to speak to the “chilling and fascinating

	
  
combination of childhood innocence” and “disturbance” in autism that “cry out for
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symbolic elaboration” (Frith 2003:18). Despite the danger of romanticizing autism or
divorcing it from its lived reality, the words of those responsible for individuals with
autism also give voice to the fascinating and mesmerizing aspects of people with the
diagnosis. In her book about her two sons with autism, Moore (2004) states, “I suppose
some people find it sad that a child with a perfect face is not ‘normal.’ I don’t; for me,
their angelic faces perfectly express their innocence and strange integrity.” In remarking
on her son’s innocence and strange integrity, Moore hints that their way of being skirts
the pressures of social norms and in so doing can be viewed as representing an attractive
if atypical authenticity. Her comments suggest a way in which to understand the role of
innocence and humor in the relationships between caretakers and those with autism. In a
book on identity in modern times, Giddens (1991) argues that the emergence of “pure
relationships”—bonds “in which external criteria have become dissolved” such as
“kinship, social duty or traditional obligation”—are one of the hallmarks of modernity
(6). In another book on identity, Davis (2005) comments that “the moral ideal of
authenticity is a powerful force in modern culture and a crucial element of modern
identity” (259). While it is open to debate whether authenticity and purity are more
achievable in modern times, Goffman’s work shows that the rigors of social norms and
impression management still have the power to orient our behavior towards approval and
the success of interactions rather than the “pure” connection described by Giddens.
Though this points to the more cynical implications of Goffman’s work, to whatever
degree this reading is true it demonstrates one way in which the behavior of those with

	
  
autism might be seen as refreshing and liberating. The potential to experience their
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behavior as innocent and/or humorous is built into the ways in which individuals with
autism do not follow the strictures of social expectations. In loving them, one opens their
heart up to people who are deeply authentic, people who can “only be themselves”
(People Magazine, Review of Moore, 2004). And given the exploratory and creative
character of humor (Reay 2011), we can glimpse how in their interactions with those with
autism caretakers laughing are both showing love and exploring the possibilities afforded
by different ways of being.
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CHAPTER 5
The Language of Pathology and the Looming Future: Growth in the Context of
Atypicality and Dependency
INTRODUCTION
Autism is seen as belonging among the increasing number of human conditions that
western society has defined as clinical entities, to be diagnosed and conceptualized
through the language and concepts of modern medicine. The forces that drive a condition
to be seen as belonging to the medical arena are diverse and complex (Conrad 2007).
Though this belonging can only ever be partial, to be viewed as a clinical entity to any
significant degree is associated with powerful effects on the way that a condition is
interpreted and responded to. For example, Jane Mercer (1973) argues that individuals
working in the helping professions—medicine, psychology, social work, and even
education—often take a “clinical perspective” on clients with an intellectual disability
(ID) (2; see also Carrier 1983). This means that those tasked with studying and managing
the care of individuals with an intellectual disability believe that the best way to define
ID is as a form of biological abnormality that can be measured by standardized
assessment techniques and addressed through changes to that person’s functionality
(Mercer 1973). Though intellectual disability is a fundamentally different condition than
autism, in many instances the two overlap.37 Moreover, at present both are defined as
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Intellectual disability is assessed by scoring a 70 or below on a basic Intelligence
Quotient test. Autism, on the other hand, is fundamentally based on criteria concerned
with social interaction (e.g. issues with eye contact, trouble interpreting emotions),
communication (e.g. trouble with figurative language, or complex requests), and
repetitive behaviors (e.g. hand-flapping, echolalia). That being said, the proportion of

	
  
developmental disabilities, and Mercer’s comments about the clinical perspective

147	
  

apply just as readily to autism as to ID (Sullivan 1979). Of course, understanding and
trying to address autism with the assumptions and techniques of the clinical perspective is
not without merit. Indeed, a variety of stakeholders (professionals, families, even
individuals with the diagnosis) have described the value autism’s current
conceptualization in giving them answers and access to services, supports, and empathy
(Newschaffer and Curran 2003; Grinker 2007; Robison 2008).38 However and despite
the benefits, there are also costs associated with looking at and speaking about
individuals whose behavior fits the criteria for autism from the viewpoint of the clinical
perspective.
Though in theory the clinical perspective is applied to two fundamentally
different types of “abnormality,” its real world application to both pathological and
statistical conditions encourages the tendency to speak about the later as if they actually
represented those of the former. Though the clinical perspective is applied to entities that
are believed to derive primarily from an individual’s atypical biology, the perspective
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
individuals who have autism and co-occurring intellectual disability is high. Dated
literature found that 75% of individuals with autism also had intellectual disability (with
half of these functioning in the severe range [Rutter & Lockyer 1967]). More recent
literature has the rate of co-occurrence dropping (likely due to the integration of
Aspergers and high-functioning autism into the spectrum), with a recent meta-review by
Fombonne (2001) finding that 19.4% of individuals with autism functioned within the
normal range, 29.4% had mild to moderate learning disability (verbal and performance
IQ scores in 50-70 range), and 49.9% had severe to profound learning disability (below
50 – although, the difficulty of testing individuals with autism using language based
exams is important to note [see Charmin et al. 2011]) (c.f. O’Brien and Pearson 2004).
38
For example, the ascendance of autism to the rank of “celebrity” social problem in the
public sphere has—as with other equally ranked issues—brought awareness and
resources to those with the label and those with whom they are associated (for the term
“celebrity” social problem, see Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:57).	
  	
  

	
  
actually encompasses two very different forms of abnormality. The first,
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“pathological abnormality,” describes conditions in which “symptoms” stem from
biological processes in the body that carry the potential to “destroy the biological
organism as a living system” (Mercer 1973:3; Mercer 1965). The second, “statistical
abnormality,” describes conditions that lead appearance or behavior to deviate enough
from some population norm that it gets defined as a problem, but a problem which—
though linked to biology—will not directly threaten the fundamental operation of the
organism in question (Mercer 1973). Both of these categories represent ideal types, to
which real cases conform to varying degrees.39 Ignoring the conceptual messiness for
now, Mercer (1973) suggests that one of the issues in housing both pathological and
statistical abnormality under the clinical gaze is that we run the risk of thinking “in terms
of one model while operating with the other” (5). In practice, this would mean, for
example, describing and responding to individuals with a developmental disability like
autism (a form of statistical abnormality) as if they had a form of pathological
abnormality that could fundamentally destroy them “as a biological organism.” Of
course, severe autism and intellectual disability (unlike, say, left-handedness and eye-

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
39	
  For example, while an extremely dangerous illness like Ebola clearly fits the
pathological model, is the common cold really a danger to life? And, though individuals
with intellectual disability continue to live and develop over time, can the same not be
said of individuals who live with cancer for decades? In addition and adding another level
of ambiguity, individuals who are left handed, for example, have a statistical atypicality
based in biology that could theoretically be labeled as a problem and be brought under
the clinical gaze (and has, see Coren 1993). So where do we draw the line between
something that is of clinical-statistical relevance and something that is just “normal
variation” (Ortega 2009:430).	
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considerable challenges (difficulty navigating social situations, the need for intensive
supervision and support) (Mercer 1973).41 However, describing autism with words like
“etiology, symptom, syndrome, diagnosis, prognosis, and prevalence” means perceiving
those with autism as having something “somewhat akin to the disease processes to which
these terms are usually applied”—disease entities that are life threatening (Mercer
1973:17).
Though developmental disabilities are generally neither fatal nor stop
development, the language used to talk about autism in the public sphere (e.g. in the
media) often suggests—even if only figuratively—that autism is akin to a degenerative or
deadly disease. Some of the major tensions between a number of the most popular
representations of autism and the experience of those caring for individuals with the
disorder are the result of public discussions and conceptualizations of the condition that
have spoken about it with the language of the pathological model (Silverman 2012). This
language has been used to describe autism even though, in the words of one sibling and
writer, the condition is “nondegenerative and nonterminal” and “the boys and girls” with
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
40	
  The distinction between left-handedness and eye color suggests which forms of
statistical abnormality more easily fall under the clinical gaze. Specifically, those whose
biological differences more clearly come into conflict the operations and assumptions of
particular societies and cultures. While eye color seems entirely unrelated to many forms
of activity, left-handedness (a mechanical reality that gets in the way of, for example,
using three rings binders, scissors, right-sided desks, can openers, etc.) does not. Of
course, the reality that race has been turned into a clinical entity on many occasions
entirely undermines this argument (Zuberi 2001). 	
  
41	
  This is one of the main reasons that autism has been described as a “public health
emergency,” and why caretakers and activists have sought to attract the attention of the
clinical gaze or, at the very least, not fought it off (Newschaffer and Curran 2003; Eyal et
al. 2010; Eyal 2013; Feinstein 2010; Silverman 2012; Valentine 2010).	
  

	
  
the diagnosis “grow up” (Greenfeld 2009b:32). Thus, descriptions of autism that
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suggest—even metaphorically—that it threatens the fundamental operation of those with
the condition have the potential to conflict with the lived experience of those caring for
adults with the diagnosis. Moreover, suggestions of non-development and death
demonstrate the power and sometimes-unintended consequences of professional, media,
and activist representations of significant atypicality that shape public perceptions and
policy on autism (Broderick 2011; The New York Times 2009; Scully 2008; for a study of
how the media shapes popular views on mental illness, see Wahl 1999).42 The first half of
this chapter will explore the ways in which the experiences of caretakers of adults with
autism come into conflict with representations of autism associated with the language of
pathology. The application of the clinical model and the language of pathology likely
serve to represent the fear and angst of caretakers concerned about what will happen to an
individual with autism who will need care throughout their lives. It is likely also fed by
the hope that the language of pathology will energize individuals with the right
knowledge and techniques to set about finding a cure for autism (a magic bullet that
would solve the problem of future care). However, the reality remains that many
individuals with autism grow, develop, and learn, remain alive and present in the social
networks in which they are embedded, and yet continue to qualify for a diagnosis of
autism and remain atypical and dependent. In order to accurately represent the experience
of adults with autism and their caretakers it is crucial to recognize just how important
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
42	
  As one writer put it, the dichotomous assumption behind the pathological model—that
either you are treated or you will eventually die (what one author describes as the “cure
or die” mentality, Waltz 2013)—does not accurately describe the reality of autism.	
  

	
  
planning for the future is for those who remain atypical and dependent. The second
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part of this chapter will seek to draw on sociological theory of the future in order to
clarify how the reality of statistical abnormality is different from pathological
abnormality precisely because conceptualization of the future plays such an important
role in care.
Given my focus on how caretakers of adults with autism interact with and plan for
the reality that those with the condition generally have a normal life expectancy, it seems
serendipitous that there has recently arisen in sociology an interest in theorizing how
people conceptualize and anticipate the future. Recent work in sociology has begun to
push for more concrete theoretical tools through which to understand how people imagine
their relationship with the future and how that conceptualization shapes subsequent
behavior (DiCicco-Bloom and Gibson 2010; Cerulo 2006; Mische 2009; Gibson 2011a;
Gibson 2011b). One article in particular suggests a theoretical structure with which to
explore the tensions involved in the multiple levels on which the future unfolds. While
past theoretical work has conflated shorter- and longer-term horizons into an amorphous
mass (Heritage 1984; Bourdieu 2000; Schutz 1967), Tavory and Eliasoph (2013) argue
that the future is shaped by layers of temporal structure which, though often unfolding in
tandem, can also exist in tension with one another. They introduce us to three abstract
modes of “future making”—protensions, trajectories, and what I will call ‘temporal
structures’—through which people conceptualize and towards which they coordinate
everyday interaction as they make sense of what comes ahead (Eliasoph and Tavory
2013).
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The term “protention” is used to describe the “moment-by-moment

anticipations” through which individuals “constantly calibrate” themselves to the
immediate future (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013:909, 913; Husserl 1960). Though the social
“skills” required to bring about the immediate future are usually taken for granted, the
complexities within protentional dynamics become starkly apparent when, for example,
the smooth flow of micro-interaction breaks down (Tavory and Eliasoph, 2013:909, 913;
Garfinkel 1967). The term “trajectories” refers to the longer-term paths along which
actors envision themselves moving, and tend to proceed in ways that “are more or less
culturally predicable” (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013:909). Trajectories can be broken down
into two sub-concepts: “narratives,” or shared stories about how specific events relate to
one another, and “projects,” or individual goals towards which people see their everyday
actions building (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013:914, 915; Mische 2009).43 The final
conceptual level of future coordination—what I call temporal structure—feels to actors as
if it unfolds “automatically and would keep going with or without anyone’s actions”
(Tavory and Eliasoph 2013: 916). Though they do not provide a name for the masterconcept (my reason for providing temporal structure), Tavory and Eliasoph (2013)
describe two sub-concepts: “plans,” or assumed and well trodden paths (e.g. ranks in the
military hierarchy, or grades in high school), and “temporal landscapes,” or things people
take for granted so deeply (e.g. the seven day week) that they seem natural, universal, and
very hard to change.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
43
The authors recognize the continued struggle to understand how narratives and projects
interrelate, cautious not to assign too much power to either “culture” or “individual
psychology” (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013; Mische 2009; Fligstein 2001).
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The reality that people’s anticipation of and coordination with the future can

unfold on multiple levels provides a useful analytical tool to start conceptualizing how
caretakers of adults with autism orient themselves continued existence and future needs
of those with the condition. Despite the little sociological work that has explicitly delved
into the ways in which modes of future-coordination both intersect and diverge from oneanother, past empirical studies do provide some clues as to how the strains and
contradictions surrounding the conceptualization of future might be analyzed. In the
introduction to their paper, Tavory and Eliasoph (2013) explain that “in contrast to those”
who argue that modes of “future orientation operate in tandem or can be reduced to one
basic form,” the reality is that these modes merge, detach, and directly contradict each
other when, for example, “actors place similar protentions on different narratives [. . .]
similar trajectories on different temporal landscapes” or “ambivalently orient themselves
to multiple futures at once” (909). Past studies into phenomena like flirtation and
marriage show how different future orientations can starkly or subtly conflict with one
another. For example, during flirtation, two people might easily coordinate (protention)
what appear to be behaviors that represent an equal interest in one another, while at the
same time imagining these behaviors fitting into very different trajectories (one viewing
the behaviors as a preamble to a sexual encounter, the other viewing it as harmless fun
that will lead no where) (Tavory 2009; on ambiguity in momentary interaction, see Leifer
1988). In another example, the recent rise in divorce, multiple marriages, and long-term
relationships outside the context of marriage shows how the increase in multiple
trajectories actually undermines the “naturalized plan” or temporal structure of marriage
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as an inevitable part of adulthood (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013:928; Beck-Gernsheim
1999; Hackstaff 1999).
In the case of autism, the challenges of future care are considerable, with the
major concern of aging caretakers turning to who will take care of the individual with
autism after they die (Donvan and Zucker 2010; Naseef 2013). Answering this question
with certainty always remains challenging, with families and professionals working to
cobble together funding for places to live, transportation needs, health needs, and a whole
variety of necessities that the individual with autism is unable to organize for themselves.
While the first part of this chapter will explore how the popular language of autism
misrepresents the reality and challenges represented by the condition and the available
responses and solutions to those challenges, the second part will address the role that
temporality plays in caretaker’s efforts to address the most pressing challenge presented
by autism—the need for life long care and significant support considerably beyond what
a typical adult requires. The importance of appreciating how people’s orientation to the
future can unfold in commensurate and conflicting ways is that it opens up a theoretical
angle through which to discover how caretakers think about and respond to a difficult
(logistically, emotionally, socially) reality that rarely has a clear answer, magic bullet, or
“cure.” In the conclusion, I return to ways in which the pathological model does a
disservice to representations of other statistical and chronic illnesses, and how the reality
of planning for future needs is an important component of the lived experience of such
conditions.
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Though descriptions of autism that employ the language of pathology have aided in the
push for scientific research and educational services, pathological terms and imagery
have characterized individuals with the condition in ways that conflict with the
experience of those caring for people aging with the disorder. Language is “essential”: it
associates meanings and labels with the categories created by abstraction, dividing the
complexity of reality into concrete units so that experiences may be contemplated and
manipulated intellectually (Mercer 1973:256). Despite the utility of this process,
language also has its costs: once we categorize an empirical phenomena as belonging to
some class, associated meanings and labels get treated as “given,” “natural,” or “right”
and place obstructions in the way of more “creative,” “useful,” or, at the very least,
relevant ways of organizing the empirical world (Mercer 1973:256; Bowker and Star
1999). Autism has been characterized by the meanings associated with the pathological
model of abnormality for some time: descriptors like “disease” and “severe pathology”
have been common for decades, and ones like “epidemic” have become more popular as
rates of diagnosis have increased (Bettelheim 1967:396; Henry 1971:278; Silverman
2012; Harris and O’Conner 2005; Kirby 2005:23; Fombonne 2001; Wall Street Journal
2003). There are a number of compelling reasons for lumping autism—which, on closer
inspection, more easily qualifies for the statistical model of abnormality—with
phenomena whose characteristics largely qualify them for the pathological model of
abnormality (Grinker 2007). For example, speaking about the behavior of those with
autism as “symptoms” gives individuals from the helping professions and the clients they

	
  
serve (e.g. families) a targeted language through which to conceptualize behavioral
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issues and create therapeutic goals (an author and father notes that calling autism an
“epidemic” has been “good” because it means that we are seeing “more research, more
philanthropy, and more understanding of how families struggle,” [Grinker 2007:5]). On a
logistical note, the pathological model also supplies a language familiar to third party
payers (i.e. insurance companies) who seek to impart homogeneity, accountability, and
temporality to the relatively heterogeneous and continually expanding diagnostic and
therapeutic methods applied to autism (Leslie and Martin 2007; Bouder, Spielman and
Mandell 2009; for discussion of same issue with mental illness, see Horwitz 2002:75).
From the perspective of epidemiologists, the pathological model of autism keys people
into the reality that—while much of the increase in diagnosis is due to changes in
clinician behavior, the official definition of autism, and general awareness—autism is
based in real, if complex, biological irregularities, and some of the increase may actually
be secular (i.e. not due entirely to measurement changes) (Croen at al. 2002; Newschafer
et al. 2007; Lawler et al. 2004; King and Bearman 2008). And in what one sibling
describes as “marketing” autism, it can even be argued that part of the motivation of
applying the concepts of the pathological model to the disorder might be to try and
energize—though arguably an act of magical thinking—some kind of treatment success
equal to the major innovations (e.g. antibiotics, vaccines, the eradication of smallpox) of
America’s golden age of public health and medicine (Greenfeld 2009b:32; Starr 1982;
Rogers 2014; for the danger of this thinking, see Offit 2008). However, the experience of
those who interact with and care for individuals with autism—particularly adults with the
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condition—attests to some of the costs of characterizing autism through the language
of the pathological model.
Through such mischaracterizations as the suggestion that individuals with the
disorder do not continue to grow and develop throughout their lives, the language of the
pathological model of abnormality does a disservice to the lived reality of caring for
adults with autism. Though the fit between reality and the abstract categories of language
are never perfect, there are basic criteria that guide our use of various concepts when
applied to our lived experience. The pathological model of abnormality is ideally suited
to phenomena—usually described as diseases—which threaten the development and
basic operation of the biological organisms with which they interact. Thus, the language
of the pathological model tends to affix to the conditions to which and individuals to
whom it is applied the suggestion that because of some abnormality (1) their existence is
threatened, and thus (2) if they continue to be abnormal will eventually cease to develop
and survive. A demonstration of the power of the language of pathology is given by the
reality that suggestions of non-development and what might be described as metaphors of
death pervade the way that we talk about autism in the public sphere (Fitzpatrick 2009;
Morrice 2005; Broderick and Ne’eman 2008).
In speaking about their everyday experience, however, caretakers of adults with
autism explicitly and implicitly buck against the ways in which pathological language
mischaracterizes individuals who have the diagnosis. For example, despite a noticeably
atypical developmental course, the suggestion that individuals with autism do not
continue to develop, learn, and grow as they age—physically, socially, emotionally—
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(Sicile-Kira 2012; Biklen et al. 2005). Talks with and observations of Ross and Molly
Zago demonstrate how their experience of their son, Martin, demonstrates that he
continues grow and learn as he ages:
Standing next to his wife as she washes dishes at the sink, Ross tells me,
“you know, we recently had friends for dinner, and Martin handed the
lady something and she said ‘thank you.’” After saying this, Ross looks at
me—his voice slowing for effect—and says with pride and wonder, “and
Martin said ‘you’re welcome.’” He laughs, scrutinizing me for a response.
Then Ross goes on to describe another recent incident in which Martin
brought him a shirt, and told him “this is your shirt.” After telling me this,
he exclaims, “that’s the first time!” [referring to his son’s correct use of
the pronoun “your” in his statement].44 After another pause, Ross
explains to me that while these things might seem like small successes,
they are really big for him and Molly.
Ben: Can you tell me a time that Martin did something that surprised you
with his insight into something? [. . .]
Molly: He was lying down. And I went in and I covered him up, and I
said, ‘how are you feeling?’ He had to be upset [earlier that day, Martin
had been in a van that was involved in an accident]. He said, ‘Martin will
die someday.’ Golly, he was really scared.
Ben: What did you say?
Molly: There was nothing I could say. I said, ‘yeah, but not now. You’re
okay.’
I am sitting out on the front porch of the Zago residence with Ross. Together we
watch as Martin pushes the lawn mower across the green grass that covers the
expansive lawn sloping down towards the road below. Ross tells me how he still
remembers when his son turned twenty-one, and he told him “Ok, now you’re a
man and you can mow the grass.” Martin was the “happiest guy in the world,”
and from that point he started mowing the lawn on his own. He puts the gas in the
mower, takes care of it, cleans it, and puts it away and locks the shed when he is
done (though his technique could still use some improvement: Ross points out to
me that rather than going in a circle, so as to throw cuttings where the mower has
already cut, Martin’s path sometimes throws cuttings onto parts of the lawn he
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
44 Using correct pronouns—“I” and “You”—was one of the fundamental issues that
Kanner (1943) said distinguished the syndrome in the first scientific paper to describe
autism.	
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won’t cut). As I sit and talk with Ross, the mower stops for a moment. I watch
as Martin bends down and tampers with the machine. Ross gets up to go and
assist his son. When Ross comes back he tells me that the mower has trouble
starting sometimes. We talk on and Ross tells me about a cousin of his that does
lawn mower repair. He tells me that his cousin, Roger, is a bit of an introvert and
actively avoids interaction with his family.45 He then explains that in the past,
when something was broken, Martin will ask him (Ross) to fix it. However
recently, when the mower’s screws vibrated loose, Martin went to Ross and said,
“mower broke; take it to Roger Webster.” After telling me this, Ross laughs and
says, “he knows what he’s talking about!”
Ross: But basically he would just talk about stuff now more and more,
[and he’ll] ask you questions about anything, but they’re simple, just tothe-point, blunt, three-four word, why is this [. . .] I don’t know how to put
a finger on it, just the interest, just asking questions about things. That was
just the other day; I told you about the weeds, the fact that he walked
along and helped me. He would never come with me and do something [in
the past], and the fact that [the weeds I was carrying] started to fall and he
just on his own pushed them back and then he held on until I got up
through here and we went in the woods to dump them [. . .] He asked [my
brother-in-law, the last time we saw him] something about either
something on TV? I forget what he said he asked him about but [my
brother-in-law] said, “he was actually trying to have a conversation with
me,” and that’s the first time, the first time ever. [. . .] Sometimes I think
he needs more but I don’t know what would be available, especially when
I see him developing, like he’s developed in the last two or three years.
It’s unfortunate there’s no funding or anything for any kind of formal
education. After 21, they’re done and he is just changing.46 But I don’t
know, there again, what would he achieve?”

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
45
On one occasion, Ross wondered allowed to me whether his cousin might not qualify
for a diagnosis of autism.
46
The end of formal education is widely cited as a shock to families caring for
individuals with developmental disabilities like autism. In one article, a parent states: “
‘It’s a big shock to the system when they graduate,’ Smetona said. ‘Their schooling was
everything to them. It met their social and extracurricular needs. It’s hard to find
something in the community for Michael and Megan to do.’ [. . .] ‘Kids have been getting
$60,000 a year minimum worth of school services. Then it’s gone,’ [. . .] ‘A percentage
will go on to college. Others can’t be home alone’” (Henry 2009). An ‘appropriate
education’ for all is an entitlement. Adult services for those with a developmental
disability are based on ‘what’s available,’ and is almost always associated with waiting
lists (e.g. you can’t sue the state for adult services, unless they break a previously made
contract; you can sue the school district for not providing an “appropriate education,”
and, as many parents explained, just the name of the right lawyer can make the case).	
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Ross and Molly suggest some of the social advances that have characterized their son’s
aging. Saying you’re welcome when a guest thanks him; helping his father as he carries
weeds from the garden; using the correct pronoun when notifying his father about a shirt;
demonstrating some awareness of death and his own mortality; using body language to
signal to his uncle the desire to engage in conversation. All represent things that Martin
rarely or “has never done before” in his interactions with his parents and others in his
social network. Together, these experiences attest to the reality that, despite the imagery
of pathology, adults with autism are “not done” but keep “developing” and “changing.”
In the words of another father of an adult with autism, “development delayed does not
mean development denied” (Naseef 2013:213).
Of course, it is easy to find caretakers agreeing at times with the pathological
model’s suggestion of non-development. For example, in Ross’s question as to what
further education “would achieve” he suggests ambivalence about the potential for
growth. Such statements attest to the reality that, despite their growth, the development of
individuals with autism as they age is abnormal compared to the rest of the population.
However, no matter the degree of disability, one is hard pressed to find cases of
individuals with autism who do not grow and change. Just as powerful and potentially
damaging as the suggestion of non-development is the suggestion of non-existence.
Though the official definition of autism does not characterize it as a fatal condition,
popular descriptions of autism that use words associated with pathology can intimate the
opposite. While these descriptors do not necessarily suggest that autism leads to death,
describing individuals with the condition as absent, lost, or even “dead souls” can be

	
  
interpreted as transforming autism into a metaphor of death (Fitzpatrick 2009: 44;
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Seroussi 2002:201; Sarrett 2011; Waltz 2013). These metaphors sit in contrast with the
complex experiences of caretakers, who, in their daily interactions with adults with
autism, are faced with the irrefutable presence, even if abnormal, of those with the
condition.
In their interactions with adults with the disorder, caretakers demonstrate that the
metaphors of death that attach themselves to pathological descriptions of autism brush
over the ways in which those with the condition are both present and active participants
in the social milieus in which they are situated. Though individuals with autism have
been classified by one scholar and parent as among those sorrowful events that she
describes as a “living loss,” the issue with using the language of pathology to describe
those with the disorder is to go as far as to suggest that caring for individuals with
developmental disability is the same as reacting to a child that has died (Roos 2002).
While some may argue that the focus on children with autism shows how in the public
conscience they are viewed as anything but dead, the language used to describe people
with the condition—exotic terms like “absent,” “lost,” and “dead souls”—involve
descriptions that “slip out of imaginary discourse to shape the perception and reception of
real individuals” and leave little room for the reality of adults with the condition
(Goehner 2011; Johnson and Van Rensselaer 2008; Murray 2008:117; Fitzpatrick
2009:44; Truchan-Tatryn 2003:207). The power of this language becomes more extreme
once a child with autism becomes an adult with autism, and thus demonstrates by his or
her continued presence that they might be difficult to integrate socially but they are
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certainly not dead (Greenfeld 2009b). Grappling with the implicit suggestions of the
pathological model that pervade popular representations of autism, the sibling of a
twenty-year old with the condition who participated in my study stated on his blog that:
“Autism Spectrum Disorder is not a disease. Cancer is a disease. Alzheimer’s is a
disease.47 Diseases kill you. Last I checked, autism does not kill you.” In so stating, this
sibling was arguing against language that suggests that autism qualifies for the
pathological model of abnormality (“autism does not kill you”) as opposed to the reality
that it is a form of statistical abnormality (once again, Mercer 1973). In their interactions
with and stories about Bianca Lee, friends, family, and co-workers demonstrate how she
is neither dead nor absent, but rather is a present and active element of the social settings
she inhabits:	
  
Jack: [Bianca’s] an introvert and does not, you know, doesn’t get energy
from being with people. The bigger the crowd sometimes, the more energy
it takes for her to maintain herself in that setting [. . .] Bianca’s actually a
clear cut case of that [someone who wanted her own place, and to live
independently from her parents]. We bought [her brother] his house and
we were going over to look at it, and she didn’t say, “well when do I get
mine?” But we went and looked at the place that was for sale over here.
And at that point she kind of clicked into, oh, okay. So then she said, “I
need a new house.” [. . .] Bianca has seemed to me to be capable of
development, I mean, from the time she was a little girl. I perceive that, I
think I said I can see that she goes on in the developmental ladder and that
she would, you know [. . .] Recently, it was really like a breakthrough. She
was really upset and I ask her to tell me why she was upset and she did
and I’m not remembering the specifics of that now. And that was, I mean,
that was a new thing [. . .] So with respect to Bianca, she’s contributing
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
47
Despite the general point of this statement, it unwittingly attests to the difficulty of
classifying today’s chronic conditions—like autism—because Alzeheimer’s is often not
directly responsible for killing people. Rather, the behavior characteristic of Alzheimer’s
(e.g. issues swallowing, walking, controlling bladder and bowel) can lead to
comorbidities (e.g. infections, blood clots, pneumonia) which themselves cause death.
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her share of the groceries, she’s buying clothes and she’s buying some
recreation with her own money.
I am shadowing Bianca for the day at her job, at the offices of Helping
Hands (HH). HH specializes in behavioral health, including services for
individuals with Autism and/or an Intellectual Disability. Some of HH’s
staff manages the house that Bianca and her roommate live in. Bianca
works four days a week for about four hours a day. Her responsibilities
include (in order of the amount of time she spends doing each) passing
confidential health documents through a paper shredder, placing paper in
the office printer and copy machines, taking mail from people’s boxes and
delivering it to their offices, watering the potted plants on her floor (on
Thursdays), and, if the shredder is down, organizing the administrative
closets (her boss, Carolyn, tells me, “she is great at that!”). Throughout
the day, Bianca is monitored by her job coach, Julia, who also spends time
with Bianca at the home she lives in. Julia tells me that Bianca is “so
smart” and “inquisitive,” and interested in all kinds of things. For
example, she once took her automatic coin operator entirely apart—
unscrewing all the small pieces—and then put the whole thing back
together. More recently, when her TV stopped working, Bianca wanted to
open it up. She applied a butter knife to the back of the monitor in an
effort to achieve this.
I spend an hour sitting next to Bianca at work, watching her as she
methodically takes paper from a pile to her right and runs it through the
shredder. When Bianca comes upon stapled packets of paper, she gets a
stapler remover and pulls the staples out. Sometimes she pauses to slowly
scan the pieces of paper, and I wonder if she can read them. I ask her at
one point, “what does it say on that top line” and she tells me,
“pe…peer…revia…peer review…[then, after placing her finger on the
first word]…inve…investigation…reccomen…recommendations…peer
review and investigation recommendations.” Though she is often quiet, at
times she suddenly initiates conversation, saying, for example, “Ben…I
want a new HD TV, and a Video Recorder…” (Earlier in the day, Julia
told me that I should have joined them in the car, because Bianca was
talking non-stop about getting a new TV [her old one still broken]). Less
than an hour before the end of the day, I talk to Carolyn about the work
Bianca does. She tells me that there is a company that comes and shreds
the paper that Bianca doesn’t get to—because there is so much to do. She
tells me that during the time she has overseen Bianca, she has had the
pleasure of watching her grow and develop in her position. For example,
she tells me how she has an easier time now negotiating with Bianca
about which days to work: “if we don’t have, uhm, work for a certain day,
I’ll write her a note, and say, ‘there is no work tomorrow, can you switch,
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take off tomorrow, and come in on Friday. Put yes or no’ and she tells me.
And then she takes the note home, and then she knows that her work
schedule has changed. Which was, uhm, not always comfortable in the
very beginning. For her to come in on a Friday, she was, ah, initially
resistant to that, and she has gotten much better, much more flexible with
that.”
Jack: “I got an e-mail that says, ‘I want to go to Puerto Rico.’”
Ben: “From Bianca? Really?”
Jack: “Uh-hum. ‘I want to go for six days. When can I go to Puerto
Rico?’” [. . .]
Jack: “She and Joan48, she’s been, and so now…” [. . .]
Joan: “Oh, it’s totally time! I totally agree with her [. . .] We stayed
outside San Juan [last time we went], I think Jack had used his points for a
hotel, right on the water. And it was right on the water, and it had a pool.
Because Bianca likes a pool. And so we would go, we would get up and
rent one of those little things [“a cabana?” I ask]. Yeah, and I would set it
all up, and Bianca would be in the water, and then I would go out and we
would go out into the water, and then we would hang out in the little
cabana thingy, and then she would go back into the pool, and then as soon
as she could she would swim up to the swim up bar [everyone laughs] and
then I had to have a conversation with the bartender that you can not just
give Bianca anything she asks for, she can have one drink, one! [. . .] She
was really fun! [. . .] We went, we went to go see the lighthouse, and it
was closed on the day that we went. And I was like, ‘huh, I should have
checked that.’ So then we had to drive back. And then I thought to myself,
‘why do we have to drive all the way around the island, why don’t we just
drive through the island.’ [. . .] [we] are driving along and Bianca’s
looking out the window, and says, ‘there’s an Indian,’ ‘there’s a native
person.’ [laughing] And then we stop in this tiny little town, cause it is
lunchtime and she wants lunch, they only speak Spanish, so I said, ‘ok

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
48
Joan has been a friend of the Lee family ever since Jack met her at his congregation
decades ago. At the time she was dating another woman, and the Lees invited both
women to move into their home (the congregation did not accept their relationship). Both
Joan and her girlfriend were some of the most pivotal of the several young teachers
(many of them undergraduates at a near by college) who were given room and board in
the Lee residence in return for working with Miller and Bianca. Like others who become
close to individuals with autism and their families, Joan (and, at the time, her girlfriend)
no doubt qualify as “fictive kin” for the Lees (Stack 1974). Indeed, Jack and Vale both
informed me of how Joan’s parents expressed some discomfort with how close Joan
seemed to the Lees—possibly surpassing the closeness of her relationship with her
biological parents. This settled down when the Lees and Joan’s parents spent time
together recently and hit it off.
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Bianca, what does this say?’ [. . .] She knew enough Spanish (from
watching Placo del Sesimo on TV) I told her what I wanted, and she
ordered it, said ‘Gracias’ to the people.”

These extended interview and field note excerpts demonstrate that, like Martin Zago,
Bianca Lee continues to grow and develop. They also attest to the reality that in the
experience of family, friends, employers, and service staff, she is a vibrant member of the
social situations in which she is embedded. Those who know her describe Bianca as a
hard-working employee whose constant pace of activity is much appreciated by her boss,
and whose labors help her to buy various necessities and luxuries (for a review of the
value of integrating individuals with autism into the workplace, see Bornstein 2011).
Bianca’s boss also describes her as a person who has evolved in her employment (having
an easier time now negotiating work hours with her employer), just as family and friends
describe her as having evolved through her personal hobbies and relationships (e.g.
learning Spanish, and recently demonstrating an ability to use words to communicate her
feelings—“that was a new thing”). Of course, there is a good deal of experiential
evidence that attests to the reality that Bianca is atypical: she is described and observed to
be an introvert, someone who needs extra support in the context of work, a person who
obsessively focuses on items that she desires, and someone—to take a specific case in
point—who does not recognize the tensions that might be aroused by describing the
citizens of Puerto Rico as “natives” or “Indians.”49 The contours of her atypicality

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
49
In another example that demonstrates difficulty comprehending social distinctions,
Joan told me a story about Bianca in which the later worked at a sock factory at which
most of the workers were Cambodian. To the dismay of her then job coach, Bianca would
speak to her Cambodian co-workers in Spanish. The reasoning, as Joan explained,
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qualified Bianca for a diagnosis of autism; the label signifies to those around her that
her behavior is significantly different than a typical member of the general population
(though the statistical nature of this normality is more assumed than measured, see
Mercer 1973). However, suggestions of absence or death conveyed by the popular use of
pathological language to describe autism does a disservice to the reality that Bianca is a
living person embedded in a social network. Moreover, in suggesting that death is an
integral part of the condition—an outcome that is relatively unmovable, no matter the
social context—descriptions of autism ignore the degree to which the experience of
atypicality and the degree of a person’s functionality are determined by social
surroundings. For example, Bianca has no problem doing quite typical things—going on
vacation with a family friend, swimming with her in a pool, and making her way over to
the pool bar to order a pina colada. While seemingly mundane observations, in their very
mundanity they highlight the damage that the language of pathology exerts on those with
autism. Moving beyond the ways in which the language of pathology performs a
disservice to the development and presence of individuals with the condition, we find that
the pathologizing of autism can attach stigma both to those it describes and those with
whom they are associated.
Pathological descriptions of autism not only attach suggestions of nondevelopment and metaphors of death to those with the disorder, but also impute to their
families and other caretakers a form of honorary pathology that subtly (or not so subtly)
undermines the nuanced experience of living alongside autism. Scholars of the anti	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
seemed to be: “she noticed that they were speaking a foreign language, so she spoke the
only foreign language that she knew.”
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psychiatry movement argued that one of the issues with medicalizing “madness” was
that in so doing you stigmatize those so labeled, communicating to others that there is
something fundamentally bad, scary, or sad about them (Conrad & Schneider 1992; Szasz
1961; Scheff 1966; Goffman 1961). Though autism is no longer defined as a mental
illness, describing those with the condition as non-developers or “dead souls” can be
viewed as a process of stigmatization. In a classic work on the nature of stigma, Goffman
(1963) argued that those who are stigmatized often confer onto those with whom they are
connected a level of associational stigma—suggesting that they, too, are bad, scary,
and/or sad (also, see Milner 1994). A powerful historical example of honorary stigma in
action is presented by the so-called “menace of the feebleminded,” in which early
eugenicists argued that the “mentally deficient”50 and their kin constituted a “social
menace,” a “drain on society,” a “national calamity,” and linked them to social problems
like “crime,” “abuse of charity,” “drunkenness,” and other threats to America and its
“future generations” (Trent 1994:141, 160, 165, 166, 178; Wray 2006). It is possible to
see in these theories of “degeneration” suggestions of how the language of pathology
spreads the threat of non-development and death from those who are significantly
atypical to their families and caretakers. Despite being a largely historical concept
(though, further below, we will see how the idea of “degeneracy” sometimes rears its
ugly head), describing autism with the language of pathology still has the power to subtly
communicate that there is something fundamentally tragic, sad, or “broken,” about those
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
50	
  Though labeled with now out-of-date and offensive labels like “idiots,” “morons,” and
“imbeciles,” the 19th century population of individuals with developmental disabilities no
doubt included people who would today be diagnosed with autism. 	
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diagnosed and those with whom they are associated (Sarrett 2011:147; Sinclair 1993;
Fitzpatrick 2009). And while caretakers of adults with autism are quick to point out the
challenges associated with atypicality, their words and experiences, at the very least,
complicate the moral suggestions made by stakeholders in the press and public about the
quality of their everyday lives. To demonstrate this, we return once again to Ross and
Molly Zago’s descriptions of daily life with their son Martin:
At dinner, Ross talks to me about some of the newspaper articles he reads about
individuals with autism and the families that care for them. He tells me that these
articles are all about “the suffering child with autism” and their “suffering
families.” Ross recounts that recently, after reading one of these articles, he
looked up at his wife and said, “we’re not suffering.” As he gets up to make
coffee, he explains that he doesn’t worry about whether Martin will get married,
or have children. Molly follows this by telling me that they “don’t think about
it.”51
Ross: Oh yes. He’s pretty strong because we ride bikes a lot. See, we do
that with our free time. Two years ago, we rode 2,000 miles and last year
we rode 1,000 [a couple of their trips have been written about in a local
newspaper] [. . .] He talks to girls. Oh yes! And they can be 13 or 40, it
don’t matter. That’s how he introduces himself. “What’s your name? What
month, day and year were you born?” Then he tells them what day of the
week it was and they’re always fascinated [. . .] He goes to therapeutic
riding. We go there with him and I’m on the Board of Directors for that
now, so I’m involved with that [. . .] (speaking of therapeutic riding) I
mean, nothing is better, I say to anybody, ‘if you think you need a
psychiatrist, just come with me on Thursday. I’ll give you an hour.’ [. . .]
[In the evening] we usually have dinner and clean up and everything and
we watch TV and eight o’clock or something we’ll have dessert.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
51
In the interest of full disclosure, it would be inaccurate to say that the language of
brokenness, for example, never entered Molly or Ross’s descriptions of their son. For
example, in describing a tantrum his son was having in a Mall once when he was ten
years old, Ross told me that a woman came up to him and said, “what kind of father are
you?” Ross responded, “lady, if you can fix him, I’ll make you a millionaire.” This
comment was effective in getting the woman to “realize that he had a problem, and
swallow her tongue,” but also shows how despite taking umbrage with media portrayals,
families also, at times, use the language of pathology to describe the atypicality of their
loved ones.
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Molly: The thing with Martin is, he’s just a part of our lives. We have one
friend that said to Ross, ‘Can we go do adult stuff?’ Martin’s an adult.
What are you going to do? We’re not going to a strip club, because that’s
not what we do anyway. It’s like, you go to a restaurant, Martin will go to
any restaurant, he’s perfectly good at a restaurant [. . .] Our lives would be
completely different without him, but that’s not necessarily meaning it
would be any better.52

In their descriptions of Martin, the dynamics of their relationship with him, and the
impact that autism has had on their lives, Ross and Molly Zago explicitly and implicitly
challenge suggestions of brokenness and sorrow often associated with the language of
pathology. While it is true that they have struggled at times and to varying degrees,
Martin’s caretakers speak about and demonstrate the elements of joy and vitality that
animate their lives. Through the distinct (biking hundreds of miles) and the mundane (the
ritual of evening TV and dessert); walking around the community (Martin’s quirks
attracting the attention of women) and participating in special services (therapeutic
riding, about which Ross contends “nothing is better”); even through engaging in hobbies
and chores (Martin’s mowing represents both)—the Zagos contest the stigmas of
pathology often attributed to those with autism and those who care for them. Or, as put by
Ross, the complexity of their experience is shortchanged by descriptions of the “suffering
child with autism” and his “suffering family.” Despite the troubles they have faced, other
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
52
Though I was never given a chance to interview him, the Zago’s other son might
disagree with his parents about the effect of his brother. Both parents explained their
strained relationship with him, particularly Ross who “hasn’t been able to talk to him
since a year ago” because of a fight they had when Ross made some suggestions about
his future. Molly described the relationship between her two sons as “empty,” but did not
give me enough information to determine whether he might agree with descriptions of
autism like that made by Kartzinel (2007) who states that the condition sucks “life’s
marrow out of the family members one by one” (xvi).
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condition in terms like “tragedy” (Fitzpatrick 2009). While such descriptors are not
always rejected (see chapter 3), they don’t encompass the nuanced lived experience of
many with autism and those caring for them. A final example of the ways in which the
pathological model mischaracterizes the experience of those who care for individuals
with autism is in the language used to describe things like growth, change, and
development when it is significant enough to be recognized.
In another example of how the pathological model bends the lived reality of
autism to its own logic, many events that are more realistically described as learning or
growth get described as “treatment,” “recovery,” and even “cure.” When applied to
conditions like autism—in which people do not die and continue to develop—suggestions
of non-development, metaphors of death, and reductionist characterizations demonstrate
how the language of pathology can do a disservice to the lived experience of statistical
abnormality. Some have argued that one of the reasons autism has been described as a
pathological condition is to energize research into finding a cause and a cure (Fitzpatrick
2009). Despite the benefits that this research produces, one of the downsides is to suggest
that autism is or will soon be curable (Eyal et al. 2010). Another more subtle downside is
to encourage descriptions of processes that are most realistically described by words like
development and learning with words like “treatment,” “recovery,” and even “cure”
(Pellicano and Stears 2011; Davis 2009; Robertson 2009; Helt et al. 2008; for discussion
of this with ID, see Mercer 1973:71; Waltz 2013). One of the main issues in speaking
about methods for bringing about change or growth as “treatments” or “cures” is the risk
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of brushing over the ways in which many individuals with autism—though helped by
interventions—remain atypical and dependent as they age (for examples of this, see
Edelson and Rimland 2003; McCarthy and Kartzinel 2010; Johnson and Van Rensselaer
2008).
Facilitated communication—a method in which a helper gives physical support to
someone with autism as they communicate through typing—is one of the controversial
interventions that have been pitched in the past as a “treatment” for autism (Berger 1994).
Though the controversy around facilitated communication has cooled down since it was
first brought to the attention of the newspaper reading public, it still serves as a useful
analogy for the complexity that surrounds other interventions that have since come to be
described as treatments for autism (e.g. diets).53 While these various techniques can be
used to bring about a degree of improvement, to describe them as treatments—language
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A very sophisticated discussion of the complex effects associated with diets and other
interventions is provided by Charlotte Moore (2004) in her fabulous book George &
Sam: “A year later, when Sam was seven, a lot of publicity was given to secretin
injections [. . .] I wouldn’t feel justified in injecting them with anything about which so
little was known. But Sam’s condition at that time had deteriorated so much that I’d have
tried almost anything [. . .] And though no miracle was worked, Sam did improve after
secretin. It’s hard to be very clear about its effects, because I’d removed the gluten from
his diet a few weeks before, so I’m not sure which improvement to attribute to which
treatment [. . .] After secretin (and gluten removal) Sam immediately started sleeping
through the night [. . .] It’s hard to discuss treatments we tried without sounding
evangelical, either for or against. I can only reiterate that every autistic child is different,
and that what suits one may do little for another [. . .] Speaking entirely from my own
experience, if I had my time with the boys again, I would put them on the diet, and start
an ABA or Verbal Behavior program as early as possible. Autistic children get set in their
ways; it’s best if you can point them in desirable directions. The later you leave the
intervention, the harder your struggle will be” (120, 121, 126, 127). While Moore’s
comments clearly demonstrate the help and improvement that can be supplied by
interventions like diets and education, her work is also very clear about the reality that
despite the improvements, learning, and growth, both her boys continue to have autism.
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suggesting that they lead to a dissipation of all challenges associated with the diagnosis,
in short a cure. The experience of Miller Lee and his family with Facilitated
Communication (FC) is a powerful example of the complexity that characterizes
something which some commentators might jump to describe as a miracle:
Jack: And so I think, you know, I had, I think I had said to her ‘I would
love to try this [facilitated communication] with Miller,’ and so she
[representative from a state sponsored cooperative whose mission is to
create favorable opportunities for people with developmental disabilities]
just let us know that he [another representative] was coming. Well, I saw
Miller focused and into it [. . .] He wanted to do it and that’s kind of
mindboggling [. . .] And so they first were having him just point to like
pictures like day and night and that sort of thing because they wanted to
see can he respond to symbols or whatever [. . .] It was the first campaign,
the first election of Bill Clinton and they asked him who are you going to
vote for, for president and he typed “I don,’ d-o-n, and then he hit the
eight. Well, on a lot of keyboards in the old days, above the eight was the
apostrophe and so I don’t know and then he stopped and then the guy who
was with him said ‘are you finished,’ and he [. . .] I mean, for a kid like
Miller who has plenty of self-stimulatory behaviors and all of that, even
more then than I think he does now, he just was so focused and so happy
to, and so that’s how it started [. . .] he resists lying on his belly and the
OT [occupational therapist] person uses facilitated communication with
him and he basically said, “I have to see where I am, and so I don’t like
lying down cause then I don’t know where I am.” And, I mean, he’s never
slept on his belly [. . .] One of the things Miller will do is we’ll get to the
end of a sentence or we’ll take a break and my computer, well you can set
it up different ways, but it’ll say each word and then you hit the period and
it’ll read the sentence and speak the sentence. And if I drop my hand away
or if Miller pulls back, he’ll reach to the keyboard and he’ll hit a letter and
the interesting thing is it turns out to be the first letter of the next word [. .
.] You know, where I resolved that there’s the academic controversy in the
research and that’s fine, well and good, but facilitated communication is a
grassroots phenomenon and in some sense it almost doesn’t matter where
the academic conversation comes out because it is so practically useful to
know that Miller would prefer beer or wine and, you know, you can ask
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him questions and you can get an answer and you can act on it and it
floats.54
Jack and Vale have decided to invite their son Miller to join us for dinner;
this will give Jack and Miller the opportunity to show me FC, and allow
me to ask Miller some questions. Before Miller arrives I tell Jack that I am
skeptical, and so will be closely observing the FC communication in order
to find evidence that the words being typed are actually derived from
Miller’s efforts. We set up in Jack’s office on the second floor, Miller
sitting to my right, and Jack to the right of his son. I watch as Jack
supports Miller’s right wrist in the nook between index finger and thumb,
allowing his son’s pointer finger to bob up and down above the keyboard
tapping away at letters. The Macintosh desktop is opened to a program
that speaks out words typed once they are completed, and as his finger
pokes the keys, Miller’s left hand braces the edge of the desk. At times he
licks the finger he types with, and/or rubs his eyes with it, his head rocking
back and forth, just as often as not looking at the keyboard, as a stream of
light noises emanate from his mouth (a flutter of a sound from his throat
that sounds like a light wheezing mixed with tongue taps against the
pallet). While I watch I think of reasons that make me question whether
this conversation is controlled by Jack: 1) why earlier in the day when
FCing with a staff person did miller only say “hello”; 2) why, if it is
Miller composing these sentences, does he need so much support from
others to write; 3) why, if he can communicate so clearly, does he still act
so atypical in public settings (e.g. when I watched him grab soda from a
refrigerator at a fast food restaurant, spilling it all over the floor, even
though his staff person said not to.). But then again, I realize many things
that seem to support it: 1) Though I struggle with Miller when he allows
me to FC with him, it makes sense that such an intimate interaction would
require some practice; 2) I learned from interactions with students in a
school for autism and documentaries (e.g. the film Autism is a World) that
people who behave just like Miller have learned to type first through FC,
and later learned to type independently; 3) Many of the things that Miller
says to his father are embarrassing, controversial, and surprising to Jack
in a way that seriously undermine his being the one to pose the question
(several times Jack says things like, “huh!” or “oh, that’s interesting”; 4)
The intensity with which Miller looks at me directly in the eyes for periods
while he was typing (something he did not do at any other time on our
visit) suggests he is focused on communicating with me; 5) the reality that
Miller got up during the typing, went to the bathroom, and then quickly
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Jack and other parents I talked to who use Facilitated Communication did share
examples with me of other cases of FC where they questioned whether the disabled
individual was actually responsible for the text being produced.
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returned to his seat as if he had more to say (if he wasn’t in control, why
come back?)
Vale: Well there’s another whole category of things in terms of FC, is
stuff that the person wouldn’t, the facilitator wouldn’t want to bring up or
they wouldn’t want to use in a context. Well I remember, I’m thinking of
Maggie (a family friend). Maggie is a lesbian and one of the things Miller
said with her was, “is God okay with your lesbianism?” [. . .] And another
time he said, “why don’t you have sex with me?” [. . .] Maggie says,
“well, I’m a lesbian and lesbians don’t have sex with men. It’s nothing
personal.” [I am also told of an incident in which the parents of a
roommate of Miller’s were disabused of their doubts concerning FC when
their son reported that his ear was aching, and then a visit to his primary
care specialist confirmed it to be true].
Ben: Can you tell me what it was like when you started to type?]
Miller: bbg it was like getting out of jail. it was freedom. it was like
finally exiised.
Ben: Tell me something you were very happy to share with your parents.
Miller: that i loved them and was sorry we hadn’t been able to be ffriends,
only ddisabled kid and caaregivers.
Ben: Tell me something people would be surprised to know about you?
Miller: that i follow the news espevcialkly politics. i know what the
parties mean and that tthe president and governor and legislators can do to
make my life possible in the community.
Jack: And he did say to me, I mean, I asked him about, you know, did you
understand what, did you understand people’s speech and what people
were saying and he said ‘no, when I was younger, I didn’t. I could not
make much sense out of what they said’ [. . .] And he says he learned to
read by watching television.

Learning to type out his thoughts with the help of a facilitator represented for Miller and
his family a pretty stark transformation. Before he was able to do this, his parents and
others around him had no idea how much of his environment he was aware of. Once he
began to communicate, it helped shape the way that those around him acted, serving
instrumental (we know if he wants wine or beer), social (I follow the news), and
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55
emotional (it felt like I existed) needs. And it might be seen as miraculous: here is
an individual who comes across as very atypical who, all of a sudden, is speaking about
things that no one ever suspected he understood. Indeed, for those who find the
transformation questionable, my own notes and the work of others who began as doubters
attest to the reality that doubt is normal and that, despite pushing credulity, there is
considerable evidence that many who do FC are in control of it (Biklen and Cardinal
1997; Wells 2006). And yet, what can get lost in discussions of whether or not FC is real
and how miraculous it seems is the reality that someone like Miller remains considerably
disabled (indeed, the degree of his atypicality significantly contributes to the seeming
miraculousness of his communication). A line in a 1994 New York Times article
demonstrates: “But Jenny had become the study of a new treatment for autism that,
depending on one’s point of view, is either a miraculous way to lift the silence in which
most autistic children live or an ‘emperor’s new clothes’ delusion” (Berger 1994). While
this article is careful to note the controversy surrounding FC, in using the language of
pathology—FC as a “treatment”—it also represents what Mercer describes as “referring
to one with the model of the other.” Treatment fits FC into the death vs. cure dichotomy,
suggesting the question “does it work, or doesn’t it.” At the same time, it undermines
asking the question “even if it does work, how atypical does someone like Miller remain
after learning to do it?” One might argue that this focus comes from talking about autism
as a pathological condition as opposed to a statistical difference. The issue with this is
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
55
Miller’s comments suggest why metaphors of death are so attractive: he describes
feeling like he was in jail or non-existent. However, it is important to note that there is a
difference between feeling this way and describing autism in the public sphere in ways
that characterize those with autism as if they don’t develop and don’t exist.
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encouraging us to ignore the fact that—though FC has been very helpful for Miller—
it has not meant that his atypicality and dependency have just gone away. And this is a
reality that his caretakers—like all those in my study—will continue to face as they focus
on what the future holds.

PREPARING FOR DEPENDENCY
Though the language of pathology often mischaracterizes the complexity of the lived
experience of caretakers of adults with autism, the challenges that are faced when trying
to care for someone who remains significantly atypical and dependent are considerable.
The language of pathology can suggest that individuals with autism do not develop and
do not grow up. It can also suggest that they and their families are fundamentally tragic,
broken, or sad. However, individuals with autism do develop and do grow into adult men
and women. Moreover, as opposed to behaving in ways that suggest pathology (as older
psychodynamic theories of autism suggest, see Bettelheim 1967: 69), families are vital to
the social integration of those with autism and remain central to their outcomes—as
“caregivers, advocates and, too often, the only party with the autistic adult’s best interests
in mind” (Greenfeld 2009b:32). Of course, any critique of the pathological model of
abnormality must make note of its many uses and valid points. Beyond scientific research
that attests to the degree to which autism is based in biological difference (e.g. distinct
cognitive patterns, neurological and genetic abnormalities), is the reality that families of
individuals with autism admit to the complex and challenging experience of caring for
those who are significantly atypical and dependent (Frith 2003; Grandin 2006; Greenfeld

	
  
1972, 1978, 1986; DiCicco-Bloom et al. 2006; Silverman 2012). For example,

177	
  

repetitive behaviors, communication issues, challenges with social interaction, and a
variety of maladaptive behaviors—in other words, significant atypicality or deviance (see
Chapter 3)—can all suggest at least some validity to describing autism as a clinical entity.
And yet, caretakers also lament the ways in which the pathologizing of those with autism
in their lives causes public discourse to brush over genuine development and learning.56
As we saw above, another cost of the language of pathology is to convert what is
often better described as development, growth, and change into treatment, recovery, and
cure. In her critique of this move, Park (2001) states that the issue with giving people the
“success story everybody wants to hear” is that you can start to lose grip on the
challenges of the lived experience of continued atypicality and dependency. For this, Park
(2001) provides a relevant antidote in a section of a memoir about her daughter with
autism’s adult years:
A description of autism must be anecdotal; without anecdotes there are
words but not experience. Anecdotes must temper our yen for the
miraculous, keep the account honest. Without them, Jessy’s slow progress
takes on too much of the aura of the success story everybody wants to
hear. Suppose I say what is entirely true: that she has worked, rapidly and
efficiently, for twenty years [. . .] that she is hardly ever absent and never
late; that she pays taxes; that she keeps her bank account accurately to the
penny [. . .] That she is a contributing member of her community and of
her family. Who wouldn’t hear, behind those words, others: “miracle,”
“recovery,” “cure”? Reality escapes between the lines. Anecdotes must
recapture it, as many as I can cram into these pages, not for decoration or
liveliness, but for truth (25).

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
56 For a great example of a parent writing off as a “repetitious monologue of meaningless
speech” one specific act that actually represented learning can be found in Hart
(1989:191).	
  

	
  
Though Jessy Park has done considerably well in comparison to many who have
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significant forms of autism, her mother points to the reality of continued atypicality and
dependency despite her vital presence and growth.57 Thus far, this paper has sought to
demonstrate the damage done to the lived experience of atypicality rendered by the
pathological model of abnormality. However, it is possible that caretakers would agree
that the biggest issue with the language of pathology is the simple reality that it brushes
over the degree to which conceptualizing the future is a fundamental part of what it is like
to be responsible for someone who will likely remain atypical and dependent for the rest
of their lives (Johnson and Van Rensselaer 2008; Frankland 1995). Or, as summed up by
a simple question: “who is going to take care of this person after I am gone?” (Donvan
and Zucker 2010; Naseef 2013). At first glance it might seem a bit ironic that for all of
the concern drummed up by the language of pathology, the reality of continued needs
throughout adulthood is covered up by the suggestion that those with autism do not
develop and do not continue to exist. Statements by some parents hint at the
psychological realities behind some family members being the stakeholders partly
responsible for talking about autism as if it cleanly fit the pathological model of
abnormality (Fitzpatrick 2009). For example, speaking about finding a strong conviction
to recover her child from autism, Karen Seroussi states (2002): “the most difficult and
trying thing in my life was no longer fear about Mile’s future, but the daily question of
what he should eat” (106). In a memoir, Josh Greenfeld (1986) states the psychological
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  Since she doesn’t and will never live independently and continues to have a diagnosis
of autism, Jesse does not qualify for the “optimal outcome” described in recent research,
(Feign et al. 2009).	
  

	
  
and emotional dynamics more clearly when he says: “Foumi still talks of starting a
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school, establishing a group residence [. . .] I guess all that’s down the line [. . .]
meanwhile I live in my Peter Pan dream, enjoying the Noah who will never grow up”
(124).58 However, as we know, individuals like Noah do grow up, and do have a future.
In order to explore the challenge of continued atypicality and dependency for those
caring for individuals with autism without relying on the language of pathology, the rest
of this chapter will explore how the pain associated with the future is linked to significant
tension between modes of future orientation.
In the tug of war between potential and the likelihood of continued and significant
abnormality, we see how the conceptualization of alternate trajectories animates the lived
experience of caretakers of adults with autism. Despite being couched in the language of
pathology (e.g. “symptomatic improvements,” “symptom abatement”), recent scientific
work has expressed the reality that most individuals with autism develop and learn as
they age (Levy and Perry 2011:1272; Seltzer et al. 2004:234). This work has given
credibility to the idea that development in autism is not a mirage, but a valid—if
complex, and uncertain—reality. Though this growth usually occurs in seemingly less
romantic form, examples of stark breakthroughs, enticing cases demonstrating the
potential for growth, are hard to ignore for the possibilities they suggest (Fountain,
Winter and Bearman 2012; Helt et al. 2008).59 Yet, the reality that continued atypicality
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Greenfeld (1986) goes on to say “I mentioned the whole business of living without a
future to a friend. ‘But you have to have hope,’ he said. I’m not so sure. I think you have
to have guts” (124).
59
Recent research has chronicled a sub-group of individuals with autism who—though
diagnosed as having the condition when young—age out of the diagnosis (often into
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partly responsible for the empirical patterns that allow caretakers of individuals with
autism to experience tension between alternate trajectories. As reviewed earlier, Miller
Lee’s performance with FC was a revelation to his parents. Their surprise was similar to
others who have learned that some people whose behavior suggests otherwise are actually
quite self-reflexive and, with the right support, able to communicate (for example,
Mukhopadhyay 2011; Hacking 2009). In the aftermath of Miller’s newfound abilities,
Jack started to talk to his son about a variety of different issues. However, the mismatch
between the desires now being communicated and the reality of Miller’s continuing
atypicality and dependency in the future introduce more complex tensions for his parents
and other caretakers:
Ben: Tell me what you’d change about your life if you could?
Miller60: I wish the state would stop fucking with my supports. but he
can’t read [speaking about the governor] i would likke to get ba new job
and have girlfriends. I don’t know how to find a girl friend. i can’t hang
out in bars with aastaff person unless they can help me type. i’d love to
vconnect with a woman who wouldd fc [facilitated communication] with
me. i have enjoyedd kelly who use to work with me and did fc. and shed
is gone I woulld to have a non staaff friend. maybe i could do something
online, but i’m hesitant. i don’t do email that much. it takes a lot of
energy yo use thje computer. maybe ben the pvrn who helps me do email
could help me do some bloggging or something. i know this is up to me,
but I get cold feet. maybe i should get some kind of goal to make this part
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
other clinical categories, like ADHD, OCD, or generalized anxiety) (Helt et al. 2008). It
remains to be seen whether the best way to describe this group—as Helt et al. do—is as a
“recovery” group. Others have described the “optimal outcome” as those who eventually
1) live independently, 2) work full-time, 3) get married, and 4) have friends.	
  	
  
60
Conversations with Miller were typed by him with his father (Jack) acting as
facilitator. Specifically, Jack sat next to Miller and supported his wrist according to the
Facilitated Communication method. My questions were asked out-loud by me, and then
typed into the computer by Jack so that there would be a record of them along with
Miller’s answers.
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of my daily life. very glad you asked. i am going to send alison an email.
tonight
Vale: He wants a girlfriend.
Jack: At our last [services] meeting, they were asking some formal
questions, and one of them was ‘are you satisfied with your services?’
[laughing] and he typed, he typed ‘yes, everything but a girl friend.’ [. . .]
[the service provider responded] ‘well you’re on your own for that.’ [. . .]
Vale: but Miller doesn’t even masturbate. So I don’t even know what the
poor guy.
Jack: Yeah, well, I don’t think his, ah, wiring is, is, typical? [. . .] and,
when he was adolescent, and he would get erections in the shower, and ah
it’s like he would, ah, stimulate himself a little, but then it was like, maybe
it’s too much [. . .]
Vale: He thinks he would like to have sex with people he is attracted to,
it’s just that I’m not sure that he [. . .] well he knows what’s involved, you
asked him.
Jack: No, I did that. Yes, the man puts his penis in the woman’s vagina,
and then he takes it out [laughing] [. . .] I, uhm, we did, we hired a sex
worker, or a sex therapist I guess she would be considered [. . .] to see if
he could learn to masturbate, because we thought that this might be [. . .]
uhm, yeah, she, it, there wasn’t, we didn’t have enough money to hire her
for long enough for her to learn to communicate with Miller [. . .] I mean,
it just, just practically, we couldn’t, we couldn’t do it, and, and her first
attempts, uhm, just didn’t go [. . .] and realizing that unless she would
learn to, to, FC with him, or, you know, develop some way to
communicate with him.
Ben: Can you tell me how people like your staff learn to do fc correctly
with you?
Miller: they have to trust me to be high functioning enough and be willing
to[practice with me. i get a rythm after some time with a person. you did
well for a first time. edverybody end up with a different style with me. i
try to tune in to them and good partners tune into me. i’m not sure but
maybe relax more. that’s harder at the beginning partly because i’m tenser
too and feel like I have to try hardeer and i’m not yet familiar with your
touch. some times i can tell they are tired or upset about something. it
helped tonight tha you act like a fridend and not a staff who is worried
aaboutt being evaluated forr how well we do. yes we are.
Ben: besides dad who is most in tune with you doing fc.
Miller: grace whitney, then bill oaks thhen on staff now barnes then alfred
then vanessa. she has great promise. i ghave tried with alison and maybe
we’ll maake it. she is not that comfortable getting close. there is a
bonding in the best partnerships. i’d like that. yes. i know it is late and
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mom promised dessert. so let’s quit and maybe you can visit me again. i
hope so. talking with you has been a blast.cool. now dessert.
Miller: have him typing my wilder ideas like watching naked ladies on the
web. noot as much as i hoped. only in magazines. bess w. got me a
hustler to distract me giving bloodf at the hospitasl. It worked. I enjoyyed
looking at the women for sometime. i bought another one. but not
recently [I ask him whether he would want to have sex with someone] i
guess so but i don’t know what that looks like or how it really works. i
can’t really connect that to me [. . .] there was a woman who trierto help
me but i ddidn’t get whazt she wanted me to do and she couldn’t ttype
withe me. i don’t think staff wants to touch this topic].
Jack: I would love for him to find a [. . .] typical female who would get off
on the intimacy of an FC relationship with Miller.
Ben: And can you imagine that realistically?
Jack: I can imagine it but…I can imagine another human being finding
him interesting and [. . .]
Ben: But, I mean, I was going to ask whether that could…
Jack: Could be a sexual relationship or something [. . .] or a romantic
relationship, I don’t think Miller can go there61 [. . .]

Over the couple sessions I attend in which Jack facilitated his son’s typing while I asked
questions, Miller expressed a variety of reactions to his daily life: disappointment with
recent cuts in service funding, and the politician who brought them about; the individual
characteristics of service staff that FC with him on a daily basis; who was best at
facilitating, and the importance of interpersonal dynamics to successful FCing. While
FCing, Miller also shared a variety of desires he has for the future: to get a new “job and
girlfriends,”; to integrate “e-mail” and “blogging” into his daily routine; to FC with
people other than his support staff. Focusing on the most challenging, Miller’s desire to
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
61
While Bianca has expressed interest in other people having babies (she wanted Joan to
have a baby, saying “you have baby now”), to the best of their knowledge she is not
interested in having a baby herself or a serious relationship. Of course, though she is
verbal, Bianca does not answer direct questions with the degree of reflexivity that Miller
does through FC.

	
  
have a girlfriend fits with what many might describe as a cultural narrative or even
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something as naturalized as a plan (a temporal structure). Though not unaware of the
external (“Staff would need to FC with me in the bar”) and internal (“I get cold feet”)
hurtles involved in finding a romantic companion, the way that Miller talks about it (“I
would like to have girlfriends”) still puts it forth as a desire that he has thought about and,
at least in conversation, a project that he believes is achievable. While Jack describes the
possibility that some people “would be interested in a human like him,” he speaks about
the many ways that the degree of Miller’s atypicality and dependency will complicate
achieving his son’s goal. Though Jack has learned the interpersonal and protensorial
(given the anticipation required) skills required to FC with his son, the imagined
trajectory that Miller puts forth seems to conflict with the trajectory believed to be more
realistic by his mother, father, and support staff. This is not to say that Jack and Vale
don’t want to support the trajectory that Miller envisions (as Jack’s comment, “it would
be great for him,” shows); but rather that the financial and temporal resources required to
accommodate his atypical communication, and questions as to his sexual functionality (of
which Miller is not unaware) make coordinating a relationship difficult. Though the
particularities of this case allow us to compare an individual with significant autism’s
own thoughts about trajectory with those of his parents, in most of the other cases I
explored—since individuals with autism were unable to comment in depth—thoughts on
competing trajectories were played out entirely in the anticipations and
conceptualizations of caretakers. This limitation did not dampen the reality that tension
between competing trajectories was usually the norm.
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By organizing the experience of autism around tensions between and within

modes of future orientation, we find that one obstacle facing family projects seeking to
provision care for those with profound and constant needs is cultural narratives
concerning what we owe the atypical and the dependent. Despite the development that
characterizes those with autism and the gains associated with some interventions, most
people diagnosed with the disorder as children continue to qualify for the diagnosis as
adults. Moreover, “childhood IQ” and “early language development” are still predictive
of the degree of adult impairment (Levy and Perry 2011:1273). Thus, the reality faced by
most caretakers is that individuals with severe forms of autism will remain atypical and
dependent, and finding people and organizations to provide the supports they need is a
goal that is as pressing as it is challenging. Though Miller and Bianca Lee have
experienced important development over the course of their lives, they both have
significant cases of autism and are dependent on others for a variety of things (e.g.
housing) and activities (i.e. navigating the social and physical landscape). While at
present there exist a variety of options (albeit, in high demand, with long waiting lists,
and in the context of diminishing public funding) open to families trying to provide
shelter and care for adults with autism (e.g. group homes, large residential settings, adult
foster care, nursing homes), Jack and Vale took it upon themselves—in cooperation with
several other families—to buy a pair of houses in a residential neighborhood where their
adult children could reside independent of their families (Miller lives with two other men,
and Bianca has one female room mate). A precedent forming action on the part of Vale,
Jack, and these several other families decades ago allowed for their children’s services to
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be funded by a program originally designed for individuals with severe brain injuries
whose needs are determined to be at the “institutional level.” It is part of a larger family
of programs (available in many states) that provides community-based supports funded
through a combination of state and federal funds. This program is called the “waiver
program” because it allows the state to waive some Medicaid rules (e.g. placing persons
in settings that qualify as “institutional”) so that individuals and caretakers can have more
choices about the services received and how they are provided.62 Despite the early
success and decades of state support secured by the Lees and the other families involved
in the project, a recent decision by the state to cut back on services has put the project in
jeopardy. Though Jack, Vale and the other families (and, as we saw from his typing,
Miller as well) lay much of the blame at the feet of the new governor and his advisors,
they are acutely aware (as are all caretakers of those with significant needs) of the
dangers posed by the government cutbacks that have and continue to occur in the wake of
the 2007-2008 recession. Calling themselves the “Phillipstown Four” after the
neighborhood in which the two residences are located, the Lees and the other families
have filed a lawsuit in order to preserve what they believe to be, despite other options, the
right trajectory for their children:
Vale: Well I think you have to work with individuals situations, but I
wouldn’t want to be advocating to create any more (secluded residential
settings) [. . .]
Jack: There are people who want farms [. . .] and are developing farms and
maybe, certainly somebody who’s grown up in a rural area might…
Vale: Well I think though there’s a feeling that with many families their
feelings is this kid’s just going to embarrass themselves in public and they
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Securing waiver funding and just how difficult it is now becoming was a popular topic
of conversation among many of the families I spent time with.

	
  

186	
  
just need to be in the environment where they’re sort of shielded from all
that [. . .] Well that’s a very tempting belief but I think it’s a mistake
because I think you really are safer [. . .] in a typical setting and I, because
it’s in isolated situations where weird stuff can happen and the public or
generally people don’t know about that [. . .] And I think we had some
pretty tough run-ins in terms of our kids in terms of stuff that was
happening where the provider wasn’t doing a very good job, in terms of
police getting called, hospitalizations, things of that nature, uhm, and my
poster child for that would be the people who live right next store to
Bianca. It’s a little, tiny twin house and while we tried to enforce the wall,
you can still hear what goes on if people get really loud, you know. And
they ended up pulling their hair out, in fact I think they ended up calling
the police, and they tried to document Bianca’s screaming and they said
she was breaking the peace and all this stuff and cited her and we had this
meeting with the police chief and all this stuff [. . .] [the neighbors were at
their wits end] and if the previous provider didn’t know what to do, they
just kind of ignored it. So in connection with this meeting with the police
chief, Jack said, “well if she’s screaming, you call me. Here’s my phone
number,” and Paul said, “oh well you’re not going to answer the phone.”
And [Jack] said, “no, I’ll hear it. I’ll hear it, you know. It’s in the other
room but I’ll hear it.” And so he called him a couple times when she was
screaming and Jack picked up the phone and then talk to Bianca and kind
of intersected it [. . .]
Jack: The Nantels [Bianca’s neighbors] are now advocates for those two
women [Bianca and her roommate]. They will tell you if a staff person
treats them disrespectfully, I mean [. . .] Roxy will say “that staff doesn’t
treat them with respect.”
Vale: She’s always known who was good and who wasn’t [. . .] They’re a
good example of normal community people but when they’re unhappy and
are really pissed off it’s because things are b-a-d, bad and if things get
better [. . .] they’ll be happy [. . .] She’s safer and there’s people who are
watching [. . .]
Jack: There was a fire at Bianca’s house and how did that happen [. . .]
The fire department in Phillipstown basically said “well, we think this
was, you know, it started out,” it was an outside house fire on the back
deck and so they said it was accidental probably smoking and staff
basically said oh no, no, no, nobody’s smoking here [. . .] Actually Paul
Nantel has told him [the fire chief] that. He didn’t want to rat him out so
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they just waited. In other words the neighbors said yes staff smoke on the
back porch and they put their cigarettes out.63
Over the course of my time living with the Lees they lay out to me some of
the challenges they have faced because of the cuts in funding that have
recently gone into effect across the state. As Vale explains to me in
reference to some struggles her son has had at his supported employment:
“At that point, the house manager was just not up to the job and there was
just, it was just, it was part, it was all part of this after the service cuts
took effect, everything at the boys’ house kind of melted down because
people that needed to be involved, that had some skills, weren’t there
anymore and the supervisory people were stretched thinner and it just all
kind of came to a bad outcome. Anyway, sometime in the fall, Miller had a
wetting accident and Carolyn did a kind of intervention [. . .] Miller says,
‘I want to do the job my way,’ and he described what that was [. . .]
Rather than doing the part he appeared not to be able to do, which is often
the typical job coach shtick, Kelly had discovered that what he liked to do
was sort of like stomp on the boxes and break the, and break the tape [. . .]
And so, it would appear in hindsight that [the job coach] didn’t get the
message or couldn’t figure out, you know, I don’t know. Anyway, there
was another incident I think involved soiling as well as wetting, and I
think it was a combination of him not realizing he needed to go to the
bathroom plus Miller saying, well shit on you essentially, because that is a
strategy that people with severe disabilities use to get out of things that
they really don’t like.” The Lees also tell me in detail about the lawsuit
that they are bringing against the state, since the level of funding that is
being cut is undermining the operation of the homes. They explain to me
that the homes have been a model that they have tried to spread to
others—through their participation in several advocacy organizations—
and they’ve “done all this work, and no one is paying any attention to it.
Other parents want their kids to live on a farm in east jesus, [state] [. . .]
there have not been a lot of people, parents who have said, ‘this is what
we want to do, show us how to do it…’”

Vale and Jack have worked hard to secure funding from the state for their children’s
services, buy homes for them to live in, and all in a situation that allows their kids to
reside in the community—an outcome that is central to their beliefs about what is best for
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
63
Though Jane Jacob’s (1989) concept of “eyes on the street” was theorized in relation to
urban settings, these comments would seem to suggest that this is one of the potential
values of placing the atypical and dependent into suburban settings as well.
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for a long time they envisioned it as a model that others could and should pick up on.
However, despite feeling that their model is superior to other options64, they have
struggled to get other families interested. Moreover, challenges to the model have always
existed (“screaming, hopsitalizations, police getting called”), and, as Miller’s recent
soiling incidents demonstrate (caused either because of frustration, motor control issues,
or a combination of both), continue to emerge. Finally, despite the success they have in
instituting and supporting their model in the past, fiscal tensions in recent years have
created a new narrative around state support for the atypical and dependent (Edsall 2012;
Leland 2010). Thus, despite the trajectory that the Lee’s have envisioned, contingencies
continue to emerge that suggest that other trajectories for their children (being placed in
more restrictive settings, as per the state’s wishes; returning home to live with Vale and
Jack) may still become a reality. The lawsuit has only made more clear the reality that the
Lee family exists in a protensorial state that uncomfortably flits around a variety of
different trajectories: which of those trajectories will ultimately prevail is a question that
nags all members of the Philliptown four. While other families have not taken the same
route as the Lees, all have experienced what it is like to live with a level of tangible
uncertainty that is part and parcel of the challenges of imagining and creating a future for
adults with autism.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
64
I should be pointed out that others in my study had children on farms, or created these
programs; others also had individuals in residential settings, or classic group homes. And
there are examples of all of these that people were very happy with. I also know of
examples that were less than admirable.
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While battles between family projects and the narratives of the state are most

easily described as tensions between trajectories, at other times the issues that families
face are more rightly described as tensions between trajectories and the larger temporal
structures which suggest where the atypical and dependent belong. Starting in the mid1800s, individuals with developmental disabilities like autism were placed in institutions.
These institutions were often situated in rural areas, away from large populations. It was
common for doctors, family, and friends to suggest upon the birth of an atypical child
that the child be place in “an institution that can care for them” (Trent 1994: 233; Donvan
and Zucker 2010). During the 1960s things changes: deinstitutionalization and the
“community mental health movement” brought about the idea that individuals with
mental illness and developmental disabilities should be moved back home and into the
community (Grob 1994; Eyal et al. 2010). However, the promise of community mental
health and the reality have been quite different. While this change helped create special
education (since children were moved from institutions back home [see Eyal et al. 2010;
Eyal 2013]), the move also brought about the challenge of integrating the significantly
atypical. Though this population was around before large institutions starting housing
them in the 19th century, by the time they began to be closed in the 1970s the changes to
American society were considerable. Finding jobs, a place to live, and people to care for
them is a challenge that all those responsible for adults with autism continue to face. In
their experience with this, the Zago family demonstrates through stories and interviews
the challenges:
When Martin was 21 (right after graduating high school) he got a job at a
big-box store “fronting” shelves (a task in which an employee arranges
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merchandise into appealing rows, making sure that products are
positioned as close to the front of shelves as possible with labels facing
forward). Molly explains to me that Martin loves this activity, having first
learned to do it in a vocational program connected to school. Indeed,
when accompanying his mother shopping Martin will front shelves for free
– Molly tells me with pride that, on busy days, a local clerk at a store they
frequent will ask “I am really busy today, can Martin help me?” Soon
after beginning at the big box chain, he was offered a job at a small, local
grocery store by the store’s manager. Though he did relatively well at this
job for a while, one day he approached a customer and asked her when
her birthday was. In response the customer went to the owner of the store
(who happened to be in that day), and said, “people like that shouldn’t be
out in public” and the owner fired Martin on the spot. Though they were
upset (he didn’t even call to let us know until Monday; and left us
wondering all weekend why Martin was saying “needs new job, doesn’t
work here anymore.”), both Ross and Molly expressed some ambivalence
about whether it was such a bad thing. Molly tells me that Ross struggled
with down time ( “he would start pacing and getting in people’s way, and
they would call and be like ‘he’s pacing’ and I would say ‘he probably
doesn’t have anything to do’”) and with anxiety around pleasing people (
“that is what he works for” and “he just calmed right down after losing
that job”). For his part, Ross thought about suing the owner, but
appreciated that at least “they were giving handicapped people
opportunities.” Moreover, Ross expressed ambivalence about the public
money spent on supporting a job coach to work with his son all day
(“there again, for him to work, they had a coach, the coach stood there, so
that’s kind of counterproductive to society, to whatever he produced”) but
also feels ambivalent about wanting more for his son.
Ross: My mother was afraid of him. Her idea was put him in an institution
and go along with your life, but that was thirty years ago and she was
older too. What did blind people do? The blind girl I knew when we were
growing up, weaved carpets. That’s what blind people did. That’s how it
was. Downs was nothing. It was just considered totally retarded and
useless. Look what Down’s kids do today. It’s fabulous what they do. It’s
just amazing [. . .]
Ben: Can you tell me a little bit about how you think about the future?
Ross: I’m in la-la land. We haven’t faced it. We haven’t. We’re just going
to wait until one of us gets sick or who knows what. I think part of it is
from watching in [last state they lived in], but I understand here it’s as
bad, the waiting lists are so long that it’s almost irrelevant anyhow. They
take them when the second parent’s unable to care [. . .] I don’t know. I’m
not ready to not be with him. I like him too much. We enjoy him. To me,
he’s pleasant. He’s funny. I don’t know that I’d want to sit here and think,
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is he sitting somewhere, what kind of dinner did he have. They’re not
going to let him run the mower. I know they’re not because no matter
where he is, the risk for liability would be too high. Seriously, I haven’t
thought about it but I’ve even been toying with the idea of giving this
property to the state as a group home for him because I know a lady in
[last state they were in] did that [. . .] I’ve also toyed with the idea of
buying another house, a little house somewhere or maybe a little two
bedroom modular for us to move into when we’re elderly and let him stay
here. [. . .] [One lady I know placed her son in a group home, and she said
to me] “I raised him to twenty-one; I’m done with him. I did my job. Let
the state take him.” Now, [this woman] will come to horseback riding and
visit [her son]. She comes and gets him and takes him to dinner but she
had, I think, nine children, but she felt they should make that break, and
some ways, it would be better if we did it now or when we’re seventy so
we would still be alive that we could do that, we could go get him, take
him to dinner and he could get adjusted to not living in our home. Because
of that, I lean toward putting him in a home at some time, but like I said,
now, as long as we’re able to ride the bicycles together and he loves to
mow the grass and shovel the snow and all this stuff, I’ll see.
Ross shares a story with me about his involvement in a local dispute
concerning a group home for adults with autism. Several weeks before I
visited, a private for profit organization announced its plans to build a
house in a nearby residential neighborhood. At a township supervisors
meeting, some residents expressed upset at the plans. Days later, one of
these resident published an article in a local newspaper in which he stated
that: “I have never thought that two autistic young men living under
professional supervision next door would adversely affect my property
value by much if by any at all, but I do have a serious concern that the
commercial operation of a for-profit organization like [company] could.
Interestingly, our neighborhood covenant states that the ‘premises may
not be used for commercial enterprise,’ but this issue was never raised in
the meeting [. . .] Since federal and state legislation mandates this type of
accommodation for individuals with a disability, if I do suffer financial
loss from this real estate transaction, I will then be one property owner
randomly singled out and indirectly forced to pay an additional penalty
for a problem I did not create simply because I bought my house before
this situation arose and could not there for do anything to avoid it.”
Martin was outraged after reading this. He explained to me that of all
people, this professor, who, by his job title, he believed should have been
more enlightened, was organizing this smear campaign. Particularly
infuriating to Martin was the fact that the professor actually rented rooms
in his house to others, enough so that “he was, technically, breaking the
same law that he was supposed to be enforcing.” One of the individuals
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that was to live in this house was a young man that Martin knew. Another
thing that shocked him was some of the other comments that came out
around the issue. One individual—on an online forum where people could
write in about any local topic—had stated something to the order of ‘who
cares about people with autism, they are nothing more than the result of
drug dealers and alcoholics” [this would be degenerative thinking rearing
its ugly head]. In a response letter written by Martin and printed in the
paper, he wrote “These are not drug addicts and child molesters. Autism
is not contagious. The neighbors of this home will most likely never have
their house shot with paint balls or their mailbox jammed full of snow [. .
.] Two unrelated people cannot occupy a home in [town]. No unmarried
couples? No gay couples? Seriously? [. . .] My son is severely autistic. He
said his first words at age 9 and three-word sentences by 11. He did have
his share of tantrums. We were informed by one professional that around
puberty, he would either become uncontrollable or he would start to
become a gentle man. That he is. Happy, loving, compassionate, obedient,
curious, intelligent, a joy to all who meet him.”

Contained in this long string of field-notes and interview excerpts is the story of two
parents grappling with the challenges of integrating an individual who is atypical and
dependent into a society whose response to them is—at the very best—ambivalent.
Throughout we see hints as to the alternate trajectories they juggle for Martin, and the
ways in which they find themselves contending with the larger temporal structures that
are most easily described as plans (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013). Ross and Molly were
both very proud of Martin’s work at the grocery store, and were grateful to the store
manager who gave him a job. They viewed their son’s work in the store as fulfilling a
personal project, and in line with the cultural narrative (or even temporal structure) of a
paid occupation that, particularly in American Society, is a normative outcome for young
adults. When a customer came into the store and complained to the owner that “people
like that shouldn’t work here,” she was tapping into what might be described as another
plan: that individuals who are severely atypical should not be placed in typical settings.
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institutionalization (that oriented Ross’s mother’s view)—when the atypical were
expected to be placed in institutional settings (or hidden from public site). Martin and
Molly were furious at this; they felt their son was a great worker, and, though it went
against their larger beliefs about the money spent on social programs, placed him on
SSDI (because, as Martin explains, “he deserved it.”). Moreover, while his son was not
directly linked to the ruckus in the neighboring town, Ross felt that people like his son
had every right to be in residential neighborhoods. Martin made his feelings known by
publishing an article to air his feelings.
And yet, unlike the Lees, who set up an independent living situation and work for
their children, the Zagos have kept Martin at home. Ross and Molly Zago give various
reasons for keeping Martin at home: “he is happy being here,” “we haven’t wanted to
think about it,” “he is just a part of our lives.” Molly goes on to explain that, while they
were happy with his work, they both have to admit that he seems more relaxed now that
he doesn’t have the pressure of fitting into a job. While Ross liked his son working, he
also likes the program he is now in. And yet he wonders whether there might not be
anything more for his son; he also wonders whether the cost of this to society is worth the
benefit. It is important to describe these thoughts and feelings as belonging to the Zagos.
Other families in my study might disagree strongly with some of these assertions, and in
their hard work, activism, and personal examples, have tried to shape the trajectories of
individuals with autism—and the narratives and plans for the disabled in society—around
differing assumptions. However, sharing both strong feelings and ambivalence, the Zagos
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give voice to the underlying questions that animate (or haunt, depending on how you
look at it) our society’s struggle to integrate and respond to atypicality and dependency.
While the language of the medical model focuses on pathology and treatment, focusing
on the future of adults with autism raises a list of longer more complicated questions. As
the professor Michael Bérubé stated while writing about his son with Down Syndrome
“For Jamie came into the world asking us a question more basic than any I’ve dealt with,
in this book or in life: Assuming that we can even imagine a form of social organization
in which citizens like Jamie are nourished, supported, encouraged to reach their full
potential, why might we seek to create it at all?” (Bérubé 1998; c.f. Nussbaum 2006).
	
  

	
  

CONCLUSION
Despite suggestions and characterizations associated with applications of the pathological
model of abnormality, individuals with autism continue to live and develop into
adulthood; as opposed to having no future, tensions associated with conceptualizing the
future are a central component of the experiences of caretakers. When applied to
conditions like autism—in which people do not die and continue to develop—suggestions
of non-development, metaphors of death, and reductionist characterizations demonstrate
how the language of pathology can do a disservice to the lived experience of statistical
abnormality and the caretakers associated with it. In focusing on caretakers coordinating
care while struggling to conceive of and shape the future, we see how the experience of
those responsible for adults with autism generalizes out to other conditions in which
individuals continue to survive albeit atypical and dependent. One such example that
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immediately jumps to mind is mental illness, a category of statistical abnormality that
has been the target of heated classificatory battles over the course of the 20th century.
Like Autism, severe mental illness has been the target of both pathological language and
utopian ideas of how various techniques offer a cure or magic bullet. While severe mental
illness does create considerable challenges, to speak about those with the diagnosis as if
they were not going to survive or wouldn’t require life long support and care is to do a
disservice to them and their caretakers (Grob 1994). While medication, for example, can
be of great help, it requires sustained intake, and thus is a long-term management
technique as opposed to a cure (Shorter 1997; Johnson 1990; Estroff 1985). Viewing
mental illness differently than this is to perform the same type of subtle transformation
from statistical abnormality to pathological abnormality that are demonstrated by the
experiences of caretakers of adults with autism.
Applications of the pathological model of abnormality mischaracterize a variety
of conditions that share at least some of the qualities of what it is like to care for an adult
with autism. The anti-psychiatry movement had a profound influence on how Americans
think about and respond to mental illness. Writers like Szasz, Scheff, and Goffman all
questioned—explicitly or implicitly—whether the medical model of mental illness held
water (Szasz 1961; Scheff 1966; Goffman 1961). Of course, the rhetoric they used was
sometimes as extreme as that used by the psychiatrists they sought to challenge—going
as far as to call mental illness a myth, undermining the experience of those who care for
and work with the mentally ill (Johnson 1990). What these authors did was to seemingly
question the biological bases of all mental illness, including the more extreme forms.

	
  
This was a mistake: interacting with individuals with severe autism (or

196	
  

schizophrenia, or severe intellectual disability, or manic depression) precludes one from
thinking that there isn’t a strong biological basis to these conditions (whether or not we
understand that biology). Indeed, when Goffman was personally touched by mental
illness—his first wife was mentally ill, and committed suicide—he described feeling bad
about seeming to portray mental illness as solely based in the relations of an institution
(though, and this is often ignored, Goffman does differentiate in Asylums (1961) between
“organics” and others, though talking little about the former).65 The dichotomy between
pathological abnormality and statistical abnormality is a more nuanced way of
distinguishing between the costs of applying the “medical model” to the realities of what
caretakers of conditions like autism experience than to say that those diagnosed represent
merely individuals that have “problems with living” (Szasz 1961). Though autism is not
defined as a mental illness (it is defined as a developmental disability), the management
required for many individuals with mental illness shares some similarities with caring for
those with autism (preoccupation with the future topping the list). The disservice done by
the anti-psychiatry movement has not been rectified as the struggles faced by individuals
caring for the significantly atypical continue to be written about (Earley 2006; Davenport
2010; Jamison 1995). For as we have seen, though the language of pathology does a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
65
“In Asylums Goffman usually places ‘mental illness’ in quotes [. . .] but once his wife
committed suicide, he drops the quotation marks and refers to a possible organic roots of
mental illness. David Mechanic, with whom I corresponded, wrote that after his wife’s
suicide, Erving told somebody that had he written it again, his book would be different”
(See Dmitri Shalin interview with Samuel Heilman,
http://cdclv.unlv.edu//archives/interactionism/goffman/heilman_08.html).
	
  

	
  
disservice to the reality of autism (and mental illness), so to does the idea that like
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classic pathological conditions autism (and, once again, mental illness) can be easily
treated and cured. Instead, a large part of the work is better described as management in
the context of social networks, and it is these social networks—caretakers working
together—that determine whether and to what degree care and support will be provided.
Interestingly, it is in describing what has been relayed above as long-term
management and care that we see how the case of autism generalizes beyond
immediately clear forms of statistical abnormality. In her book on illness metaphors,
Sontag (2001) complains about the ways that metaphors of illness frame those with
sickness as if they were, for example, fundamentally sad or already dead. What is
important to note is that the conditions that Sontag chose to look at have long periods in
which the individual can be expected to continuing living (and even thriving). Heart
Disease, Cancer, AIDS: all of these, as opposed to conditions that spread and kill quickly
(the classic examples of the pathological model), are illnesses that manifest in more
complex ways; moreover, for those who contract them, the advent of new interventions,
has led to increased life expectancies to the point that pathological abnormality starts to
look more and more chronic or even statistical in nature. The fusing of modern medicine,
science, and technology has created changes in other conditions as well—while
childhood diabetes used to kill individuals quickly, the introduction of insulin drastically
changed the condition (Feudtner 2003). Other conditions include severe abnormalities, or
babies born with conditions that we would not have been able to deal with before.
Besides the ethical issues and complications that arise (Bosk 1992), these examples blur

	
  
the boundary between statistical and pathological abnormality. We also have more
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clearly statistical forms of abnormality like cerebral palsy. In one example, a mother of
an individual with CP states: “my child has cerebral palsy, and there are not enough
programs out there. People always look at the children but never the adults. We could
save so many more people with all sorts of problems, but when families can no longer
care for them, where do they go? What kind of life do they have? I do not want to think
of the day when I can no longer care for my child. We must learn to see the whole picture
for all these people” (Fallon 2009). This mother notes the issues faced by those who
continue to live and develop in the context of atypicality and dependency. Seeing the
whole picture requires looking at the way our language obscures the reality of what such
a life looks like. It also requires acknowledging—personally, morally, politically—that
conceptualizing the future is not just an academic exercise, but a deeply personal reality
for those who care for and are responsible for the atypical and the dependent.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
The reality that autism is neither a deadly condition nor one for which we have a
generally effective cure means that descriptions of it that employ the language, concepts,
and assumptions of modern medicine discourage recognition and discussion of the needs
and experiences of the many adults with autism and caretakers for whom talk of cause
and cure is very much besides the point. Over the course of the 20th century, medical
historians, anthropologists, and sociologists began to highlight two generally different
ways through which disease entities have been conceptualized.66 The first
conceptualization, the physiological, views disease as something to be primarily
understood through its expression in the individual, with the cause, symptoms, course,
and outcome of a specific condition predominantly determined by individual idiosyncrasy
in the context of a particular environment (Aronowitz 1998; Temkin 1977; Rosenberg
2007b). The birth of modern scientific medicine in the late 19th century further energized
(though did not create, as both were around since antiquity) the other, increasingly
popular conceptualization of disease, the ontological. This orientation views diseases as
entities that are autonomous, exist “in some platonic sense outside their manifestation in
the individual,” and “unfold in characteristic ways in the typical person” (Aronowitz
1998:8; Temkin 1977). The popularity of the ontological view was helped by the germ
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
66
Though this dissertation has expended a considerable amount of space problematizing
descriptions of autism that try to pigeonhole it into the worldview of modern medicine,
the reality that so many people—including some in this study—sometimes speak about
their experience using the assumptions and terms of that worldview drives this
conclusion’s engagement with its concepts and language.
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several major infectious conditions (e.g. smallpox, tuberculosis). That we have been able
to discover a relatively standard cause and cure for these conditions has provided a
persuasive argument that, no matter the quirks of the individual patient and their social
location, the nature of disease and our response to it can, at least in theory, rely on the
assumption that clear and significant autonomous characteristics are an actionable reality
(Christakis 1997; Christakis 1999). The increasing routinization and bureaucracy that
surround modern medicine have both relied on and further reinforced the ontological
view, or the idea of a perfect correspondence between “pathological mechanisms,
diagnostic categories, and disease-specific treatments” (Silverman 2012: 13). Indeed, the
assumption that disease entities have standard properties is67 one upon which insurance
billing, laboratory science, medical and pharmaceutical research, and evidenced based
practice all rely (Daly 2005; Horwitz 2002; Starr 1982; Timmermans and Berg 2003).
And yet, there have been many studies that have shown that even with conditions
that fit most easily with the assumptions of the ontological view—those diagnoses that
have a clear etiology, pathology, and treatment—if we look closely enough, contextual
and sociological reality has a tendency to undermine the neat assumptions of ontology
(Aronowitz 1998; Bowker and Star 2000; Rosenberg 2007a). Speaking about a historical
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
67
The distinction between ontological and physiological can be related to other scholastic
distinctions like rational vs. empirical, or conventional vs. natural. In the sociology and
anthropology of medicine, a very influential formulation has been that between illness—
“the innately human experience of symptoms of suffering”—and disease—“what the
practitioner creates in the recasting of illness in terms of disorder” (Klienman 1988:3; c.f.
Aronowitz 1998; Mol 2002). The distinction is made between individual experience and
the knowledge developed by biomedicine.

	
  
incident featuring a condition that easily fits the ontological view of disease,
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Rosenberg (2007a) states, “even frightening epidemics, such as the yellow fever that
visited Philadelphia in 1793, could be construed as the consequence of a peculiarly
tainted microenvironment [. . .] coupled with idiosyncrasy, which explained why some
succumbed, some recovered, and others never fell ill” (3). For conditions like autism—a
diagnosis that we conceptualize with the language of ontology68, but which has no clear
treatment, is (in most cases) not infectious69, has a complex and only partially understood
etiology, and is associated with a relatively typical life expectancy—individual variation
presents such a stubborn barrier to finding a standard cause and cure, that our desire to do
so has led to popular discussions around autism that are at best confused and at worst
dishonest.
Of course, there are benefits that derive from associating autism with the
language, concepts, and, most importantly, the optimism of modern medicine. These
include attention from powerful actors, momentum for advocates to draw in resources,
justifications for insurance coverage and educational services, and the platform and
marketing for funding scientific and clinical research which, if it doesn’t find a cause and
cure, does provide a better understanding of the biology behind autism (Bouder,
Spielman and Mandell 2009; Eyal 2013; Grinker 2007; King and Bearman 2011; Singh et

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
68
For example, one of the reasons DSM-5 got rid of Autism subtypes, to be replaced with
a severity scale, was that “the science” of autism diagnosis “failed” to support the validity
of subtypes (i.e. Autistic Disoder vs. PDD-NOS vs. Aspergers) (Personal
Communication, David S. Mandell).
69
This qualification only because some cases of autism might be linked to an infectious
illness in the mother (e.g. rubella) (Libbey et al. 2005).	
  	
  

	
  
al. 2009).70 However, the language and concepts of modern medicine have also
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encouraged many stakeholders to speak about autism as if it is a condition that only
children have, that it somehow stops development, that it is a threat to life, that it can or
will soon be miraculously cured, or that individuals like those in my study won’t need
intensive support throughout their lives (see previous chapter; Greenfeld 2009b). Such
conceptualizations have the potential to do a disservice to adults with the condition and
their caretakers for whom terms like care, management, and support, are much more
relevant to lived experience than etiology, pathology, and treatment.
Though the assumptions and goals of ontologically-focused modern medicine are
the foundation upon which much of the language we use to speak about autism is built,
the life-long atypicality and dependency that are a significant attribute of the lives of
many with the diagnosis suggest the importance of attending to the social-contextual
factors that the physiological view values. In their review of the sociological factors that
contribute to the “autism epidemic,” Eyal et al. (2010) provide a compelling description
of how the ontological view of autism is out of sync with the physiological reality of
those with the condition, particularly as they and their families age:
With a great deal of resources and effort now dedicated to early diagnosis
and early intervention in autism, those with other diagnoses (specifically
mental retardation), those who are deemed too impaired, and also those
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
70
According to King and Bearman (2011): “Autism was the first specific disorder to have
a Senate hearing focused exclusively on it [. . .] Between 1997 and 2006, funding for
autism research by the National Institutes of Health increased five-fold from $22 million
to $108 million [. . .] The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s funding of autism
activities increased from $2.1 million in 2000 to about $16.7 million in 2005 [. . .] And an
additional $1 billion was committed to autism with the signing of the Combating Autism
Act in 2006. The increase in resources devoted to autism research and treatment has far
outpaced increasing prevalence rates” (325).
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who are too old, are marginalized [. . .] And since nobody is in the
position to assume the mantle of medical diagnosis of social destiny, the
fateful decision as to this allocation of categories, resources, and destinies
is preempted by arbitrary forces such as the differential clout of parents,
place of residence, social proximity to other affected families, differential
access to services, and more. Moreover, even if we had in place an
objective and rational assignment and allocation, what would happen to
these very same children when they grow up into adolescents and adults
with autism, in likelihood not “cured” or sufficiently improved to lead
fully independent lives? Prevention, early intervention and improvement
of diagnosis would no longer be relevant to them. As many parents can
testify, there is a stark discontinuity in the lives of their children as they
grow up. Sometime around early adolescence, the intensive therapeutic
regime they underwent as toddlers and youngsters is gradually whittled
down, replaced by very little that is targeted, and they and their parents are
left to their own devices (Eyal et al. 2010: 262).

One of the hot topics of autism has been around “intensive therapeutic regimes,” which,
in an interesting melding of medical and educational standardization, have been described
as treatments and “gold standard” interventions. 71 Though such programs can have a
profound influence on those with autism, once individuals have aged out of the education
system they are no longer qualified for these services and their families are “left to their
own devices.” The experience of adults with autism and those who care for them not only
becomes increasingly ‘physiological’ in nature, but also falls largely outside the rhetoric
of modern medicine with its focus on discovering therapies that bring about fundamental
change (Eyal et al. 2010: 29; Gadamer 1996). This dissertation has focused on families
and other caretakers dealing with the complex, physiological, lived experience of
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
71
In a striking case of what we might describe as the medicalization of education, applied
behavior analysis—which is arguably a form of education, as much as it is a form of
therapy—gets called a “treatment.” I thank Jason Schnittker who once asked in a
sociology colloquium (whose speaker was David S. Mandell) why ABA, an education
program in schools, was often described as a “treatment.” It is an example of how
medical language spreads, and possibly encourages confusion about the potential and
reality of medical and educational techniques.
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sample, the questions, concerns, and reflections that animate their experience is shared by
many others who are connected to adults with the condition. Moreover, their
interpretations and responses to atypicality and dependency provide insights into other
forms of “abnormality” associated with experiences and challenges not easily addressed
with the language of biomedicine. These include those with disabilities, those of old age,
and others with a variety of conditions that have come to make up a larger part of the
mortality and morbidity load of the American population (Rosenberg 2009).
Though much of the mystique of modern medicine has been built around the
profound innovations surrounding our understanding and treatment of infectious disease,
the changes in mortality and morbidity that are associated with the second half of the 20th
century in the U.S. means that the larger themes of this dissertation have become ever
more important and applicable. Up until the mid-20th century, the major shaper of
morbidity and mortality in many human populations was infectious disease (McNeil
1977). In what, since Omran’s (1971) article, has popularly come to be called the
“epidemiological transition”, mortality and morbidity, at least in wealthy countries like
the U.S., has increasingly been shaped by chronic illnesses like cancer and heart disease.
A recent article entitled “what do people in the U.S. die from,” argued that tobacco, poor
diet and physical inactivity, and alcohol consumption were the leading causes of death in
the year 2000 (Mokdad et al. 2004). The authors contend that, though the transition is
uneven and complex, the suggestion still remains that “these findings, along with
escalating healthcare costs” and “an aging population” argue for a reorientation of U.S.
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health care and public health systems (Mokdad et al. 2004: 1238; McKeown 2009) It
also suggests that the job of medicine—to perform miraculous, multiplying saves—will
become increasingly expensive and difficult to achieve, and will need to be supplemented
with the often less miraculous job of management, care, support, and behavioral health.
Obviously, autism is very different than cancer, but the themes of this dissertation
resonate with and have relevance for the increasing number of chronic and life-long
conditions that fall under the clinical view and yet evade easy answers. Most obviously,
these include other forms of developmental and physical disability, and significant mental
illness: down's syndrome, cerebral palsy, fragile X, schizophrenia, manic-depression (on
the ideology of “recovery” in mental health policy, see Grob and Goldman 2000; Braslow
2013). It also includes conditions that, though they might threaten life, allow a person to
live for a long enough period of time while ill that their atypicality and dependency
arguably qualify, to a point, as statistical abnormality: quadriplegia, multiple sclerosis,
Parkinson’s disease, Alzeheimer’s. It also includes a number of conditions that Feudtner
(2003: 17) describes as “transmuted disease,” or disease entities that, because of modern
medical techniques, are transformed from acute to chronic conditions, not cured but
managed for extended periods of time: AIDS, Cancer, Type 1 Diabetes, Heart
Conditions. It also includes the care and dependency that come to define us all as we
move into old age (a designation that will describe an increasing proportion of the U.S.
population in the coming decades) (Hochschild 1978; Gubrium 1997; Levitsky 2014). An
exploration of the complex interpretations, responses, and reflections of families and
other caretakers of adults with autism provides a picture of one kind of atypicality and
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others kinds listed above. In what follows I cite some sources whose reflections
demonstrate how the themes of each chapter resonate with those associated with other
forms of atypicality and/or dependency.
The conflict and negotiation that animated caretaker applications of popular
frames of deviance to complex situations of deviance (i.e. the maladaptive behavior of
adults with autism) are similar to the dynamics that characterize applications of these
frames to other forms of deviant behavior. Chapter three used the case of maladaptive
behaviors in adults with autism to explore how caretakers interpret and respond to
deviant behavior—actions that undermine role performance and the functioning of social
systems. Drawing on concepts from the sociology of deviance, medicalization, social
problems, and Goffmanian structuralism, the chapter shows how caretakers do use
historical, widely accessible definitions or frames of deviance to understand and socially
control maladaptive behavior. However, the conflict, negotiation, and residual ambiguity
left over from these applications demonstrates that in understanding abnormality we are
always faced with the uncomfortable relationship between neat frames and the messy
situations of everyday life. It doesn’t take much searching to find these same three
meaning-structures being applied to various forms of deviance (some associated with
other medicalized conditions, e.g. mental illness) in ways that show caretakers struggling
to fit the coherence of these frames with the ambiguity of lived reality. The three cases
below recount, respectively, a conversation between a brother of an adult with autism and
a mental health staff worker; the thoughts of a father of a boy with manic-depressive
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disorder on a woman who is charging his son for breaking and entering into a private
residence; and the response of parents to a non-disabled, adult offspring behaving in a
troubling manner:
During the morning coffee break, Sumner had attacked another employee
at the workshop, someone who was physically disabled. He had forced the
weaker person to the ground and began banging his victim’s head on the
floor. When the staff separated them, Sumner had nervously repeated,
‘I’m being good, I’m being good,’ in his throaty monotone. The curious
staff person asked me what he meant. She thought that in his disturbed
way, Sumner must have a confused notion of right and wrong, and perhaps
some delusion or perversion of the mind compelled him to believe he
should molest a weaker person. ‘The answer is probably a lot simpler than
that,’ I replied. ‘When did he say, ‘I’m being good?’ She explained that he
began chanting the phrase after he had been separated from his victim. I
recalled similar events I had seen as a child when Sumner would cower if
he heard that my father might beat him after similar outbursts, times I had
seen my older brother tremble and heard him say, ‘I’m being good,’ in an
attempt to say, ‘I’m sorry, it’s over, I won’t do it again, don’t hit me!’
‘You have to remember,’ I explained, ‘Sumner’s problem isn’t mental
illness or delusions. It’s a communication problem. He doesn’t have the
ability to explain his behavior, or even to offer an apology. He can’t
express himself through new phrases; he can only repeat a few echolalic
statements he has learned in the past.’ ‘You mean he didn’t mean it’s good
to beat other people?’ she asked, still confused. ‘No, I’m sure he meant
that stopping was ‘being good.’ I reassured her. We talked a little while
longer, and I took the opportunity to explain what ‘communication
disorder,’ meant and why we had to remember that Sumner’s feelings and
thought patterns were not as abnormal as they appeared. It was simply his
inability to express himself that separated him from other people, creating
these periods of frustration that erupted into inappropriate behavior and
echolalia (Hart 1989: 153-154).
A tall, thin uniformed officer was waiting outside when I pulled up to the
center. Police Officer Vern Albert said Mike had gotten up early at his
mother’s house and had walked to a nearby Starbucks coffee shop. He’d
removed a glass water bottle from a shelf there, hoisted it up into the air,
and announced to the store’s customers that it wouldn’t break if he
dropped it because he had supernatural powers. He had let the bottle fall,
and it had shattered at his feet [. . .] From Starbucks, he’d run into a
residential area, entered the backyard of a house, climbed onto its wooden
deck, and hurled a patio chair through the plate-glass door, setting off the
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alarm. Ignoring the piercing sound, Mike had ducked inside the house,
switched on a stereo CD player to drown out the racket, and begun
rummaging through the kitchen cabinets. He’d then made his way upstairs,
where he’d gone from bathroom to bathroom, turning on the taps. After
checking the bedrooms and discovering no one was around, Mike had
stripped and taken a bubble bath [. . .] The officers burst in after releasing
the dog. Mike had finished his bath and had dressed. He was stepping into
a bedroom when the animal sprang. As trained, the dog locked its teeth
into Mike’s upper arm. Even though the dog was biting him, Mike hadn’t
surrendered. He’d wrestled with the officers, and it had taken five of them
to finally handcuff him [. . .] A few minutes later, Kersey reappeared and
explained that the husband didn’t care if Mike pleaded guilty to two
misdemeanors or to a single felony. “But his wife wants him punished.
She’s saying he did sixty thousand dollars’ worth of damage to their
house.” “Sixty Thousand!” I exclaimed. That was more than twice what
she’d originally said. “That’s ridiculous!” Kersey said she was afraid Mike
might come back. “What she really wants is for him to be put in prison,
but that’s just not going to happen.” “I was in their house,” I said. “I saw
the damage. She’s making this much worse than it is!” Kersey shrugged.
“She is the victim.” I didn’t feel that way. As far as I was concerned, Mike
was the victim. He’d not asked to become mentally ill. He’d thought he
was dreaming when he broke into their house [. . .] As we left the
courtroom, I thought about the victims, especially the wife. Before this
moment, I had honestly come to despise her. As a reporter, I had been
trained to put myself into someone else’s shoes. And if my son had not
been the one who had broken into their house, I’m certain I could have
easily slipped into that role. But I hadn’t been able to do that. Now that
Mike’s case was over, I tried. I wondered how I would have felt if I had
come home and discovered a madman had thrown a lawn chair through
my plate-glass patio door. How would I have reacted if I’d suspected that
he had urinated on my carpet and had taken a bubble bath in my teenage
daughter’s tub? If it had been my life that had been intruded on, if I had
been so distraught that I had felt compelled to put my house on the market,
would I have demanded a pound of flesh, as they had done? Or would I
have understood that mental illness was a chemical brain malfunction?
Would I have shown mercy? Because it was Mike who was psychotic, the
answer had seemed obvious. But sadly, when I stripped away his face and
replaced it with the hollow look of a deranged stranger, I was forced to
admit that I might have reacted much as they had. I felt conflicted (Earley
2006:20-22, 127, 215-216).
In another procedure students were asked to spend from fifteen minutes to
an hour in their homes imagining that they were boarders and acting out
this assumption. They were instructed to conduct themselves in a
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circumspect and polite fashion. They were to avoid getting personal, to
use formal address, to speak only when spoken to [. . .] In the remaining
four-fifths of the cases family members were stupefied. They vigorously
sought to make the strange actions intelligible and to restore the situation
to normal appearances [. . .] Many accounts reported versions of the
following confrontation. A father followed his son into their bedroom.
“Your mother is right. You don’t look well and you’re not talking sense.
You had better get another job that doesn’t require such late hours.” To
this the student replied that he appreciated the consideration, but that he
felt fine and only wanted a little privacy. The father responded in a high
rage, “I don’t want any more of that out of you and if you can’t treat your
mother decently you’d better move out!” (Garfinkel 1967:47, 48).

All of the above cases represent caretakers of individuals behaving in an atypical or
deviant fashion (the first two because of neurological conditions) drawing on and
negotiating with others the application of the frames explored in chapter three in the
context of the ambiguity of lived reality. In the first, the brother of an aging adult male
with autism tries to negotiate with a mental health staff person the handicap frame of
deviance, though she is at first convinced that the misbehavior frame is best suited to the
situation. The brother explains that Sumner’s aggression stems from a communication
issue, and pleads for a response that is about support, social prosthesis, and not
punishment for seeming to want to hurt people. The second case is in connection with
atypical behavior linked to a diagnosis of manic depression, in which an individual broke
into and entered the home of a stranger. The father believes his son to be the victim of
forces that were beyond his control (a neurological condition based on brain science), but
must face some of the reality (and merits) behind the reaction of those whose home was
broken into and who view his son as bad and deserving of punishment. 72 The final case
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Recent research by Jason Schnittker shows how the change to a genetic conception of
mental illness has not decreased the stigma associated with those conditions that are

	
  
demonstrates an example of atypical behavior not stemming from neurological
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difference, but rather a predetermined “breaching experiment” to see how caretakers and
loved ones might react to deviance in the home. A father is faced with a son behaving
differently, and finds himself struggling to apply different frames of deviance (i.e. “you
don’t look well,” “you can’t treat your mother decently”) and the social control strategies
with which they are associated (i.e. “get another job that doesn’t require such late hours,”
“you’d better move out!”). All three cases demonstrate how the framing of deviance is
conducted through the use of readily available frames that people use to understand and
respond to deviant behavior. However, the use of these frames is always complicated by
the ambiguity of situations, and contested by the perceptions and positions of other
stakeholders in the setting.
Despite the characterizations of sorrow and tragedy that often attend popular
representations of disability and chronic illness, the experiences of those who have or
care for those with incurable medical conditions are anything but monochromatic. In her
study of “chronic sorrow,” Roos explains that the reality of loving and being responsible
for someone who can be characterized as a “living loss” brings with it experiences and
struggles that are quite different than the grief associated with death (so often the worst
prognosis of those classic conditions that most easily fit the ontological model of
disease). Though Roos’s insights clearly fit some of the findings of my own study, the
families and other caretakers with whom I spent time demonstrated that there were also
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
popularly linked with violent behavior, even though we might expect that the science
behind the illness would encourage people to see such violence as out of people’s control
(Schnittker 2008).
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more positive experiences associated with caring for someone who remains atypical
and dependent. Chapter four explored how humor and innocence are two aspects of the
experience of caretaking for an individual with autism that likely apply to the experiences
of others with or caring for people with conditions associated with continued atypicality
and dependency. The two cases below recount the experience of a mother of two males
with autism, and a woman with Multiple Sclerosis:
If I were a firm believer, would their imperviousness to religion worry
me? I don’t think so. Autists present a fascinating challenge to the
theologically inclined. Their absence of altruism, their underdeveloped
moral sense, is balanced by an absence of malice, an almost prelapsarian
innocence. George once said to baby Jake, who was crying, “Jake, TinkyWinky created you for good, but you’ve turned out evil.” This sounds
profound, but it is in fact an adaption of a line from Wallace and Gromit.
George does not truly understand the meaning of good and evil, nor is he
(as yet) capable of implementing either. Most of the Ten Commandments
are easy for the boys to keep. The Seven Deadly Sins are largely an
irrelevance. The boys might covet their neighbor’s ox—or their neighbor’s
ice pop—but the desire would be purely for the ox or ice lolly itself,
unaccompanied by any desire to get one over on the neighbor. Any
temptations they feel arise from their overriding private preoccupations,
not from the kinds of torments that neurotypical flesh is heir to. I met a
very intelligent Asperger’s boy in his late teens, who was a fanatical Lib
Dem (if that’s not a contradiction in terms) and followed the workings of
Parliament with close attention. At the time, a number of sexual scandals
among politicians of the Chelsea-strip variety were coming to light. This
boy, who wanted to become a politician himself, had the answer: “I know
how to avoid a sexual scandal!” he announced. “If somebody said they
wanted to suck my toes, I’d just say, ‘No, thank you’” (258) [. . .] Perhaps
this life would be hellish if I riled against it. Hell—my definition,
anyway—is a place where you don’t want to be, and from which you can’t
get out. When you have autistic children, there is no respite, either for
them or for you [. . .] But I’ve long since settled into a fairly calm
acceptance. They are what they are. That’s all there is to it. Our family life
has its own rhythms, its own compensations. Every day, the boys make me
feel bored and irritated; equally, every day they provide me with delight,
amusement, and joy. The sight of them at supper last night, for instance.
They all sat down at the table together: good. Time was when that would
have been an impossibility. But still I can’t serve them with the same
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meal. Last night, Jake had pizza, carrots, sugar snap peas, grapes, a plum,
and a mug of milk. Sam had a bowl of Day-Glo-colored cereal called
Rainbow Drops, most of which lived up to their name and dropped to the
floor. George has the carcass of Sunday’s roast duck. He hauled this out of
the pantry himself, and tore at it with his teeth, like Obelix devouring a
wild boar. The duck was still on its serving dish. George chomped on the
skin and licked up the fat. To many, this would not have been a pretty
sight, but I found it funny. Of course, on one level I wish that George and
Sam would eat the carrots and the sugar snaps, but I can’t worry about that
all the time. What makes me smile is the way that every single thing they
do is so utterly characteristic. Never imagine that a child who doesn’t talk
or play much lacks character. “Autism” is an umbrella term; the condition
in no way reduces individuality. The boys express their characters in their
every tiny action, and individuality is something I’m inclined to celebrate.
When George finished slavering over his dead duck, he said to me,
“Thanks, mademoiselle” (273-274).
“Oh, shit,” I yell as, catching my toe on the front edge of the elevator, I
pitch toward the concrete floor of the garage in my new apartment
building. “Do you realize,” George [her husband] will ask me later, “that
you might have died in that fall, and then your very last words would have
been, ‘Oh, shit’?” “Ignominious,” I’ll giggle [. . .] Despite its inauspicious
opening, I like this new life. I find the city, sprawled under its gaseous
haze, beautiful. I have come to a point in my life where I can find almost
anything beautiful. My aesthetic sense, instead of growing more refined
and discriminating, has become catholic and egalitarian. Perhaps this
effect arises from my increasing immobility. I can’t dash through my
sorroundings. I can scarcely drag my feet along, and even in the
wheelchair I’ve been relying on increasingly over the past six years I can’t
go faster than three miles an hour. Much of the time I don’t move at all.
Stilled, I gaze and gaze. And, looked at deliberately for long moments, the
world always yields up some delight. Really [. . .] I sense that [in the past]
I was really scrambling out from under the projections of others. I wanted
to find the space in which I could become my own creature. Here it is, at
last. “And I shall be well,” wrote the medieval anchoress Dame Julian of
Norwich, another woman alone, “and all manner of thing shall be well.” I
begin to feel some of her confidence: not that only good things happen—
that’s not what she’s saying—but that all that happens can be accepted,
incorporated, celebrated (Mairs 1995: 265, 266, 267).

In speaking about autism, Moore gives us compelling descriptions of the humor and
innocence that are central to her experience of the atypicality of her sons. Appreciating
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that these lighter characteristics are an important part of the texture of her experience
and relationship with atypciality is important, even if not easily contained in the language
and concepts often used by the medical model. While Mrs. Mairs, a woman with MS who
wrote about her experience, does not have a developmental disorder, her experience with
the complexity of another form of disability demonstrate that similar characteristics
animate her experience of atypicality and dependency. Pain and grief are part of her
story, but so too are humor, innocence, wisdom, and joy. In writing “all that happens can
be accepted, incorporated, celebrated,” words are placed to a form of idealism (quite
different than the utopianism of modern medicine) to which many caretakers in my study
aspired.
While the power of modern medicine to define difference can be seen in the
application of the clinical view to a wide variety of problems in social life, the reality that
this view is applied to both pathological and statistical forms of abnormality (and a
variety of cases that fall somewhere in between) means that the assumptions of the
pathological model that misrepresent the reality of autism may also misrepresent the
reality of other forms of atypicality and dependency. While the assumptions and methods
of modern medicine are best suited for those conditions that easily qualify for the
pathological model of abnormality, the reality is that our success at dealing with
pathology has left us applying the pathological model to conditions that are in reality
more statistical in nature. Popular representations of autism speak about the condition as
if it were somehow degenerative and deadly, even though the experience of families
caring for adults with the condition demonstrate that those with autism continue to live,
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autism”—as if it were a deadly disease—is pushed in order to energize medicine and
science to provide answers for atypicality and dependency with the same degree of
success that it has attained with major pathological conditions (Eyal et al. 2010).
However, the experience of families with adults with autism whose challenges get
marginalized, misrepresented, or unrepresented show how pathological language might
do more harm than good. Similarly, the medicalization of other forms of statistical
abnormality suggest that we might somehow cure developmental disabilities, and mental
and chronic illnesses, as opposed to the reality which is better described as a mix of
management, support, and care. Though the search for cause and cure for these
conditions is supported by many, it can discourage speaking about those parts of the
experience that diverge from the language of pathology: specifically, the reality of
continued existence in the future, albeit in the context of significant needs and social
dependencies. The three quotes below represent the contours of this experience: the first
are the thoughts of a mother of an adult with autism; the second is Susan Roos on a
variety of conditions she associated with chronic sorrow; and the third is from a study
discussing the ways in which research on Alzheimer’s has focused on curing those with
the condition as opposed to funding the care that they often require:
My son was diagnosed in the mid-70s with infantile autism when he was 5
years old. Today at age 40, he lives at home with me and his father. We
were told by the experts when he was very young what we could expect
for his future and that he would most likely end up working in a sheltered
workshop as an adult. They were pretty much right on with most of their
predictions. After graduating from high school, he went to work in a
sheltered workshop. After 5 years, he wasn’t happy and wanted a "real'
job. With a lot of help and encouragement, he was able to leave the
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workshop and get a real job. He is currently in his 11th year working part
time as a courtesy at a local grocery store. We could not be more proud of
him. For a long time he has wanted nothing more than to live
independently from us. So far, this has been his greatest challenge. With
severe shortages of state funds for supported living housing, it is not
possible for him. He has been on our state’s waiting list for services for
more than 15 years, but because he has parents who are still physically
able to care for him, he is not eligible to receive services. This is unfair
and unfortunate, both for him and us as aging parents. All of the attention
and money is spent on educating children, but once they reach adulthood,
they are pretty much forgotten as far as support and services (“Jackie’s
Story,” Parent Letter to Autism Society).
The media constantly remind us of the great strides that are being made in
finding cures for cancer and that researchers are on the brink of knowing
how to restore motor abilities in spinal cord injuries, multiple sclerosis,
Parkinson’s, and muscular dystrophy. Neural implants of the future will
apparently overcome the debilitating effects of many conditions [. . .] The
cultural belief that money, enthusiasm, and work can find cures, prevent
devastating diseases, and restore physical and mental losses is maintained
and strengthened by media reports. The myth that we can forestall death,
find answers, and “fix” things that are less than the desired standard is
entrenched in the culture. This myth is the driving force for great medical
advances and social activism. [. . .] As some individuals appear to be
reaping the benefits of new discoveries and innovations in treatment,
others may perceive themselves as the “unlucky” ones who are left out of
the loop. They may experience their marginality in the dominant culture,
and they may also feel marginal (or not included at all) in the hierarchy of
research and treatment related to disabilities and losses. The belief in
eventual remedies may contribute to the fantasy that life can be
imminently perfect and that what was originally meant to be may yet
occur. Belief in the potential of restoring what has been lost may increase
the disparity between the fantasy and current reality [. . .] Several
projections indicate that approximately one in four Americans will be over
the age sixty by the year 2030 [. . .] This number will inevitably include
more persons with severe and profound disabilities than every before, and
health care systems will be strained to cope with this dramatic increase [. .
.] Quality of life issues are likely to increase significantly. Professionals
working with geriatric populations will need specialized training in an
entirely new field, that of aging persons with autism, mental retardation,
and other lifelong developmental disabilities. The need for expertise in
living wills, “right to die” issues, organ transplants, legalities involved in
signing over one’s property or life savings in return for lifetime care (for
self or other), guardianship, conservatorship, and so on, is strongly
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indicated [. . .] Professionals may find themselves significantly stressed by
having to assume roles historically and traditionally assumed by family
(Roos 2002: 237, 238, 239).
This paper builds on our prior work concerning the emergence of
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) as a major social and health concern. Our study
was conducted in two phases (1985-1987 and 2009-2011). We examined
the historical evolution of the concept of AD and the emergence of the AD
social movement in the U.S. [. . .] The characterization of AD as a leading
cause of death among the elderly was crucial to sustaining the movement,
but also operated as a “double edged sword.” By construing “senility” as a
treatable, even curable biomedical entity, the movement substantively
contributed to the notion of an impending “crisis” of the aging population
to be avoided at all costs, compounding the effect of conservative federal
policies that emphasized the treatment or cure of AD, and less so the longterm care service needs of sufferers and caregivers that had given rise to
the movement [. . .] the continuing hegemony of the medical model
establishes a race against the demographic clock, pitting advances in
biomedical research against the needs of an aging population (Chaufan et
al. 2012: 788).

Jackie explains that, though doctors originally thought her son would end up working in a
sheltered workshop, he, with support of his family and community, has been able to
secure a job in a local grocery store. Now that he has achieved this goal, he desires to
move out of his parent’s home, but the funding situation in his state has made it easy for
him and his family to achieve this outcome. Jackie notes that the focus on the education
of children with autism leaves the needs of adults with the condition relatively
underappreciated. It is notable that the education of children with autism falls into the
category “treatment,” given the way that programs like ABA and other childhood
interventions have been described using the language of medicine. Chaufan et al. (2012)
might argue that autism, like Alzeheimer’s disease, constitutes a case of the “double
edged sword” of modern socio-medical collective movements. Both conditions are
described as a serious threat, to be avoided at all cost, and this encouraged the raising of
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large amounts of money to “cure” the threat while at the same time ignoring the true
needs of many with either of the two conditions and those who care for them. Roos
would likely argue that the attention we have paid to treating (e.g. educating) children
with autism and curing those with Alzheimer’s, while at the same time brushing over the
everyday needs of those with these conditions and their caretakers, constitute a case of
the American belief that “money, enthusiasm, and work can find cures” and “restore
physical and mental losses,” “the myth” that we can “ ‘fix’ things that are less than the
desired standard” (Roos 2002: 238). This trend of progressivism is rooted in American
culture, and while it is linked to some of our greatest achievements it is also responsible
for some of our most important failings. Among them is failing to recognize that humane
management, social supports, and compassionate care are important processes that must
be respected in scenarios were magic bullets and miraculous cures are unavailable.
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